(dissenting).
THE LAW
We are not trail blazing through a legal wilderness in this case. For the law is well settled in this State that labor and services in the form of examination, repair or servicing of fixtures or attachments to a building after the original installation, does not extend the time for the filing of a mechanic’s lien from the date of the furnishing of such additional services. (Emphasis supplied.) McLaughlin Electric Supply v. American *629Empire Insurance, 269 N.W.2d 766 (S.D.1978); Potter v. Anderson, 85 S.D. 142, 178 N.W.2d 743 (1970); F.H. Peavey & Company v. Whitman, 82 S.D. 367, 146 N.W.2d 365 (1966); Thorson v. Pfeifer, 82 S.D. 313, 145 N.W .2d 438 (1966). Furthermore, the highest Court of this State has steadfastly refused to permit the “tacking” of additional services after the completion of the original construction under varying facts. Dirks v. Orchard & Wilheim Co., 63 S.D. 99, 256 N.W. 723 (1934); Big Sioux Lumber Co. v. Miller, 57 S.D. 506, 234 N.W. 31 (1930); Larson v. Anderson, 53 S.D. 236, 220 N.W. 498 (1928); Barry v. G.L. Wood Farm Mortgage Co., 50 S.D. 652, 211 N.W. 688 (1927); Botsford Lumber Co. v. Schriver, 49 S.D. 68, 206 N.W. 423 (1925).
THE TIMETABLE
Original contract entered into on October 18, 1976.
.. . December 18,1976, defendant, Westin, contracts to act as professional manager on project.
. .. December 23, 1976, the lien claimant, Howard-Osmera, contracts to provide engineering services.
Spring of 1977, construction begins.
July 1, 1977, lien claimant submits invoice for 80% of its fixed fee.
. .. July 1, 1977, through August 1, 1978, lien claimant submits series of invoices for services performed in addition to the fixed fee.
... October 19, 1978, electrical punch list states: “Connect up humidifiers priority number one.” Dissenter’s note: the humidifiers were in place at this time but were not then electrically connected.
October 24, 1978, lien claimant submits invoice expressing “Final Inspection: October 19, 1978.”
... October 24, 1978, lien claimant additionally submits invoice for the balance of its fixed fee stating “20% due on completion of project.”
October 31, 1978, architect issues a sworn Certificate of Completion.
November 1, 1978, humidifiers are connected.
. . . August 22 and 23,1979, on-site inspection by a nonlien claimant now attempting to repair the faulty humidifiers. This on-site inspection is seen on the mechanic’s lien statement.
. . . October 4, 1979, lien claimant reflects on lien statement of a telephone conversation between lien claimant and one Peter Senty of Westin Contractors that humidification system does not function properly.
.. . December 17, 1979, lien claimant files lien well over one year past the final inspection. Said lien is one year after the last invoice for work. Said lien is one year after the sworn Certificate of Completion. Said lien is one year beyond the installation and connection of the humidification system on November 1, 1978.
Therefore, the mechanic’s lien was not filed within 120 days after the completion of the last work or furnishing the last item of skill or services. The lien, therefore, absolutely terminates unless such filing is made within the prescribed time. Indeed, the mechanic’s lien was filed nearly 14 months after the last work was performed on the project.
CONCLUSION
Basically, the mechanic’s lien statute is to protect the contractor or materialman who is diligent. Where the workmanship and material furnished are inferior or inadequate, and the workman must return because of this reason, the workman or mate-rialman should not reap a benefit from his own faulty work or material. To extend the time to file a lien from the date that he performs repair work or installs decent material subsequent to the original installation, is to reward poor effort. Here, the lien claimant should not be allowed to benefit from any breakdown of the humidification system by using repair work to extend the time for filing a lien for its original services. This decision is contrary to the majority rule in the United States and the past decisions of the Supreme Court of this State. Thus, I would affirm the trial court’s order directing a verdict in favor of appellees. This case is not distinguishable from past decisions of this Court.
*630I am authorized to state that Chief Justice FOSHEIM joins in this dissent.