(concurring separately). While I agree with the result reached by the lead opinion, I write separately because it is unclear how the lead opinion interprets the term "expunge” under former MCR 5.913. If it interprets that term as *305requiring the probate court to physically destroy all evidence of a juvenile record automatically once a juvenile offender has reached age twenty-seven and therefore allows use of an adjudication at sentencing only if a probation officer can discover the information from another source, then I disagree.
If the probate court destroys all information at the age of twenty-seven, there is no secondary source unless the twenty-seven-year-old defendant has previously been convicted as an adult and the previous presentence report contained the juvenile record. Thus, for a defendant first convicted as an adult at twenty-seven, the "secondary-source” rule means that the trial judge will have no access to the probate court information which may bear on "an informed sentencing decision,” People v McFarlin, 389 Mich 557, 575; 208 NW2d 504 (1973).
Moreover, if a sentence was imposed before the defendant was twenty-seven years old, the efficacy of the secondary-source rule depends on the likelihood of locating the source, which in turn depends on whether the defendant admits to it or if the probation officer happens to find it. Thus, for example, if a defendant was over twenty-seven at the time of conviction in Detroit and had a prior conviction at the age of twenty-four in Grand Rapids and a juvenile record there, the Detroit court’s access to that information would depend on the fortuity of the defendant’s revealing the fact that he had been convicted in Grand Rapids, or the officer’s locating the presentence report in the Kent Circuit Court from some other source. I fail to see what interest is served by forcing the probation officer, who is charged with the duty of investigating the defendant’s "antecedents, character, and circumstances,” MCL 771.14(1); MSA *30628.1144(1), to conduct a circuitous search for information directly available from the probate court.1
The issue in this case is whether a sentencing court can use information concerning an adult offender’s juvenile record when it has received such information. I agree with the lead opinion that the answer is yes. Even before the adoption of MCR 5.913, this Court determined in People v McFarlin, supra at 574-575, that
[t]he modern view of sentencing is that the sentence should be tailored to the particular circumstances of the case and the offender in an effort to balance both society’s need for protection and its interest in maximizing the offender’s rehabilitative potential. ... A judge needs complete information to set a proper individualized sentence. A defendant’s juvenile court history may reveal a pattern of lawbreaking and his response to previous rehabilitative efforts. This, together with [other] information . . . [is] essential to an informed sentencing decision ....
Former MCR 5.913 should not be interpreted as a limit on the sentencing court’s authority to obtain information relevant to sentencing from the juvenile court.2
Additionally, interpreting MCR 5.913 to permit the physical destruction of all juvenile court records, perpetuates the frequently asserted claim that the defendant is entitled to be resentenced because he was not represented by counsel and did *307not waive counsel when his juvenile offense was adjudicated. If there is no record available because of its physical destruction, the prosecutor may be unable to rebut this contention.3
The apparent purposes for the automatic ex-punction provision in former MCR 5.913 were to protect the rehabilitated juvenile offender and to cure an administrative problem, i.e., the probate court’s concern regarding space for its files. Where the juvenile is subsequently convicted as an adult, the first concern no longer obtains. This Court should accommodate the second concern by reading the rule to create a distinction that allows the probate court to expunge its "files” and requires it to retain some "record” of juvenile entries such as it would typically have for case control purposes. By allowing the latter to be maintained, the probate court’s administrative concern regarding available space can be alleviated without infringing upon the sentencing court’s interest in juvenile entries listed for an adult offender.
*308The current court rule reflects the legislative intent evidenced in MCL 712A.18e; MSA 27.3178(598.18e) and prohibits the automatic ex-punction of any life offense, criminal traffic violation, or adjudicated "[rjeportable juvenile offense.”4 MCR 5.925(E)(2)(b). In addition, if an adjudicated "[r]eportable juvenile offense” is set aside by the probate court according to the procedures set out in MCL 712A.18e; MSA 27.3178(598.18e), the court must
send a copy of the order to the Central Records Division of the Department of State Police and to the law enforcement agency involved in the apprehension of the juvenile .... [MCR 5.925(E)(3)(c)(i).]
MCL 712A.18e(13)(d); MSA 27.3178(598.18e)(13)(d) also requires the State Police to maintain a nonpublic record of that order and the correlative juvenile record which shall be made available to a court of competent jurisdiction for sentencing purposes. MCR 5.925(F) provides that when the juvenile offense record of an adult convicted of a crime is made available "to the appropriate agency . . . the record must state whether, as to each adjudication, the juvenile had counsel or voluntarily waived counsel.” When read together, it becomes evident that MCL 712A.18e; MSA 27.3178(598.18e) and the current court rule impose reporting requirements that insure that, in circumstances similar to the instant case, the sentencing court will receive information concerning an adult offender’s juvenile record.
Consequently, although there is every reason a sentencing court should be allowed to consider an *309adult offender’s juvenile record, too narrow an interpretation of the term "expunge” under former MCR 5.913 may preclude that result. It is in "window cases,” such as this, falling between Mc-Farlin and MCR 5.925, where the presence or absence of a juvenile court record is critical.
I would hold that, while the rule permits destruction of case "files and records,” it does not permit destruction of fundamental case data, such as the nature of the proceeding, the ultimate disposition, and whether the defendant was represented by counsel or waived representation. This construction would permit the probate court to maintain its own housekeeping system without imposing a "secondary source” rule on probation officers and trial judges.
Riley and Griffin, JJ., concurred with Boyle, J. Mallett, J., took no part in the decision of this case.The Court’s proportionality analysis in People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 661; 461 NW2d 1 (1990), underscores the need for accurate data permitting identification whether a sentence is "disproportionately severe or lenient.”
Indeed, although the people do not advance the claim, it is arguable that both this limitation and the portion of the rule allowing the probate court to direct expungement of law enforcement files are not practice and procedure and are in conflict with statutory authority.
Although an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction is not invalid unless a term of imprisonment is imposed, Scott v Illinois, 440 US 367; 99 S Ct 1158; 59 L Ed 2d 383 (1979), it is unclear whether a prior uncounseled juvenile adjudication is constitutionally invalid. People v Covington, 144 Mich App 652; 376 NW2d 178 (1985), lv den 426 Mich 866 (1986).
Federal cases have held that
evidence of a standard practice or customary procedure in a particular jurisdiction can be used to establish the probable constitutional validity of a prior conviction. Courts have also held that the defendant must carry the burden of establishing the invalidity of a prior conviction when the government demonstrates habit and custom that meet constitutional standards. (See, e.g., United States v Dickens, 879 F2d 410 [CA 8, 1989]; United States v Davenport, 884 F2d 121 [CA 4, 1989].) [United States Sentencing Comm, Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual (1991 ed), p 614.]
In McFarlin, supra at 571, this Court acknowledged that Michigan’s courts have provided for counsel in juvenile cases "since juvenile courts were first established in this state.”
A "[r]eportable juvenile offense” is defined in MCR 5.903(B)(6)(a)-(s) and includes nineteen serious felonies.