OPINION
WILLIS, JudgeThe district court found appellant Richard A. Hoelzel guilty of felony burglary and gross-misdemeanor interference with a 911 call. The court stayed imposition of sentence on the gross misdemeanor count and refused to sentence on the felony count. The state appeals. Because we conclude that the district court’s refusal to sentence effectively stayed adjudication of the burglary count and that the stay was not supported by “special circumstances,” we reverse and remand for sentencing.
FACTS
In September 1999, respondent Richard A. Hoelzel entered his estranged wife’s residence through an open garage door to talk to her, in violation of a harassment restraining order. When she threatened to call the police, Hoelzel unplugged the phone from the wall and then walked out of the house and sat down in the back yard. His wife reconnected the phone and called the police. The police found Hoelzel sitting in the back yard and arrested him.
Hoelzel was charged with first-degree burglary, in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1 (1998), a felony; interference with a 911 call, in violation of *46Minn.Stat. § 609.78, subd. 2 (Supp.1999), a gross misdemeanor; and violation of an order for protection (OFP), in violation of Minn.Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 14(a) (1998). After a bench trial, the district court found Hoelzel guilty of first-degree burglary and interference with a 911 call. The court dismissed the charge for violation of an OFP because a harassment restraining order, rather than an OFP, was in effect.
At Hoelzel’s sentencing hearing, the district court announced that it found Hoelzel guilty of burglary only because his conduct was a “technical violation” of the burglary statute. The court noted the adverse effects of a felony record and announced that, over the prosecutor’s objection, it would defer sentencing on the burglary count:
The Burglary is not going to be sentenced until and unless I have to address it by either a revocation or the Court of Appeals tells me I must.
The district court’s sentencing order stayed imposition of sentence on the interference with a 911 call count. The court placed Hoelzel on probation for two years, required him to perform 32 hours of community service and to undergo a follow-up psychiatric examination, and fined him $300. This appeal followed.
ISSUES
1. Was the district court’s deferral of sentencing the functional equivalent of a stay of adjudication?
2. Do “special circumstances” support the deferral of sentencing?
ANALYSIS
1. Refusal to sentence
The state argues that the district court’s refusal to sentence Hoelzel on the burglary count is a stay of adjudication and that the circumstances of this case do not support such a stay. Hoelzel contends that the district court did not stay adjudication because the court “formally adjudicated” him guilty of burglary and interference with a 911 call and then exercised its discretion in choosing the count on which to impose sentence. The state responds that the sentencing disposition on the burglary count must be considered a stay of adjudication because there was no sentence and thus no final adjudication on that count.
Minnesota law provides that “a sentence constitutes a final judgment, or adjudication, of conviction.” State v. Thoma, 569 N.W.2d 205, 207 (Minn.App.1997) (citing Minn.R.Crim.P. 28.02, subd. 2(1)); see also State v. Putzier, 183 Minn. 423, 424-25, 236 N.W. 765, 766 (1931) (explaining that there has been no final judgment until there has been both a determination of guilt and a judgment of sentence imposing the penalty which will be enforced without further judicial action). A finding of guilt is not an adjudication of guilt. See Minn.Stat. § 609.095 (1998) (“[A] court may not refuse to adjudicate the guilt of a defendant who * * * has been found guilty by a court or jury following a trial.”).
By declining to sentence Hoelzel for burglary, but leaving open the possibility of a future sentence, the district court deferred adjudication on that count. Deferral of sentence produces the same result as a stay of adjudication, that is, Hoel-zel’s record reflects no felony conviction. We conclude that the refusal to sentence on the burglary count is the functional equivalent of a stay of adjudication on that count.1
*472. Special circumstances
A district court should not interfere with the prosecutor’s charging function “absent evidence of selective or discriminatory prosecutorial intent, or an abuse of prosecutorial discretion.” State v. Krotzer, 548 N.W.2d 252, 254 (Minn.1996). But a district court may stay adjudication of a criminal charge if “special circumstances” so warrant. Id. at 254-55. The “inherent judicial authority” recognized in Krotzer is to be used “sparingly and only for the purpose of avoiding an injustice resulting from the prosecutor’s clear abuse of discretion in the exercise of the charging function.” State v. Foss, 556 N.W.2d 540, 541 (Minn.1996) (emphasis omitted); see also Thoma, 569 N.W.2d at 208 (holding that stay of adjudication of criminal charge “is justified only if the [district] court, after reviewing the circumstances of the case, determines that the prosecutor’s charging decision was a clear abuse of discretion.”).
Here, the district court stated that it “happened to disagree with” the prosecution in charging Hoelzel with burglary and found Hoelzel guilty only because the court believed that the law so required. The district court also noted the adverse effects of a criminal record:
I think everybody involved in the court system knows what happens when people run a criminal history check [and] they see a conviction of First Degree Burglary on somebody’s record.
Disagreement with a prosecutor’s exercise of the charging function and the existence of collateral consequences of a conviction are not special circumstances supporting a stay of adjudication. See Foss, 556 N.W.2d at 541 (describing intention to limit use of stays of adjudication to cases where prosecutor’s clear abuse of charging function creates injustice); see also State v. Twiss, 570 N.W.2d 487, 487 (Minn.1997) (holding that possible loss of job due to criminal conviction is typical consequence of serious offense, and not special circumstance); State v. Prabhudail, 602 N.W.2d 413, 414-15 (describing continuance for dismissal and stay of adjudication as “functionally equivalent,” applying Krotzer-Foss-Thoma standard and concluding that deportation, as collateral consequence of criminal conviction, is not special circumstance justifying continuance for dismissal).
At the sentencing hearing, the district court expressed its opinion that “the difference between sentencing [Hoelzel] as a felon or a gross misdemeanor offender means essentially * * * probation for two years, as opposed to five.” Based on Hoel-zel’s psychological profile, the district court noted that if Hoelzel was “going to act out, he’s going to act out whether he’s on probation for two years or five” and that if Hoelzel did “act out,” he would do so “relatively quickly.” This is not a special circumstance that justifies a stay of adjudication.
DECISION
The district court’s deferral of sentencing on the burglary count is the functional equivalent of a stay of adjudication. Because no special circumstances support the deferral of sentencing, we reverse and remand for sentencing on the burglary count.
Reversed and remanded.
. The dissent contends that the sentencing disposition here is expressly contemplated by statute. See Minn.Stat. §§ 609.035, subd. 1, .585 (1998). ("[I]f a person’s conduct constitutes more than one offense under the laws of this state, the person may be punished for only one of the offenses” but "prosecution for or conviction of the crime of burglary is not a bar to conviction of or punishment for any other crime committed oñ entering or while in the building entered.”) The statutory provisions do not address the present circumstance, where the district court has not yet decided whether to punish Hoelzel on the burglary count by imposing a sentence on that count. i