(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. I find that the statute prohibits the recording of a conversation, whether by a third party or participant, unless all persons involved in the conversation have given their permission.
On its face, the statute does not state that a person who is a party to the conversation cannot violate the statute. Rather, if the Legislature had intended that the statute not apply to participants, I think that it would have stated that intention in clear language. As a matter of fact, the very first phrase of the statute indicates that participants to the conversation can violate the statute: ’’Any person who is present * * *” (emphasis added). If the Legislature intended to exclude participants, I think that it would have stated any person not a party to the conversation. Moreover, the statute also states that all participants in the conversation must consent to the overhearing, recording, amplifying, or transmitting of the conversation. To me, this plainly prohibits participants, as well as third parties, from the activities designated in the statute without disclosure to the other persons to the conversation that the conversation is being overheard, recorded, amplified, or transmitted.
Moreover, I think the fact that the Legislature even defined the word "eavesdropping” is signifi*484cant. If the statute did not apply to participants, I think that the Legislature would not have defined the word eavesdropping since the common meaning of the word is to overhear. Therefore, if one violated the statute by overhearing (eavesdropping) a conversation, then any conduct, such as recording, amplifying, or transmitting, resulting from the overhearing would be prohibited. However, the Legislature did define eavesdropping, using the disjunctive "or”, as not only overhearing but also recording, amplifying, or transmitting the conversation. Thus, to violate the statute, one needs only to overhear or record or transmit or amplify. This clearly indicates to me that the Legislature specifically prohibits conduct beyond the ordinary meaning of the word eavesdropping by prohibiting conduct that not only could be accomplished by a third party but also by a participant.
Further, the majority seems to focus on the phrase "private discourse of others”, contained in the definition, as supporting their conclusion that the statute does not apply to participants. By reading the phrase in context, with the definition substituted for the word eavesdrop in the statute, the majority’s interpretation is not supported:
"Any person who is present or who is not present during a private conversation and who wilfully uses any device to [overhear, record, amplify or transmit any part of the private discourse of others without the permission of all persons engaged in the discourse] or who knowingly aids, employs or procures another person to do the same in violation of this section, is guilty of a felony * * MCL 750.539c; MSA 28.807(3), MCL 750. 539a(2); MSA 28.807(1X2).
The phrase "of others” modifies "private dis*485course”, which does not necessarily imply that a potential eavesdropper must be a third party not otherwise involved in the conversation. Moreover, the phrase is followed by the words "without the permission of all persons engaged in the discourse” (emphasis added), indicating that the unilateral recording of a conversation, unbeknownst to the others involved, is not permitted. Thus, reading the statute as a whole, I would find that a participant is prohibited from recording the private discourse of any other person involved in the conversation unless all persons consent.
It is incumbent on the courts to protect conversations from secret recordings because of the sophisticated electronic equipment that private companies and government agencies have at their disposal. The use of these recordings intrudes into every phase of a person’s or a company’s internal affairs and requires strict policing. There is obviously more credence given to a tape recording than a verbal recollection. Further, the recorded conversation is easily edited and the only rebuttal would be another recording. Violations of these restrictive statutes should carry strict and serious penalties so as to discourage future use. I cannot repeat enough for emphasis that there has been a deluge of sophisticated electronic listening equipment within the last two decades that threatens all privacy. Therefore, I conclude that the statute prohibits the recording of a conversation, whether by a third party or a participant, unless all persons involved in the conversation have given their permission. I would reverse.