OPINION
MOLLY FRANCIS, Justice.Rafael Sanchez was charged with a consumer affairs violation in a City of Dallas municipal court of record. On the day the case was set for trial, Sanchez made an oral motion to quash the complaint, and the trial court granted the motion. The State appealed to the County Criminal Court of Appeals, arguing the motion was untimely and the municipal court therefore erred in granting the motion. The County Criminal Court of Appeals affirmed, and the State appealed to this Court.
To resolve the issue presented, we must address the meaning of the language “before the date on which the trial on the merits commences” in article 45.019(f) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. For the reasons set out below, we conclude the oral motion was timely. Consequently, we affirm the judgment of the County Criminal Court of Appeals.
Chapter 45 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure governs actions in the justice and municipal courts. Ml pleadings of the defendant may be oral or in writing as the court may direct. Tex.Code CRiM. Peoc. Ann. art. 45.021 (Vernon Supp.2003). Article 45.019(f) provides:
If the defendant does not object to a defect, error, or irregularity of form or substance in a charging instrument before the date on which the trial on the merits commences, the defendant waives and forfeits the right to object to the defect, error, or irregularity. Nothing in this article prohibits a trial court from requiring an objection to a charging instrument be made at an earlier time.
Id. art. 45.019(f) (emphasis added). The State asserts the motion was untimely because it was presented on the day the case was scheduled to go to trial.
When we interpret statutes, we seek to effectuate the “collective” intent or purpose of the legislators who enacted the legislation. Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). When attempting to discern this collective legislative intent or purpose, we necessarily focus our attention on the literal text of the statute in question and attempt to discern the fair, objective meaning of the text at the time of its enactment. Id. ‘Where the statute is clear and unambiguous, the Legislature must be understood to mean what it has expressed, and it is not for the courts to add to or subtract from such a statute.” Id. An exception to this rule is if the statute’s plain meaning would lead to absurd consequences that the legislature could not possibly have intended. Id.
Here, the statute requires a defendant to object to the charging instrument “before the date on which the trial on the merits commences ” or waive that objection. Commence means to “begin, start” or “to initiate formally by performing the first act.” WebsteR’s Third New Int’l DictionaRY 456 (1981). Thus, giving the words of the statute their plain meaning, a municipal court defendant must object before the date on which the trial begins or starts or waive his complaint. In other words, some act must be performed to *700begin the actual trial before waiver occurs. To give the statute the meaning advanced by the State would require this Court to improperly add language, in particular the word “scheduled” or “set,” to the statute that is not there. “Scheduled” to commence does not equate with actual commencement of trial; an event can be scheduled to occur but then be reset. The statute cannot have the meaning advanced by the State.
Moreover, the exception does not apply in this case because a plain-meaning application would not lead to absurd results. To the contrary, the statute allows the judge to hear a motion to quash on the day the case is scheduled for trial. If a municipal court judge grants the motion to quash, the State has two options: (1) it can challenge the ruling by appeal under article 44.01(a)(1) of the code of criminal procedure or (2) it can simply refile the complaint. The ultimate result is that a judge has the ability to ensure the complaint is not defective prior to trial, if presented with a motion to quash.
On the other hand, if the judge denies the motion (thereby suggesting the grounds in the motion to quash are not meritorious) and commences trial, the defendant has waived his complaint. If the judge denies the motion but does not begin trial on that day, the defendant’s motion is timely and may be considered on appeal. We cannot conclude these consequences could not possibly have been intended by the legislature.
Having considered the meaning of the statute, we turn to the facts of this case. We begin by noting there is no reporter’s record from the municipal court hearing because the judge refused the State’s request that one be made. Thus, we have only the clerk’s record to review. While the absence of a reporter’s record has not hampered our ability to resolve the precise legal question presented, we remind the municipal court judge of the statutory requirements regarding records. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 30.00010 (Vernon Supp.2003).
In its original brief, the State does not argue, nor does our record reflect, that any act was performed that commenced the trial on the merits. Rather, in a one-page brief, the State simply asserted Sanchez “orally presented the motion on the very same day that the case was set for trial on the merits.” Because the State failed to argue in its original brief that trial had already commenced when Sanchez moved to quash the complaint, it is not necessary to the disposition of this appeal, and in fact would be dicta, to determine precisely what actions would constitute commencement of trial on the merits in a bench trial or jury trial.
We note that, in a reply brief, the State asserts in a single sentence that the motion to quash itself constituted commencement of trial. Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.3 permits an appellant, in its reply brief, to address “any matter in the appellee’s brief.” Tex.R.App. P. 38.3. However, a reply brief is not intended to allow an appellant to raise new issues. Whether presentment of a motion to quash would constitute commencement of trial on the merits was not an issue raised by appellee’s brief. Consequently, we need not consider the matter as it is a new issue raised in the State’s reply brief.
Regardless, the State’s assertion is without merit and would render the statute meaningless. If trial begins with a motion to quash, a motion to quash could never be timely presented on the date before trial on the merits commences. In other words, all motions to quash, regardless of when presented, would be untimely.
The State has not shown that Sanchez’s motion was untimely; consequently, the trial court did not err in considering the motion presented on the day the case was *701scheduled for trial. We resolve the issue against the State.
We affirm the judgment of the County Criminal Court of Appeals.
JAMES and LANG, JJ., dissenting separately.