(dissenting). This case involves the meaning of the word "nonrenewal” as used by the Legislature in MCL 380.132; MSA 15.4132, the statute governing employment contracts of administrators. The trial court determined that the term is synonymous with discharge or termination from employment. The majority adopts a less restrictive definition that includes a reassignment from an administrative position to a nonadministrative position. I am of the opinion that the majority’s interpretation of the statute is overbroad and find no error in the trial court’s application of the more restrictive definition. Accordingly, I dissent.
As noted by the majority, this Court had occasion to address what constitutes a "nonrenewal” under § 132 in Wessely v Carrollton School Dist, *40139 Mich App 439; 362 NW2d 731 (1984), and Roberts v Beecher Community School Dist, 143 Mich App 266; 372 NW2d 328 (1985). Those cases held that an economic layoff is not a "nonrenewal.” The Wessely Court reasoned:
A statute that is plain and unambiguous is not open to construction by a court. We find nothing ambiguous in the statute before us that would require us to construe it or analyze the legislative intent behind it. It clearly applies to nonrenewals of contracts. There is no reason to extend it to layoffs as well. Plaintiffs argue that administrators need procedural protections from lay-offs as well as from nonrenewals of contracts. That argument might well be taken up with the Legislature, or at the next collective bargaining talks. But it does not persuade us to expand application of this statute to accommodate plaintiffs’ situation.
As the trial judge noted, nonrenewal of a contract terminates the legal relationship between the contracting parties, whereas a lay-off does not necessarily mean cessation of the employment contract. This case provides a good example of the distinction. [139 Mich App 442-443. Citations omitted; emphasis added.]
In Roberts, supra, this Court stated:
Section 132 expressly refers to "nonrenewals” in imposing certain notice requirements and omits any reference to the temporary loss of employment known as layoff. The "nonrenewal” of an employment contract is a term of art and describes a phenomenon significantly different from a mid-contract economic layoff. This Court in Wessely observed that the "nonrenewal of a contract terminates the legal relationship between the contracting parties, whereas a lay-off does not necessarily mean cessation of the employment contract.” 139 Mich App 443. Contrary to the plaintiff’s arguments on appeal, the difference is not simply one *41of labeling. For example, in the instant case, plaintiff was almost immediately assigned to a teaching position as required under the collective bargaining agreement between defendant and the Beecher Education Association, of which plaintiff was apparently a member. The legislative use of the term "nonrenewal” in § 132 is specific and unambiguous and must be construed and applied on its face. Since this case involved' an economic layoff and not a nonrenewal, § 132 does not apply.
Our construction of the language comports with the clear purpose of § 132, which is to protect nontenured administrators from the arbitrary and capricious actions of local school boards. Where a school board’s action in dismissing an administrator is genuinely mandated by economic conditions, the potential for arbitrary and capricious behavior is all but precluded. We note in this context that § 132 does not guarantee continued employment but merely attempts to guarantee that an administrator will not be discharged for reasons that are arbitrary or capricious. The notice requirements are procedural mechanisms designed to achieve this purpose. [143 Mich App 268-269.]
Under Wessely and Roberts, the word "nonrenewal,” as used in the statutory provision at issue, unambiguously denotes the severance of the legal relationship between the employer school district and the employee administrator. I would therefore construe the word "nonrenewal” to be synonymous with either the word "discharge” or the word "termination” and conclude that the reassignment of a nontenured administrator to a classroom teaching position does not trigger the procedural protections of MCL 380.132; MSA 15.4132. See Roberts, 143 Mich App 268-269; Wessely, 139 Mich App 443.
In this case, there was no termination of the legal employer-employee relationship that existed between plaintiff and the district. Instead, plain*42tiff’s employment continued in a different position. Further, the parties’ employment contract for the 1989-90 school year clearly contemplated and reserved to the district the right to change plaintiff’s assignment. Under these circumstances, and in light of the law as expressed in Roberts, supra, and Wessely, supra, the trial court properly granted summary disposition for defendants. I would hold that the procedural protections set forth in MCL 380.132; MSA 15.4132 do not apply absent a complete cessation of the employer-employee relationship and, because such a cessation did not occur in the present case, I would affirm.