dissenting.
I cannot agree with the majority opinion that Balderrama is a “driver or other occu*359pant” of his motor vehicle within the meaning of the priorities provision of the no-fault act. As the majority points out, the precise definition of “driver or other occupant,” as used in Minn.Stat. § 65B.47, subd. 4(c) (1980), is one of first impression. We must look to common understanding and legislative intent to derive its meaning here. Minn.Stat. §§ 645.08(1), 645.16 (1980); Standafer v. First National Bank, 236 Minn. 123, 127, 52 N.W.2d 718, 721 (1952).
It is unlikely that anyone would consider a person like Balderrama, who was outside his vehicle filling his tank, to be a “driver or other occupant” as that expression is commonly understood. The legislature’s use of the words “or other occupant” strongly suggests individuals inside the vehicle. Legislative intent should not be determined by reference to the broad policy underpinnings of the no-fault system when the words of the statute itself provide a clear indication of legislative intent. See Minn.Stat. § 645.-16 (1980).
The commissioner’s comment to the priorities provisions of the Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act also suggests that “driver or other occupant” contemplates vehicle occupancy, not merely external vehicle contact. It states: “Pedestrians and other persons not occupying a motor vehicle, but who are not basic reparations insureds, may claim against the security covering any ‘involved’ vehicle.” Unif. Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act § 4, comment, 14 U.L.A. 62 (1972) (emphasis added).
I would hold that Balderrama was not a “driver or other occupant” of an involved vehicle and that he could therefore look “to the security covering any involved motor vehicle” under subdivision 4(c) of the priorities provision of the no-fault act. I would reverse.