dissenting.
The sole issue in this case is whether section 255.001 of the Texas Election Code (“the Texas statute”) is unconstitutional for violating John Doe’s right to free speech under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. U.S. Const. amend. I. While conceding the State’s interests in this case are compelling, the majority concludes the Texas statute is “not narrowly tailored to serve an overriding State interest” and ultimately holds that “section 255.001 is unconstitutional on its face and cannot be upheld.” 1 Because I disagree, I must respectfully dissent.
*107In relevant part, the First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. Const, amend. I. The First Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 336 n. 1, 115 S.Ct. 1511, 131 L.Ed.2d 426 (1995).
The Texas statute regulating political advertising provides:
(a) A person may not knowingly enter into a contract or other agreement to print, publish, or broadcast political advertising that does not indicate in the advertising:
(1) that it is political advertising;
(2) the full name of either the individual who personally entered into the contract or agreement with the printer, publisher, or broadcaster or the person that individual represents; and
(3) in the case of advertising that is printed or published, the address of either the individual who personally entered into the agreement with the printer or publisher or the person that individual represents.
Tex. Elec.Code Ann. § 255.001(a) (Vernon Supp.2001).
Initially, it is important, I think, to point out that this case involves the following: (a) a candidate election; (b) a commercial business transaction; (c) political advertising not authorized, and specifically disapproved, by the candidate; (d) an agreement between the candidate’s political consultant (independent of the campaign) and a corporation, The Order Desk, Inc.;2 (e) distribution via bulk mail; and (f) a losing candidate. This case also involves the State’s interest in combating political corruption, which, as the United States Supreme Court noted in McIntyre, is greater in candidate elections than in votes on public issues. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 352 & n. 15, 115 S.Ct. 1511.
The Texas statute is presumptively constitutional. See Ex parte Granviel, 561 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex.Crim.App.1978). Moreover, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has reviewed the Texas statute against a First Amendment free speech challenge, and the court expressly held it to be constitutional. KVUE Inc. v. Moore, 709 F.2d 922, 937 (5th Cir.1983), aff'd sub nom., Tex. v. KVUE-TV, Inc., 465 U.S. 1092, 104 S.Ct. 1580, 80 L.Ed.2d 114 (1984). The KVUE-TV court stated that the “Texas sponsorship requirements are ‘generally-applicable and evenhanded regulations that protect the integrity and reliability of the electoral process itself.’ ” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 & n. 9, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983)). The court went on to reeog-*108nize that the Texas sponsorship requirements do not regulate the content of the political message, but even if they do infringe on First Amendment rights, the infringement is of an extremely limited nature. Id. After applying the balancing test of Anderson, the Fifth Circuit held that the Texas statute does not violate the free speech clause of the First Amendment.
In 1995, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in McIntyre, holding an Ohio statute unconstitutional on First Amendment free speech grounds because it prohibited the distribution of anonymous campaign literature. 514 U.S. at 356, 115 S.Ct. 1511.3 Based on McIntyre, Doe has challenged the Texas statute, and the majority has held it facially unconstitutional.
The question before us in this case is whether the holding in McIntyre invalidates the Texas statute as applied to Doe on First Amendment free speech grounds. I conclude that it does not. It is my view that the Texas statute differs in material ways from the Ohio statute that was declared unconstitutional in McIntyre and, thus, is not controlled by the McIntyre holding. It is my view that the Texas statute does not directly regulate an individual’s independent free speech but, rather, regulates only the electoral process by regulating the commercial activity of entering into a contract or agreement with another to print, publish, or broadcast political advertising. Or put another way, it regulates interdependent, not independent, activity. By so doing, in my view, the Texas statute comes within the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (per curiam), and, therefore, is a constitutional regulation of the electoral process. In Buckley, the Supreme Court upheld certain provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act that required private individuals to report certain expenditures in a candidate election. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 384, 115 S.Ct. 1511 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 80, 96, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (per curiam)). I agree with Justice Scalia who said: “If Buckley remains the law, this is an easy case.” Id. at 385, 115 S.Ct. 1511.
The State identifies three interests to justify the requirements imposed by the Texas statute: (1) deterring and punishing fraud; (2) notifying the public of any allegiance a particular candidate might feel toward the publisher of the communication; and (3) providing a method of detecting those expenditures which appear to be from individuals, but in reality come from political action committees or corporations. The Texas statute applies only to situations where there is a contract or agreement with another to print, publish, or broadcast a political advertisement. As such, the statute seeks to regulate the commercial transaction and, therefore, the electoral process, not the political speech. Here, for instance, the “publisher” (ie., distributor) is a corporation, The Order Desk, Inc. Dallas County Dist. Attorney v. Doe, 969 S.W.2d 537, 539 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1998, no pet.). As the majority recognizes, the law forbids corporate expenditures or contributions on behalf of a specific candidate. Tex. Elec.Code Ann. §§ 253.091-.104 (Vernon Supp.2001). To permit anonymous agreements diminishes accountability within the electoral process and increases the likelihood of unauthorized contributions and expenditures by corporations. Application of the mandato*109ry provisions in this case requiring disclosure of the identity of the individual who contracted or agreed with The Order Desk, Inc., a corporation, regulates the electoral process and corporate participation in that process. It protects a corporation from an appearance that it is making an illegal contribution when in fact it is not. Without the statutory mandatory disclosures, an appearance of corruption could exist because there is nothing to indicate that it is not the corporation illegally distributing the fliers. Furthermore, the mandatory disclosure requirements serve the State’s interest in detecting illegal expenditures without a needless waste of resources that might otherwise be required to police what, on its face, might appear to be an unauthorized corporate expenditure but in fact is not. Consequently, it serves the State’s greater interest in combating political corruption in candidate elections recognized in McIntyre. 514 U.S. at 352 & n. 15, 354 n. 18, 115 S.Ct. 1511. These inappropriate actions are exactly what the State hopes to avoid through its extremely limited regulation of the electoral process. By imposing the identification requirement only on interdependent activity, not on independent activity, and by permitting identification of the contracting individual without requiring disclosure of the identity of the speaker or author, the narrowly tailored Texas statute is justified by the State’s enforcement interest in maintaining the integrity of the electoral process.
Unlike the “extremely broad” Ohio statute at issue in McIntyre, the Texas statute is much more narrowly tailored. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 338 n. 3, 115 S.Ct. 1511 (setting out text of Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 3599.09(A) (1988)). The Ohio statute clearly regulated independent activity; the Texas statute clearly does not. Unlike the Ohio statute that required disclosure of the identity of the speaker or author, the Texas statute requires only disclosure of the name and address of either the individual who personally enters into a contract or agreement or the person that individual represents.4 Contrary to the majority’s assertions, compliance with the Texas statute does not require disclosure of the identity of the speaker or author. I conclude, therefore, it is a regulation of the electoral process and more appropriately falls within Buckley.
In the alternative, and to the extent the Texas statute infringes on Doe’s free speech rights, any infringement is “of an extremely limited nature.” KVUE, 709 F.2d at 937. “Appropriately leaving open matters not presented by McIntyre’s handbills, the [McIntyre ] Court recognize[d] that a State’s interest in protecting an election process ‘might justify a more limited identification requirement.’ ” McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 358, 115 S.Ct. 1511 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting the majority). Justice Ginsburg also clarified the McIntyre holding: “We do not hereby hold that the State may not in other, larger circumstances require the speaker to disclose its interest by disclosing its identity.” Id. I conclude the Texas statute is sufficiently narrow to bring it within the “more limited identification requirement” recognized by the McIntyre majority and Justice Ginsburg in concurrence. I also conclude it involves the “larger circumstances” referred to by Justice Ginsburg. See id.
Doe overemphasizes the importance of Justice Scalia’s reference to the Texas statute in his dissent in McIntyre. Justice *110Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rhenquist, dissented. In a “parade of horribles” in footnote two of Justice Scalia’s dissent, he referenced statutes from forty-nine states, the District of Columbia, and a federal statute as being potentially invalidated by the majority’s holding. See id. at 376 n. 2, 115 S.Ct. 1511 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Doe seized upon that reference in his challenge to the Texas statute. It goes without saying, however, that Justice Scalia’s dissent has no precedential value. Moreover, it is initially the job of the Texas courts to determine the constitutionality and continued validity of the Texas statute post-Mclntyre. Justice Scalia recognized this in the text of his dissent. He noted that the McIntyre majority failed to establish a “clear rule of law,” and that failure left uncertain the decision’s effect on many similar state statutes. Id. at 380,115 S.Ct. 1511 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Although the McIntyre majority held that the Ohio statute burdened core political speech and could not withstand exacting scrutiny, they left open the possibility that “a State’s enforcement interest might justify a more limited identification requirement.” Id. at 353, 115 S.Ct. 1511. Justice Scalia opined that the majority’s view — that a state might “in larger circumstances” be justified in requiring a speaker to disclose his or her identity — leaves open the possibility that many of the' statutes implicated by McIntyre remain constitutional because they involve such “larger circumstances.” Id. at 380-81, 115 S.Ct. 1511 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Although I disagree with Justice Scalia that the Texas statute requires disclosure of the identity of the speaker, I do conclude the narrowly tailored Texas statute, as a “more limited identification requirement” involving “larger circumstances,” remains constitutional in the wake of McIntyre.
Furthermore, it is my view that the Texas statute is also narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest because it regulates interdependent, not independent, activity, and as applied to Doe, commercial activity as well. Although it may implicate free speech, the Texas statute does not prohibit anonymous free speech. Compliance with the statute does not require disclosure of the identity of the speaker or author. For example, one could anonymously prepare a piece of political advertising, have an agent take it to a printer, publisher, or broadcaster, and fully comply with the statute by identifying the agent as the individual personally entering into the contract or agreement without disclosing the identity of the author. The individual personally entering into the contract or agreement could be anyone— perhaps someone whose business it is to enter into such contracts or agreements on behalf of people who wish to be anonymous. This is a significant and material difference between the Texas and Ohio statutes.
Unlike the statutes at issue in McIntyre, Talley, and Maupin, the Texas statute does not bar all anonymous political advertising. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 338 n. 3, 115 S.Ct. 1511 (Ohio statute required all political advertisements to bear the name and address of the person responsible for them); see also Talley v. Cal., 362 U.S. 60, 61, 80 S.Ct. 536, 4 L.Ed.2d 559 (1960) (city ordinance required all handbills to disclose the author or distributor’s name and address); Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC v. Maupin, 892 F.Supp. 1246, 1254 (E.D.Mo.1995), aff'd, 71 F.3d 1422 (8th Cir.1995), cert. denied sub nom., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 518 U.S. 1033, 116 S.Ct. 2579, 135 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1996) (statute required any printed or broadcast matter containing allegations regarding a candidate for office to contain a statement that the information was approved by the candidate on whose behalf the advertisement was issued). *111Each of these statutes was found to be unconstitutional, in part, because they barred all anonymous political advertising. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 351-53, 115 S.Ct. 1511; Talley, 362 U.S. at 63-64, 80 S.Ct. 536; Maupin, 892 F.Supp. at 1255-56. That is not the case here. Under the Texas statute, an individual may print, publish, or broadcast anonymous fliers, such as the “Pinnochio Flier,” as long as that individual does not contract or otherwise agree with another to print, publish, or broadcast that flier.
Further, in stark contrast to the Ohio statute, the Texas statute on its face does not apply to the type of independent personal activity engaged in by McIntyre and protected by the United States Supreme Court. As the McIntyre majority pointed out, McIntyre’s independent conduct of distributing the leaflets essentially by herself “is the essence of First Amendment expression” and cannot be inhibited. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 347, 351, 115 S.Ct. 1511. To violate the Texas statute, an individual must involve another in the activity of printing, publishing or broadcasting. Here, that “another” is a corporation and the activity is commercial. McIntyre’s independent activity of distributing the leaflets would not constitute a violation of the Texas statute. Cf. Doe v. Mortham, 708 So.2d 929, 930 n. 3, 934 (Fla.1998) (upholding the constitutionality of a statute that required the words “paid political advertisement” and the identity of the advertisement sponsor to be on all political advertisements and campaign literature, by reading the statute as not applying to independent conduct such as McIntyre’s). However, because the Texas statute is unambiguous and on its face does not apply to independent conduct of the kind engaged in by McIntyre, to uphold it as constitutional requires no narrowing construction to distinguish it from the independent conduct in McIntyre. The Supreme Court’s holding in McIntyre declaring a remarkably broader Ohio statute unconstitutional does not inevitably invalidate the Texas statute.
Without a disclosure requirement, it will be impossible for a state to punish corporate acts of illegal expenditures or contributions because an anonymous speaker/author can hide faceless behind an anonymous individual who contracts or agrees with the corporate printer, publisher, or broadcaster to distribute his message. By narrowly tailoring the Texas statute to situations involving a contract or agreement, the State has focused on the most likely abusers of the electoral process insofar as unauthorized corporate expenditures and contributions are concerned.
In his dissent in McIntyre, Justice Sca-lia eloquently set out wherein the usefulness of mandatory disclosure requirements lies:
It lies also in promoting a civil and dignified level of campaign debate— which the State has no power to command, but ample power to encourage by such undemanding measures as a signature requirement. Observers of the past few national elections have expressed concern about the increase of character assassination — “mudslinging” is the colloquial term — engaged in by political candidates and their supporters to the detriment of the democratic process. Not all of this, in fact not much of it, consists of actionable untruth; most is innuendo, or demeaning characterization, or mere disclosure of items of personal life that have no bearing upon suitability for office. Imagine how much all of this would increase if it could be done anonymously. The principal impediment against it is the reluctance *112of most individuals and organizations to be publicly associated with uncharitable and uncivil expression. Consider, moreover, the increased potential for “dirty tricks.” It is not unheard of for campaign operatives to circulate materials over the name of their opponents or their opponents’ supporters (a violation of election laws) in order to attract or alienate certain interest groups. How much easier — and sanction free! — -it would be to circulate anonymous material (for example, a really tasteless, though not actionably false, attack upon one’s own candidate) with the hope and expectation that it will be attributed to, and held against, the other side.
514 U.S. at 382-3, 115 S.Ct. 1511 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
I believe those reasons are even more compelling under the facts of this case involving mass distribution by a corporation. Because I conclude this statute is distinguishable from the statute at issue in McIntyre and is narrowly tailored to serve the State’s overriding interests, thus coming within the “larger circumstances” contemplated in McIntyre, I further conclude the statute is constitutional as applied to Doe. And, notwithstanding Justice Scalia’s “kiss of death” language in the dissent, seized upon by Doe, I conclude, and hope, Justice Scalia was more prophetic than sarcastic when he thereafter wrote: “Perhaps, then, not all the state statutes I have alluded to are invalid, but just some of them; or indeed maybe all of them remain valid in ‘larger circumstances’!” Id. at 381, 115 S.Ct. 1511 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Because I disagree with the majority’s holding that the Texas statute is facially unconstitutional, I respectfully dissent.
. The trial court’s order setting aside the indictment does not find the statute facially *107unconstilutional, but states, in relevant part, “This Court, after considering the evidence, authority and argument of counsel is of the opinion that TEX. ELEC. CODE § 255.001 is violative of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and is therefore unconstitutional. Under the circumstances, the Motion is well taken.” A review of the Motion to Set Aside the Indictment, likewise, does not reveal a request to declare the statute facially unconstitutional. The purpose of the motion was specifically to set aside Doe’s indictment. Although the trial court’s order does find the Texas statute unconstitutional, it does not find it facially unconstitutional. Further, the sole issue raised by the State in its appeal is that the statute is constitutional as applied to John Doe. Nothwithstanding the language of the trial court's order and the State’s issue on appeal, the majority goes further and holds the statute facially unconstitutional.
. See Dallas County Dist. Attorney v. Doe, 969 S.W.2d 537, 539 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1998, no pet.) (Doe hired The Order Desk, Inc. to distribute the flier via bulk mail).
. The Ohio statute expressly prohibited distribution of certain materials. The Texas statute does not; however, the majority, by construction, includes distribution within the meaning of the term "publish” which the Texas statute expressly prohibits.
. The statute also requires that the political advertising include the statement that it is political advertising, but Doe makes no complaint about that requirement, challenging only the statute’s mandatory disclosure provision.