dissenting.
I dissent.
As the majority notes, I dissented from *246the June 19, 2000 opinion of this Court1 that held the involved documents were privileged and not subject to discovery. In my opinion, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined the subject documents were discoverable because they were excepted out of the claimed privileges by virtue of the crime/fraud exception under Tex.R.Evid. 503(d)(1).
Now that the majority is again finding the trial court abused its discretion in a follow-up matter, I am compelled to dissent again.
The trial court here clearly did not act “without any reference to guiding rules or principles.”2 Rather, it applied the guiding rules and principles set out in In re Meador, 968 S.W.2d 346, 351-52 (Tex.1998), and its conclusions are reasonable in light of the record. In my opinion, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to disqualify Nitla’s counsel.
Applying the Meador factors, in light of the record before us, the following conclusions can be reasonably drawn:
1. Nitla’s attorneys were told, by a trial judge’s ruling, after a hearing and in camera inspection of the documents, that the material was not privileged; thus, they did not know, nor should they have known, the material was privileged. (Factor one, Meador, 968 S.W.2d at 351.)
2. Bank of America witnessed the trial judge hand the documents to Nitla’s attorney, making it clear the documents were covered by the confidentiality agreement the judge had approved; thus, Bank of America had prompt notice that Nitla’s attorney had received the documents. (Factor two, id. at 352.)
3.The trial judge’s availability during discovery and trial to prevent the use of privileged information, and the evidence that Nitla’s trial strategy would not be based on the privileged documents3 (all copies of which have been returned to Bank of America), support the conclusion that Bank of America has not been significantly prejudiced by the disclosure of the information; thus, the significance of the privileged information has been minimized. (Factor four, id. at 352.)
Further, the extent to which Nitla will suffer prejudice from the disqualification of its counsel is great, as is clear from the fact that the case has been pending more than four years, approximately 50 depositions have been taken, the record contains tens of thousands of pages of pleadings, and the case is nearly ready for trial. (Thus, Meador factor six, id. at 352, also weighs against disqualification.)
The trial court clearly considered “all the facts and circumstances to determine whether the interests of justice require disqualification,” id. at 351, including the
*247six factors listed in Meador:4 The trial court’s conclusions are supported by the record. Because there was no abuse of discretion in this matter, mandamus relief should be denied.
. In re NationsBank, N.A., n/k/a Bank of America, N.A., No. 01-99-00278-CV, 2000 WL 799807 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.], Jun. 19, 2000, orig. proceeding) (not designated for publication).
. "A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts in an unreasonable or arbitrary manner or, stated differently, when it acts without any reference to guiding rules or principles.” In re Meador, 968 S.W.2d 346, 353 (Tex.1998).
.For example, in its order, the trial court specifically noted: "The Court repeated[ly] asked BOA's counsel to identify a single witness that Nitla’s counsel sought to depose whose identity was not otherwise known. To date, the Court has received [no] response to this query.”
. I note that the Texas Supreme Court emphasized the six factors “apply only when a lawyer receives an opponent’s privileged materials outside the normal course of discovery." Meador, 968 S.W.2d at 352. Clearly, Nitla received the subject documents during the normal course of discovery, and as a result of a court order. This is a case of first impression. The supreme court did not envision this type of situation when it set out the “Meador factors.” However, even when those factors are applied here, it is reasonable for the trial court to have concluded that disqualification of counsel is not appropriate.