concurring. I agree that a violation of the court’s previous directives does not compel a change in custody. See Sharp v. Keeler, 99 Ark. App. 42, 256 S.W.3d 528 (2007) (Baker, J., dissenting) (citing Carver v. May, 81 Ark. App. 292, 101 S.W.3d 256 (2003)). Examining Mr. Williams’s individual acts, they each appear to be almost trivial; however, taken as a whole, a continuing failure to abide by the trial court’s orders could well provide a basis for the trial court to curtail Mr. Williams’s opportunity to influence the child with his behavior. Certainly, if Mr. Williams persists in this behavior despite the trial court’s punishment of the violations by its contempt powers his conduct will, at some point, affect the best interest of the child. See Carver, supra (appellant’s interference with visitation was so extreme that the best interest of the children required that they be removed from the situation).
In light of the fact that appellant contends that the trial court erred in reducing his visitation with his child, particularly in light of Dr. Martin Faitek’s testimony that a reduction in visitation would not be beneficial to the child, I emphasize that the trial judge was entirely correct in her determination that Dr. Faitek’s expert opinion is not dispositive of the case. A trial judge does not have to accept an expert’s opinion. See generally Northwest Arkansas Recovery Inc. v. Davis, 89 Ark. App. 62, 200 S.W.3d 481 (2004) (citing Gibson Appliance Co. v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 341 Ark. 536, 20 S.W.3d 285 (2000)) (stating that fact-finders are not bound to accept an expert opinion as conclusive, but should give it whatever weight they think it should have and may disregard any opinion testimony if they find it to be unreasonable).
Furthermore, while I concur in the decision to reverse and remand with instructions to reinstate the previous visitation schedule based on the facts now before us, a significant period of time has passed while this appeal has proceeded. If the situation has changed, the trial court is always free to enter such orders as may be necessary to protect the best interest of the child.