(dissenting).
I disagree with the view reached in division II of the majority opinion. I would hold that Iowa Code section 472.9 requires a description of the property taken for “the permanent and perpetual right of ingress and egress to and from” the easement. I would also hold that because the notice given the plaintiff failed to specify the access points or to describe the remaining farmland the condemnation procedure is void. As this failure is jurisdictional, I would reverse the district court’s refusal to grant the plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.
The facts in this case are undisputed. The notice of hearing given to SMB provided a detailed legal description of the 150-foot wide strip of land required for the installation of the transmission line. In addition, the notice advised that Iowa-Illinois sought condemnation for a “permanent and perpetual right of ingress and egress to and from said property;” however, the notice did not provide a description of the extent and the location of the access points, nor did it describe the remaining portions of the SMB farmland or the portion thereof that was to be subject to this access.
A review of the statutory authority and principles concerning the nature, extent, and procedure for acquisition of an easement for an electric transmission line is helpful. Iowa Code chapter 478 provides statutory authority for a utility to obtain a franchise to acquire such an easement. The franchise grants the utility authority to construct, erect, maintain and operate a transmission line over any grounds for the purpose of transmission of electric current. Iowa Code § 478.1 (1981). It also vests the utility with the power to take property by condemnation through eminent domain proceedings. Iowa Code §§ 478.6 and .15 (1981).
The use of the land by the utility is limited, however, to such interest in the land as is necessary directly or indirectly for the purpose of erecting and maintaining its line. Draker v. Iowa Electric Co., 191 Iowa 1376, 1382, 182 N.W. 896, 899 (1921). A taking beyond this purpose is not the taking of private property for public use, but a taking for private use. De Penning v. Iowa Power and Light Co., 239 Iowa 950, 957, 33 N.W.2d 503, 507 (1948). The landowner retains all right to use the property in any way that is not incompatible to the purpose of the easement. Fanning v. Mapco, Inc., 181 N.W.2d 190, 195 (Iowa 1970). Thus, he may cultivate or otherwise use the land in a manner that is not inconsistent with the exercise of the easement by the utility.
The majority opinion adopts Iowa-Illinois’s contention that in cases where the primary easement is described properly in the condemnation notice it is not necessary to describe the ingress and egress route of access to the easement. This view ignores the fact that the condemnation of access is an independent taking by condemnation in which SMB was not only entitled to compensation but was also entitled to a descrip*641tion of the extent of the taking pursuant to section 472.9.
The right of access to an easement, even a secondary easement, is a taking of property rights that entitle the condemnee to damages. De Penning, 239 Iowa at 961, 33 N.W.2d at 509 (by giving up the right of access to the easement the utility eliminates one element of damages which may have been considered). In De Penning this court held that “damages must be paid for the rights appropriated even though full use thereof may not be immediately contemplated.” 239 Iowa at 956, 33 N.W.2d at 506. In that case the utility claimed that it had no present intention to use the access and that its rights were limited; however, the court found that these were not proper matters for consideration in fixing damages. The court also pointed out that if the utility wished to use the primary easement strip for access to erect and maintain its poles and line, it could exclude any right of access to the condemned strip over the rest of the farm. Id. at 954, 33 N.W.2d at 506.
We may conclude from our holding in De Penning that the utility not only has a right of access to its electric transmission line over the strip of land described in the primary easement, but, at its option, it may condemn additional access through the land from which it was taken. It must pay for this additional access, however. Although it was not an issue in De Penning, I conclude that if the condemnor wishes the additional access it follows naturally that the access must be described pursuant to section 472.9. Otherwise, compensation for the taking could not be accurately ascertained.
The majority, however, rely upon a quotation set out in 6 Nichols The Law of Eminent Domain § 26.112. This quote indicates that it is necessary to describe not the entire parcel but only the part of it which is used for the particular use. It also indicates that the description of ingress and egress to the easement sought does not readily admit to detailed description and would vary from time to time. Professor Nichols indicates, however, that his authority for this proposition is the case of Otter Tail Power Co. v. Malme, 92 N.W.2d 514 (N.D.1958). The majority opinion claims that the Otter Tail case concerns the same issue that is before us. I find that the majority’s reliance is misplaced under our statute and that Otter Tail is distinguishable from our fact situation. Thus, the weight of Professor Nichol’s quotation is diminished.
In Otter Tail the condemnee complained that there was not a specific description of the right of ingress and egress to the power line transmission easement. The notice given the landowners contained the general legal description of the land, the type of structure, the height of the wires, a legal description of each pole location, and “also the right of ingress and egress over the most feasible and reasonable route for the purpose of said easement.” The North Dakota court stated as follows:
Furthermore, the right of ingress and egress is not readily susceptible of any definite description. No attempt need be made to describe the exact location thereof. Our statute, Section 32-1518, subd. 4 NDRG 1943, referring to the contents of a complaint in eminent domain, requiring that the complaint show the location, general route, and termini of the right of way sought has no application to an incidental right arising from the taking of a specific easement.
Otter Tail Power Co., 92 N.W.2d at 525.
Unlike Otter Tail, where no strip of land was condemned, our case presents a fact situation where we have a specifically described and located 150-foot strip of land available for access by the condemnor. Unlike the North Dakota approach of describing the location of poles, our statute, which provides eminent domain authority for an electric transmission line, contemplates the right of way to be a strip of land of not over one hundred or two hundred feet in width, depending on the size of the line. § 478.15. Moreover, Iowa Code section 472.9, specifically provides that the notice shall “describe the particular land or portion thereof sought to be condemned, in *642such a manner that it will be clearly identified.” As we previously pointed out, a right of access through the remainder of the farm to the primary easement is a compensable taking. See De Penning, 239 Iowa at 956, 33 N.W.2d at 506. The right of access is a portion of the particular land sought to be condemned that section 472.9 requires to be clearly identified. Although the North Dakota supreme court concluded that their statute requiring the complaint to show the location of the right of way had no application to the right of ingress and egress arising from the easement, our statute and factual situation are different and require a different result.
Moreover, other courts have recognized that right of ingress and egress to a transmission right of way is restricted to the portion of the servient property within the easement boundaries unless other land is specifically condemned. It was stated in United States v. An Easement and Right of Way, Etc., 182 F.Supp. 899, 904 (M.D.Tenn. 1960):
The Commissioners are instructed that the rights of the Government are limited to the 150-foot right of way condemned in this case except for the cutting of dangerous trees located beyond the right of way. The Government does not have the right of ingress and egress over other portions of defendants’ property to reach the right of way. The Government, of course, has the power to acquire the right of ingress and egress over other portions of defendants’ property if it so desires (United States v. 39.20 Acres of Land, etc., D.C.D.N.D.1955, 143 F.Supp. 623), but that right has not been taken in this case. Unless the specific right of ingress and egress is condemned the Government does not obtain any such right.
See also United States v. Easement and Right of Way, Etc., 249 F.Supp. 747, 750 (W.D.Ky.1966).
The majority opinion also points to our holding in Draker as lending support for its conclusion that routes of ingress and egress are too uncertain to be definitely described. We held in Draker that the right to future damages to crops incident to the use of the easement during the life of the franchise is too remote and speculative to be capable of assessing damages in a lump sum, and thus the statute postponing payment is not unconstitutional. Draker, 191 Iowa at 1383-84, 182 N.W. at 899. That holding remains correct, but it has no bearing on the duty of the condemnor to describe the route over the remaining farmland that he wishes to use to obtain additional access to his primary easement.
Finally, both the majority and Iowa-Illinois contend that Iowa Code section 478.17 actually grants the right of entry independent of the condemnation. If this conclusion has merit, there would be no necessity to condemn access rights to the transmission easement. If this right of entry is independent of condemnation, the owners of the easement could just as well traverse land owned by third parties in order to service their lines. I can not agree with this assessment.
Iowa Code section 478.17 merely provides a right of access over the property that is subject to an easement and provides for the payment of damages that exercise of access causes. This section, with its reference to “such transmission lines,” must be read in conjunction with the rights of franchise and eminent domain contained in sections 478.-1, .6, and .15. It merely confirms the right of access that is implied from the right to construct and maintain lines and provides for damages caused thereby. Because of uncertainty, these damages are not ascertainable at the time of the acquisition of the original easement. Thus, section 478.17 grants no new rights, it merely clarifies the payment of damages for the interference caused by ingress and egress over the existing easement. As was pointed out earlier, an electric transmission line easement does not dispossess the owner of the land from using the land. In case of cropland, the owner of the land has a right to plant crops and section 478.17 merely gives the owner of the easement rights to interfere with that possession even though it may damage crops. This right is not independent of *643condemnation, but accompanies it. Without condemnation of the land over which access is sought, the owner of the transmission lines has no right to disturb the possession of property beyond the easement. To do so would violate one of the basic rights which attaches to the concept of property ownership.
Additional reasons indicate that section 472.9 requires a definite description of the property taken, including access rights to the described strip of land containing the primary easement. Although an easement does not give title to land or confer any title in the land itself, it does constitute an interest in land, a vested right within the meaning of the constitutional guarantees including the prohibition against taking property without just compensation. 25 Am.Jur.2d Easements and License § 2 (1966). Additional access to a described easement would place restrictions upon the use of the land by the owner as it is an additional encroachment on the dominion. For example, an owner may decide to plat out the land for building lots or to build a lake upon the property. Unrestricted rights to cross this property would jeopardize this use. Moreover, the uncertainty that would be present with an undeseribed access would cause the determination of damages to be difficult and speculative. For marketable title purposes, it would subject the entire remaining property to a clouded title thereby jeopardizing the ability to sell the property. These reasons dictate that the condemnor should describe in some particularity the portion of the land that it intends to reserve for access purposes.
Finally, Iowa-Illinois claims that SMB has waived any right to contest the condemnation upon the basis of alleged ambiguities in and inadequacies of the notice of condemnation. Citing Thornberry v. State Board of Regents, 186 N.W.2d 154 (Iowa 1971), it claims that such objections are not timely and cannot be raised for the first time following the condemnation hearing. I disagree. Jurisdiction of the subject matter may be raised at any time and may not be waived. Matter of the Estate of Dull, 303 N.W.2d 402, 406 (Iowa 1981). Moreover, in Thornberry we held that a condemnee may not stand by silently and take no affirmative action prior to the appellate proceedings on a matter relating to the exercise of substantive legislative power and authority by the condemning body. Thornberry, 186 N.W.2d at 156-57. We distinguished the exercise of legislative power from jurisdictional issues and cited the case of Bourjaily v. Johnson County, 167 N.W.2d 630 (Iowa 1969), where jurisdiction of the subject matter was properly an issue. In Bourjaily we held that the powers of eminent domain are strictly construed in condemnation proceedings and the failure to comply with the statutory requirements of serving notice on contract vendors and mortgagees deprived the district court of jurisdiction and rendered the proceedings a nullity. 167 N.W.2d at 634. In Bourjaily, as in the present case, jurisdiction was raised in the appeal to district court. Id. The failure to properly describe the property to be condemned is jurisdictional and renders the proceedings void.
I would reverse and remand for entry of judgment in favor of the plaintiff on the pleadings.
REYNOLDSON, C.J., and LeGRAND, J., join this dissent.