concurring specially.
If we were to apply the harmless-error standard of Rule 61, N.D.R.Civ.P., to this case I believe we would necessarily have to affirm the judgment of the district court. Rule 61 specifies that “no error or defect ... in anything done or omitted ... by any of the parties is ground for vacating, modifying or otherwise disturbing a judgment ... unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice.” The rule further admonishes that “The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.”
Although I concur with the majority opinion that the Bank should have considered the possibility of reduction of principal or interest as an available forbearance action, it is obvious to me that if such consideration had been given the result would have been no different in this case. *860Forbearance in the form of concessions does not require forgiveness of the entire debt. Rather, 12 C.F.R. § 614.4513(a) provides in part:
“Each System institution has an obligation to its borrowers, stockholders, and investors in System debt obligations to collect all debts owed to the institution. In pursuit of that obligation, when a borrower is encountering financial difficulties the institution should consider alternative actions that will increase the likelihood of the borrower’s being able to repay the debt in an orderly fashion or that will improve the ability of the institution to collect the indebtedness.” [Emphasis supplied.]
The very reasons which lead the majority to conclude that the trial court’s decision to not delay the foreclosure under State law, i.e., Section 28-29-05, N.D.C.C., also support a decision by the Federal Land Bank to deny forbearance or restructuring of the loans, including the possibility of monetary concessions. In the words of the majority opinion:
“In making this discretionary decision the court found that the debt would substantially exceed the value of the property at the end of the one-year redemption period while noting that in addition to this the real estate taxes were also unpaid for 1985 and 1986. Based upon those findings, the trial court concluded that continuation of the foreclosure proceedings without delay would not be unconscionable. We find no error in the trial court’s application of Section 28-29-05, N.D.C.C., to this case.”
It is thus readily apparent that had the Federal Land Bank considered but rejected the reduction of principal or interest in this particular case, for the reason that it would not “increase the likelihood of the borrower’s being able to repay the debt in orderly fashion,” such action would have been nearly identical to the trial court’s decision to not delay foreclosure under Section 28-29-05, an action the majority finds to be without error and with which I agree. Because of the size of the debt and value of the property I doubt that consideration of reducing the principal or interest due on the loan would have produced any different result in this case. I nevertheless concur with the majority opinion that such consideration is required. Protection of the “family farm” has always had a special status in the debtor laws of this State. Before that farm may be taken I agree that every legally required consideration to retaining ownership in the debtor must be specifically examined by the lender and appear of record.