dissenting.
I. Introduction
I respectfully dissent. The direct liability negligence claim Appellee Jo Fawn Ollie asserts against Appellant Harris Methodist Fort Worth falls squarely within the statutory definition of a “health care liability claim” as a claimed departure from safety directly related to an act furnished by Harris Methodist to Ollie during her *728confinement in the hospital. Consequently, Ollie was required to file an expert report; she did not, and the trial court erred by refusing to dismiss Ollie’s claims and by refusing to award attorney’s fees to Harris Methodist.
II.Ollie’s Pleadings and Procedural Background
Ollie brought suit against Harris Methodist for injuries that she sustained when, as she exited the bathtub, she slipped on the wet floor, fell, and hurt herself. Ollie alleged that
[o]n or about June 17, 2004, JO FAWN OLLIE was a patient on property controlled by the Defendant, and was injured under the following circumstances: Plaintiff had a total knee ar-throplasty on June 14, 2004 and on the date of the accident June 17, 2004, Plaintiff had got into the bathtub and as she was getting out, Plaintiff slipped on the slippery wet floor which created “a dangerous and hazardous condition” and that the Plaintiff fell victim to the hazards and injured her right shoulder.
[[Image here]]
Defendant owed Plaintiff and others the duty to provide a safe environment, maintained properly, so as not to cause harm and/or injury.
Defendant breached said duty by failure to maintain and warn Plaintiff of the dangerous and hazardous condition.
Ollie did not file any expert report; Harris Methodist subsequently filed a motion to dismiss Ollie’s claims with prejudice and for attorney’s fees.1 The trial court conducted a hearing on Harris Methodist’s motion to dismiss. Ollie argued that her claim was not a health care liability claim subject to chapter 74 of the civil practice and remedies code; Harris Methodist argued that Ollie’s claim did fall within that statute. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied Harris Methodist’s motion to dismiss.
III.Standard of Review
Whether a claim is a health care liability claim under section 74.351 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code is a question of law and is reviewed de novo. Valley Baptist Med. Ctr. v. Stradley, 210 S.W.3d 770, 773 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2006, pet. denied); Buck v. Blum, 130 S.W.3d 285, 290 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.). In order to determine whether the plaintiff asserted a health care liability claim, we must examine the underlying nature of the allegations. See Murphy v. Russell, 167 S.W.3d 835, 838 (Tex.2005). Claimants may not recast a health care liability claim as some other type of claim in an attempt to avoid the application of chapter 74. See id. The necessity of expert testimony from a medical or health care professional to prove a claim may also be an important factor in determining whether a cause of action is an inseparable part of the rendition of medical or health care services. Diversicare Gen. Partner, Inc. v. Rubio, 185 S.W.3d 842, 847 (Tex.2005).
IV.Relevant Provisions of Chapter 74 and Its Application Here; Ollie’s Claim is a Health Care Liability Claim
A “health care liability claim” is statutorily defined as
a cause of action against a health care provider or physician for treatment, lack of treatment, or other claimed departure *729from accepted standards of medical care, or health care, or safety or professional or administrative services directly related to health care, which proximately results in injury or death of a claimant, whether the claimant’s claim or cause of action sounds in tort or contract.
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 74.001(13) (Vernon 2005). A hospital is a “health care provider.” Id. § 74.001(11)(G). And for purposes of the above definition of a health care liability claim, breach of the accepted standards must be directly related to “health care,” which is defined as “any act ... furnished ... by any health care provider for, to, or on behalf of a patient during the patient’s ... confinement.” Id. § 74.001(10); Valley Baptist Med. Ctr., 210 S.W.3d at 774-75 (holding rules of grammar mandated application of “directly related” language in definition of health care liability claim to each of the categories of departures from accepted standards identified in definition); Omaha Healthcare Ctr., L.L.C. v. Johnson, 246 S.W.3d 278, 284 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2008, pet. filed) (same). In every claim that falls within the above definition of a health care liability claim, a claimant shall, not later than the 120th day after the date the claim was filed, serve on each party or the party’s attorney one or more expert reports. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 74.351(a).
Simply applying the above statutory language to the present facts, Ollie’s claim is a health care liability claim because she is asserting a cause of action against a health care provider (Harris Methodist) for a claimed departure from accepted standards of safety (Harris Methodist’s alleged creation of “a dangerous and hazardous condition” on the bathroom floor) that is directly related to “health care,” (that is, directly related to the bath furnished by Harris Methodist to Ollie during her confinement). See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.001(10), (11)(G), (13); see also Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011 (Vernon 2005) (stating that words in statute are to be given common meaning).
V. Ordinaby Care is Inapplicable,Ollie’s Claim is a Health Care Liability Claim
The majority, nonetheless, characterizes Ollie’s claim as a premises liability claim asserting ordinary negligence. The majority cites Valley Baptist Medical Center, 210 S.W.3d at 776, Shults v. Baptist St. Anthony’s Hospital, 166 S.W.3d 502, 503 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2005, pet. denied), and dicta in Diversicare, 185 S.W.3d at 847.2 While the distinction between these ordinary negligence cases cited by the majority and the present case is hard to articulate, the difference becomes obvious upon an examination of the underlying nature of the claim pleaded by Ollie. See Diversicare, 185 S.W.3d at 847 (instructing us to examine the underlying nature of the claim to determine whether a claim is a health care liability claim).
That Ollie’s claim is in the underlying nature of a health care liability claim becomes obvious when an effort is made to conceptualize submission of Ollie’s claim against Harris Methodist as a premises liability claim for breach of ordinary negligence as contemplated by the majority. The standard premises liability, plaintiff-is-invitee question asks,
*730Did the negligence, if any, of those named below proximately cause the [occurrence or injury] in question?
With respect to the condition of the premises, Don Davis was negligent if—
a. the condition posed an unreasonable risk of harm, and
b. Don Davis knew or reasonably should have known of the danger, and
c. Don Davis failed to exercise ordinary care to protect Paul Payne from the danger, by both failing to adequately warn Paul Payne of the condition and failing to make that condition reasonably safe.
“Ordinary care,” when used with respect to the conduct of Don Davis as an owner or occupier of a premises, means that degree of care that would be used by an owner or occupier of ordinary prudence under the same or similar circumstances.
Comm, on Pattern Jury Charges, State Bar of Tex., Texas Pattern Jury Charges: Malpractice, Premises & Products PJC 66.4 (2006). Any attempt to apply the definition of “ordinary care” to the present facts demonstrates that Ollie’s claim is not one for breach of ordinary care.
For example, superimposing the above definition of ordinary care on the present facts, ordinary care when used with respect to the conduct of Harris Methodist means that degree of care that would be used by an owner or occupier of ordinary prudence under the same or similar circumstances, i.e., where the owner or occupier is a hospital, the plaintiff is a patient confined at the hospital, the hospital furnishes a bath for the patient during her confinement, and the patient is three days post a total knee arthroscopy. “The same or similar circumstances” as those here exist only when the owner or occupier is a hospital, the plaintiff is a post-surgery, limited-mobility patient confined at the hospital, and the danger is a “slippery, wet floor” encountered by the patient when she exits the bath furnished by the hospital to her during her confinement.3 That is, application of the ordinary care, same-or-similar-eircumstances standard to the present facts necessarily inserts a standard of care applicable only to hospitals, not to hotels, bed and breakfasts, or to other owners and occupiers of a premises. Applying the ordinary care definition, a jury could not determine what degree of care should be utilized by Harris Methodist to, as alleged by Ollie, “provide a safe environment, maintained properly, so as not to cause harm and/or injury” or to warn Ollie of “the dangerous and hazardous condition” in the absence of expert testimony — that is, testimony about that standard of care required of a hospital in furnishing a bath for a post-surgery, limited-mobility patient confined at the hospital. See, e.g., Torres, 186 S.W.3d at 47-48 (holding plaintiffs claims for injuries when she fell while attempting to walk to the bathroom three days postoperatively was a health care liability claim requiring expert testimony); Schneider v. Haws, 118 S.W.3d 886, 891 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2003, no pet.) (recognizing expert’s testimony explained standard of care for doctor in providing escort to return patient to waiting room). In short, an attempted application of the “same or similar circumstances” language demonstrates that Ollie’s claim is in *731fact a health care liability claim against a health care provider for a “departure from accepted standards of ... safety ... directly related to health care.” See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 74.001(13) (defining “health care liability claim”).
Conversely, in the cases relied upon by the majority, the health care provider— like any other owner or occupier of a premises — did owe only ordinary care to its invitee, and application of the “same or similar circumstances” language to the facts of those cases demonstrates this. For example, in Shults, the Amarillo Court of Appeals held that a sharp paint chip on the bathroom floor of a patient’s hospital room could give rise to a premises liability claim. 166 S.W.3d at 503. A hotel or a bed and breakfast would have the same duty to remove sharp paint chips from an invitee’s bathroom floor as a hospital. In other words, application of the ordinary care standard to this claim would not automatically bootstrap the factfinder into a health care provider standard of care. Likewise, in Stradley, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals held that a claim for injuries based on the failure of a treadmill’s emergency stop feature was not a health care liability claim. 210 S.W.3d at 771-72. Again, any gym or fitness facility would have the same duty to ensure the proper functioning of the emergency stop features of its equipment as a medical center fitness facility. And again, application of the ordinary care standard to this claim would not automatically bootstrap the factfinder into a health care provider standard of care.
Under this same analysis, Ollie’s claim is not, as posited by the majority, akin to a plaintiff-invitee’s premises liability complaint about an unlocked window permifr ting access to an intruder or to a rickety staircase that gave way under an invitee’s weight, hypothetical claims mentioned by the supreme court in Diversicare. See Maj. op. at 725 (citing Diversicare, 185 S.W.3d at 854). Application of the ordinary care, same-or-similar circumstances standard to the hypothetical premises liability claims mentioned in Diversicare would not automatically bootstrap the fact-finder into a health care provider standard of care; all owners and occupiers have the same duty to all invitees to lock windows and to ensure that staircases are not rickety.
The underlying nature of Ollie’s claim as a health care liability claim becomes even more apparent upon examining other elements she would be required to prove to establish a traditional premises liability claim. In a traditional premises liability claim, as set forth in the above jury question, Ollie would be required to prove as one element of her claim that the owner (Harris Methodist) had actual or constructive knowledge of some condition on the premises (water on the bathroom floor after a bath). See Keetch v. Kroger Co., 845 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex.1992) (citing Corbin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 292, 296 (Tex.1983)). A slip-and-fall plaintiff satisfies this notice element by establishing one of three things: (1) that the defendant placed a substance on the floor; (2) that the defendant actually knew that a substance was on the floor; or (3) that it is more likely than not that the dangerous condition existed long enough to give the premises owner a reasonable opportunity to discover it. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Reece, 81 S.W.3d 812, 814 (Tex.2002) (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Gonzalez, 968 S.W.2d 934, 936 (Tex.1998) and Keetch, 845 S.W.2d at 265).
Thus, Ollie’s claim — if treated as a premises liability claim — will require her to prove that Harris Methodist had actual or constructive knowledge that water was on the floor in her bathroom while she was *732taking a bath. Because a hospital can act only through its employees, this will require Ollie to show that someone, most likely a nurse, knew or should have known of the water on the floor. Under the facts pleaded by Ollie, the issue of whether a nurse knew or should have known of the water on the floor in Ollie’s bathroom likewise requires expert testimony. For example, how frequently should a nurse check the bathroom floor of a patient’s room? Should a nurse instruct a limited-mobility patient to request assistance in entering or exiting the bathtub? These are questions of the nursing standard of care owed to an in-hospital, limited-mobility patient. Accord Torres, 186 S.W.3d at 47-48; Devereaux v. Harris County Hosp. Dist, No. 01-05-00706-CV, 2007 WL 852618, at *4 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 22, 2007, no pet.) (mem.op.) (holding plaintiffs claim for injuries when she was not properly assisted into wheel chair was health care liability claim). And they are inescapably intertwined with Ollie’s claim that Harris Methodist “created ‘a dangerous and hazardous condition’ ” and breached “the duty to provide a safe environment.”
Many, if not most, slip-and-fall cases occurring at a hospital will be actionable premises liability claims, not health care liability claims. But this is not one of them. The underlying nature of Ollie’s claim establishes that this is a health care liability claim. Consequently, I would sustain Harris Methodist’s first issue.
VI. Conclusion
Because the plain language of Chapter 74 of the civil practice and remedies code and the underlying nature of Ollie’s claim both establish that her claim is a health care liability claim, I would reverse the trial court’s order denying Harris Methodist’s motion to dismiss. I would render a judgment of dismissal and remand Harris Methodist’s claim for attorneys’ fees to the trial court pursuant to section 74.851(b). See Jernigan v. Langley, 195 S.W.3d 91, 94 (Tex.2006). Because the majority does not, I respectfully dissent.
. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 74.351(b) (Vernon Supp.2008) (requiring trial court to grant defendant’s motion to dismiss health care liability claim with prejudice and to award defendant attorney’s fees if health care liability claimant fails to file an expert report concerning the conduct of the moving defendant).
. The majority also discusses — in an effort to distinguish — Torres v. Memorial Hermann Hospital System, 186 S.W.3d 43, 47-48 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.). In Torres, the Houston First Court held that the plaintiff's claim for injuries when she fell while attempting to walk to the bathroom three days post operatively was a health care liability claim. Id.
. The majority notes that Ollie’s pleading "does not state that special precautions should have been taken for her as a post-knee replacement patient.” Maj. op. at 725. But the content of Ollie's pleading is not controlling; we are to examine the underlying nature of her claim, and she is not permitted to recast a health care liability claim as a premises liability claim. See Diversicare, 185 S.W.3d at 847.