(dissenting). I respectfully dissent.
As the majority points out, Michigan follows a broad rule of res judicata which bars not only claims actually litigated in the prior action, but every claim arising out of the same transaction which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, could have raised but did not. Gursten v Kenney, 375 Mich 330, 334-335; 134 NW2d 764 (1965); Curry v Detroit, 394 Mich 327, 332; 231 NW2d 57 (1975); Gose v Monroe Auto Equipment Co, 409 Mich 147, 160; 294 NW2d 165 (1980). Plaintiff correctly points out that her claim of fraud was not actually litigated in the divorce action and, by its very nature, could not have been litigated in the divorce action. However, even if plaintiff demonstrated that fraud took place, resolution of plaintiff’s claim for damages for fraud would require the court to redetermine matters actually litigated and settled in the divorce action, such as the value of the assets in question and the appropriate division of the parties’ property. The circuit court erred by declining to hold that the fraud count of plaintiff’s complaint, Count II, was barred by res judicata and by denying defendant’s motion for accelerated judgment pursuant to GCR 1963, 116.1(5).
Moreover, in Rogoski v Muskegon, 107 Mich *77App 730, 734-738; 309 NW2d 718 (1981), this Court held that actions to recover damages for fraud or perjury in connection with a prior action are not permitted. Plaintiff claims that a contrary result was reached in Gorman v Soble, 120 Mich App 831; 328 NW2d 119 (1982), but that case is distinguishable. A close examination of the Gorman opinion reveals that plaintiff in that case sought to recover damages from his codefendant in a prior action for fraudulently inducing him to settle. 120 Mich App 836-837. In contrast, Rogoski and this case involve actions against the opposing party in prior actions. Gorman contains no discussion of the problems explained in Rogoski or presented here. Plaintiff’s fraud claim failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted.
This result would not leave plaintiff without a remedy for any fraud by defendant in the divorce action. Plaintiff could seek relief from the judgment in the divorce action pursuant to GCR 1963, 528.3 (now MCR 2.612[C]). Moreover, an independent equitable action to obtain relief from a judgment is permitted in certain limited circumstances specified in Detroit Trust Co v Furbeck, 324 Mich 401, 414-415; 37 NW2d 151 (1949):
" '[A] court of equity will not assume jurisdiction to set aside a judgment of a court at law of competent jurisdiction on the ground that it is contrary to equity, unless the defendant in the judgment was ignorant of the fact in question pending the suit, or it could not be received as a defense at law, or unless, without any neglect or default on his part, he was prevented by fraud or accident or the act of the opposite party from availing himself of the defense.’ Valley City Desk Co v Travelers’ Insurance Co, 143 Mich 468 [106 NW 1125 (1906)].
" 'A judgment in a court of law will not be set aside by a court of equity unless it is so manifestly wrong *78that it is against good conscience. Cleveland Iron Mining Co v Husby, 72 Mich 61 [40 NW 168 (1888)]. In order to set aside a judgment of law in equity, there must be ignorance of the defense when the judgment was rendered, diligence on the part of complainant, and the fact that adequate relief cannot be had at law.’ Bassett v Trinity Bldg Co, 254 Mich 207 [236 NW 237 (1931)].” (Emphasis in original.)
I note that plaintiff has informed us that she has elected to pursue a motion for relief from the prior judgment pursuant to GCR 1963, 528.3.
I would reverse the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion for accelerated judgment on the fraud count of plaintiff’s complaint, Count II.