dissenting.
I agree fully with the dissent of Newton, J., but I also believe that there is an even more basic reason why the judgment herein cannot stand, and a new trial must be granted.
The majority handles the misconduct of jury issue in a very summary manner. Three of the jurors, after continuous discussion, could not agree with the majority vote. They were informed by the foreman, supposedly because he was so told by the bailiff, that the jury must arrive at a verdict. The three of them were unwilling to change their vote but because they had been told there could not be a hung jury, they agreed that they would draw straws and the loser would be required to change his vote even though he was not in agreement with the verdict. I cannot see how this can be other than a coerced verdict.
The law is very clear that any method of arriving at a verdict except through the exercise of judgment after weighing the evidence is improper. This cer*529tainly would preclude the method employed here of agreement to join in a verdict regardless of the juror’s individual judgment. See, 89 C. J. S., Trial, § 472, p. Ill; 53 Am. Jur., Trial, § 1079, p. 710; Annotation, 73 A. L. R. 93.
The majority opinion has the following language: “Fortunately, this very distinction in an almost identical situation was passed on in Boddeker v. Olschewske, 127 Tex. 598, 94 S. W. 2d 730.” Unfortunately for the majority, the Boddeker case did not involve chance or a lottery as this one does. In a subsequent case, Kindy v. Willingham, 146 Tex. 548, 209 S. W. 2d 585 (1947), the Texas court held: “A verdict should not be the result of chance or lot but should be arrived at through the deliberate judgment, sound reflection and conscientious conviction of the jury.”
Every verdict should be arrived at through deliberate judgment, sound reflection, and the conscientious conviction of the jury, and should never be the result of chance or lot. This case is not too different from the quotient verdict cases heretofore before this court. In Spreitzer v. State, 155 Neb. 70, 50 N. W. 2d 516 (1951), this court held that if there is an agreement to be bound and the jurors vote accordingly, then the court must grant a new trial. As the court said, the vice of such a verdict is that it does not represent the deliberate judgment of the jurors and it is subject to. manipulation and partakes of the nature of a lottery. See, also, Killion v. Dinklage, 121 Neb. 322, 236 N. W. 757 (1931); Schrage v. Miller, 123 Neb. 266, 242 N. W. 649 (1932).
The following language quoted from Cooley, J., at 46 Mich. 628, in Gillaspie v. Nebraska Tractor & Equipment Co., 175 Neb. 401, 122 N. W. 2d 17, is very pertinent herein: “ ‘ “The law contemplates that they (the jury) shall, by their discussions, harmonize their views if possible, but not that they shall compromise, divide and yield for the mere purpose of an agreement. The sentiment or notion which permits this tends to bring *530jury trial into discredit and to convert it into a lottery.” See also Meyer v. Shamp, 51 Neb. 424, 430.’ ”