joined by Justice HANKINSON and Justice O’NEILL concurring.
As it comes to us, this is a claim by one child under eighteen against another child under eighteen for negligence in making alcohol available at a party. The Court declines, and I believe properly so, to impose a duty in this case. But the Court’s reasoning for this result is too broad. In previous cases involving social-host liability, we have wisely crafted narrow rulings that left room for later development in our common law. Today the Court abandons that restraint to hold categorically that no one, under any circumstances, can be liable to anyone in the world, regardless of the age of the server or the recipient, for providing alcohol in a social setting. I am not sure that this conclusion is correct, but I am absolutely certain that it is not necessary to the resolution of this case. I would reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and render judgment for Reeder on the more limited basis that one minor cannot be liable for providing alcohol to another minor in a social setting.
I
Nothing in the Dram Shop Act itself forecloses common-law liability for an adult who provides alcohol to a minor. The Act “provides the exclusive cause of action for providing an alcoholic beverage to a person 18 years of age or older.” Tex. Alco. Bev.Code § 2.03. If the Legislature wanted to foreclose a cause of action for providing alcohol to persons under eighteen, it could have easily written the law so that it would provide the exclusive remedy for providing alcohol to anyone, regardless of age. On three occasions, this Court has resolved social-host liability issues without deciding whether a social host could incur civil liability for providing alcohol to persons under eighteen. See Friesenhahn v. Ryan, 960 S.W.2d 656 (Tex.1998) (declining to reach the question of whether per se liability exists for serving alcohol to persons under the age of eighteen); Smith v. Merritt, 940 S.W.2d 602 (Tex.1997) (holding only that there is no per se liability for serving alcohol to persons between the ages of eighteen and twenty); Graff v. Beard, 858 S.W.2d 918 (Tex.1993) (holding only that an adult social host could not be liable for the conduct of an intoxicated adult guest). Until today, this issue was clearly open under Texas common law.
There are sound policy reasons for holding adult social hosts liable for providing alcohol to minors. Texas law often treats children differently than adults. See, e.g., Rudes v. Gottschalk, 159 Tex. 552, 324 S.W.2d 201 (1959) (holding that a child is not held to the standard of a reasonably *366prudent adult but rather to the standard of a reasonably prudent child of the same age, intelligence, and experience); Tex.R. Evid. 601(a)(2) (prescribing different rules of competency to testify for children than for adults). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found these distinctions persuasive in the social-host context. See Kapres v. Heller, 536 Pa. 551, 640 A.2d 888 (1994); Congini v. Portersville Valve Co., 504 Pa. 157, 470 A.2d 515 (1988). That court first considered social-host liability for adult hosts and imposed a duty on adult hosts providing alcohol to minors. Congini, 470 A.2d at 518. Then, the court considered liability for minor hosts and declined to impose a duty. Kapres, 640 A.2d at 889. When statutes do not dictate otherwise, several other states have recognized a cause of action against adult hosts for serving alcohol to minors. See Raymond, Annotation, Social Host’s Liability for Injuries Incurred by Third Parties as a Result of Intoxicated Guest’s Negligence, 62 A.L.R.4th 16 (1988) (citing cases from Arizona, Georgia, Iowa, Michigan, New Mexico, and Pennsylvania). We should wait until the proper case, with the issue squarely before us, before deciding whether Texas should also recognize a common-law cause of action against adults who serve alcohol to minors.
II
The court of appeals held that Reeder could be hable under a negligence per se theory for providing alcohol to Lawson in violation of section 106.06 of the Alcoholic Beverage Code. When Daniel was injured, that section provided that it was a Class C misdemeanor to furnish alcohol to a minor. Tex. Alco. Bev.Code § 106.06(c).1 Reeder asks this Court to hold that no such action exists.
Not all criminal statutes provide a standard for civil liability. See Carter v. William Sommerville & Son, Inc., 584 S.W.2d 274, 278 (Tex.1979). Texas courts impose civil liability based on a criminal statute only when the statute provides an appropriate basis. See Perry v. S.N., 973 S.W.2d 301, 305 (Tex.1998). For example, we have already held in Smith v. Merritt, 940 S.W.2d 602 (Tex.1997), that section 106.06 does not provide a negligence per se action against social hosts when their guests are eighteen to twenty years old. But Daniel urges that per se liability is appropriate when younger drinkers are involved. Because of the state’s strong public policy against underage drinking, Daniel claims that the statute should be the basis for a negligence per se action against any social host who makes alcohol available to a person under eighteen.
Daniel is correct that section 106.06 reflects a public policy against allowing minors to drink alcohol. However, whether a criminal statute gives rise to negligence per se depends on several factors. First, the plaintiff must be in the class of persons the statute is designed to protect, and his injury must be the type of injury the statute was designed to prevent. See Perry, 973 S.W.2d at 305. Daniel meets this test, but Perry directs us to consider these *367additional factors: (1) whether the statute is the sole source of any tort duty from the defendant to the plaintiff, or whether it merely supplies a standard of conduct for an existing common law duty; (2) whether the statute puts the public on notice by clearly defining the required conduct; (3) whether the statute would impose liability without fault; (4) whether negligence per se would result in ruinous damages disproportionate to the seriousness of the statutory violation, particularly if the liability would fall on a broad and wide range of collateral wrongdoers; and (5) whether the plaintiffs injury is a direct or indirect result of the violation of the statute. Id. at 309.
These factors do not weigh in favor of recognizing negligence per se liability for one minor providing alcohol to another minor. First, Reeder had no common law duty to control Lawson’s behavior. Thus the criminal statute does not merely supply the standard for an existing duty, but would create a new one. Second, while it is true that section 106.06 clearly defines the required conduct, there is no indication that Reeder possessed a greater maturity level with respect to alcohol than Lawson. The third factor is not particularly clear since Reeder is certainly not blameless as a provider. However, under the fourth factor, negligence per se could easily result in damages disproportionate to the $500 fine prescribed as the maximum criminal punishment for violation of the statute.2 And per se liability could fall on a wide range of collateral wrongdoers. Fifth, Daniel’s injuries are at most only indirectly caused by Reeder’s violation of the statute. Lawson was the real tortfeasor, and Daniel does have a remedy against him. In fact, Lawson was initially named as a defendant in this action, and Daniel has settled his claims against him.
In addition to the factors outlined in Perry, it is significant, although not determinative, that the Legislature considered and rejected versions of the statute that included social host liability. See Graff, 858 S.W.2d at 919. Thus, I would conclude that section 106.06 does not provide a negligence per se action against one minor who provides alcohol to another minor.
Finally, although it is not clear that Daniel preserved this point, I would hold that Reeder did not have a common-law duty to control Lawson’s behavior. Daniel asserted a claim of ordinary negligence in the trial court and urged the court of appeals to hold that Reeder owed Daniel a common-law duty. However, in his filings with this Court, Daniel does not brief this point. The only possible reference to it is one sentence in the conclusion to his brief urging us to recognize a duty “owed by social hosts to third persons injured by minors under the age of eighteen who have been provided alcohol by the social host.” The substantive portions of the brief focus entirely on negligence per se.
Even assuming that this point has been properly preserved, I would hold that Reeder did not owe any duty to Daniel. In Graff v. Beard, 858 S.W.2d 918 (Tex.1993), this Court was asked to “impose a duty to third parties on social hosts who make alcohol available to adult guests.” Graff, 858 S.W.2d at 919. We focused on two implicit assumptions that would be required to impose such a duty: (1) that the host can reasonably know of the guest’s alcohol consumption and intoxication and (2) that the host has the right to control the conduct of the guest. Id. at 920. Because we found those assumptions erroneous, we declined to impose a duty. *368Id. at 922. We held that the guest was in a much better position to know “the amount of alcohol he has consumed, his state of sobriety, and the consequential risk he poses to the public.” Id. at 921. We also noted that, absent a special relationship between the host and the guest, the host did not have the right to control the guest’s behavior. Id. at 920.
Here, there is no reason to believe that Reeder was in a better position than Lawson to know about Lawson’s alcohol consumption or his intoxication. Additionally, there was no special relationship between Reeder and Lawson. Thus, for the reasons articulated in Graff v. Beard, I would decline to impose a common-law duty on Reeder to control Lawson’s behavior.
I would reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and render judgment that Daniel take nothing. However, for the reasons stated, I join only the Court’s judgment.
. The Alcoholic Beverage Code did not specify the class of the misdemeanor, it only prescribed the punishment as a fine of not less than $100 and not more that $500. However, the Penal Code provides that any misdemean- or that is left undesignated is a Class C misdemeanor. Tex. Penal Code § 12.03(b). Also, any misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than $500 is a Class C misdemeanor. Tex. Penal Code § 12.23. The Alcoholic Beverage Code was amended effective September 1, 1997, to change the misdemeanor to a Class B misdemeanor. See Act of June 19, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1013, § 7, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 3688. The punishment for a Class B misdemeanor is a fine of up to $2000, imprisonment of up to 180 days, or both. Tex. Penal Code § 12.22.
. Since this case arose under the former version of section 106.06, the maximum criminal punishment Reeder could have faced was a fine of $500.