(dissenting).
1. Sufficiency of the evidence.
*224¶ 28. The majority gives lip service to State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990), but, in my view ignores its teaching that "an appellate court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact unless the evidence, viewed most favorably to the state and the conviction, is so lacking in probative value and force that no trier of fact, acting reasonably, could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id., 153 Wis. 2d at 507, 451 N.W.2d at 757-758. Here, in my view, the trial court gave more weight to what Carroll D. Watkins told the police officer immediately after the shooting than it did to Watkins's testimony. This it was permitted to do. It was also permitted to disregard parts of either Watkins's statement to the police officer or Watkins's testimony, and, rather, decide the case on the evidence as a whole.
¶ 29. In its oral decision finding that Watkins had the requisite intent, the trial court noted that:
• before pulling the trigger, Watkins told his foreman that the foreman had better come to the room before Watkins killed the victim;
• Watkins took his gun out of a briefcase, pulled the slide back, and loaded a bullet in the chamber;
• with the freshly loaded gun in his hand, Watkins "mov[ed] toward the victim."
¶ 30. Although not specifically mentioned by the trial court in its oral decision, the following from the officer's report of what defendant told him, and from defendant's trial testimony, supports the trial court's verdict:
Watkins, who had been abused by the victim earlier, "became very very upset" after the vic*225tim had let him go and the victim "stomped off and went back to his bed."
• The victim was on his own bed and was not then threatening Watkins when Watkins got and loaded his gun, and pointed it at the victim.
• The victim was still on his own bed when Watkins, pointing the freshly loaded gun at him, told their foreman that he, Watkins, needed the foreman "right away or I'm going to kill him."
• After telling the foreman that he might "kill" the victim, Watkins "kept the gun pointed out with a full extension of his right arm," warning the victim: "Don't move."
• The victim, however, did move, and "got up off of the bed [and] walked slowly towards" Watkins.
• When the victim "got a couple of feet away from" Watkins, the victim "grabbed for Watkins' gun arm and Watkins let his instincts go and every thing happened so fast, he just heard a boom and saw [the victim] go down." (Uppercasing omitted.)
¶ 31. As the State cogently points out in its brief on this appeal, "the court could find that [Watkins] fired the gun before [the victim] grabbed his arm," and that there was no struggle over the gun. Indeed, this is precisely what the trial court did find: "I don't believe that [Watkins] formed the intent well in advance of the action or even minutes in advance, but the evidence supports that when the victim approached him and reached for the gun, whether you call it instinct or not, *226he formed the requisite intent and acted upon it and rejected other available options." (Emphasis added.)
¶ 32. "Intent" is an element of second-degree intentional homicide. WlS. STAT. § 940.05(1). " 'With intent to' or 'with intent that' means that the actor either has a purpose to do the thing or cause the result specified, or is aware that his or her conduct is practically certain to cause that result." Wis. Stat. § 939.23(4). Under our criminal law, a person "intends" to do an act if he or she forms that intent, or awareness, at any time before the act — even a fraction of a second before. Perugi v. State, 104 Wis. 230, 242—245, 80 N.W. 593, 595, 597-598 (1899) (approving the following jury instructions: " 'There may be no appreciable space of time between the intent to kill and the act of killing ... It is enough that the intent to kill preceded the fatal act although the act followed instantly.'"), overruled on other grounds, Montgomery v. State, 128 Wis. 183, 198, 107 N.W. 14, 19 (1906).
¶ 33. In my view, the trial court rationally rejected a Billy-Budd, reflexive explanation, found that the State had disproved beyond a reasonable doubt "accident," and determined that Watkins did, in fact, intend to kill the man who had been abusing him all evening. Under our standard of review, we must affirm the conviction. See Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d at 507, 451 N.W.2d at 758 ("If any possibility exists that the trier of fact could have drawn the appropriate inferences from the evidence adduced at trial to find the requisite guilt, an appellate court may not overturn a verdict even if it believes that the trier of fact should not have found guilt based on the evidence before it.").
*2272. Ineffective assistance of counsel.
¶ 34. Watkins also claims that his trial lawyer gave him ineffective assistance because the lawyer did not seek to introduce evidence of the victim's violent past. Assuming that such evidence would be admissible even though Watkins does not claim that he knew about the instances he says his lawyer should have sought to have admitted, see Wis. Stat. Rule 904.05(2) ("In cases in which character or a trait of a person is an essential element of a . . . defense, proof may also be made of specific instances of the person's conduct."); McMorris v. State, 58 Wis. 2d 144, 150 & 150 n.11, 205 N.W.2d 559, 562 & 562 n.11 (1973) (characterizing as "consistent" with the then proposed Rule 904.05, the proposition that "where there is a sufficient factual basis to raise the issue of self-defense, and the turbulent and violent character of the victim is an essential element of the defense, proof should be admitted as to both the reputation of the victim and the defendant's personal knowledge of prior relevant conduct of the victim"); Werner v. State, 66 Wis. 2d 736, 744 n.6, 226 N.W.2d 402, 406 n.6 (1975) (specific instances of conduct are not admissible under Rule 904.05(2) "to prove that the victim was the aggressor in a fight"), there is no. evidence that Watkins shot the victim in self-defense. Accordingly, neither the victim's reputation nor specific acts of his alleged violent conduct in the past would have been material. Thus, Watkins was not deprived of his right to effective assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must show that his or her defense was prejudiced by the alleged deficiency of the trial lawyer's representation).
*2283. Sentence.
¶ 35. Although we give great latitude to a trial court's exercise of its sentencing discretion, Ocanas v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 179, 185, 233 N.W.2d 457, 461 (1975), we will overturn a sentence if it is "so excessive and unusual and so disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock public sentiment and violate the judgment of reasonable people concerning what is right and proper under the circumstances." Ibid. Given Watkins's concededly exemplary life prior to this tragic shooting, I believe that the sentence is shockingly not "right and proper under the circumstances." Accordingly, I would remand the matter to the trial court for resentencing.
4. Other claims.
¶ 36. In a repeat of his other arguments, Watkins claims that he is entitled to discretionary reversal under Wis. Stat. § 752.35. I disagree. Larding a final catch-all plea for reversal with arguments that have already been rejected adds nothing; "[z]ero plus zero equals zero." Mentek v. State, 71 Wis. 2d 799, 809, 238 N.W.2d 752, 758 (1976).