(dissenting). The Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York (mony) is a foreign insurance company doing business in Michigan. A foreign insurer is required to pay "a premium tax upon its insurance carrier services written in this state . . . .” The tax is two percent of "the gross premiums.” MCL 500.440(l)(a); MSA 24.1440(l)(a). Mony provides a group life insurance program for its Michigan employees. The premiums for those policies are paid in part by mony and in part by the employees. The issues presented are: (1) whether the employee contributions toward their own participatory-benefit plan, supplied by mony on a nonprofit, nonactuarial basis, constitute taxable premiums within the meaning of §§ 440 and 441 of the Michigan Insurance Code;1 and (2) whether the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (erisa)2 would preempt the tax imposed by the code if construed to include such amounts received from employees.
I
I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. A premium tax applicable to foreign life insurance companies is a tax levied as a condition precedent to, and in exchange for, the privilege enjoyed by a foreign insurance company of engaging in the intrastate insurance business. Such taxes, frequently called excise, privilege, or franchise taxes, relate directly to the exercise of the privilege of conducting an insurance business in *668the taxing state. The Michigan premium tax, while not an income tax as such, is measured by the amount of a foreign insurance company’s business attributable to this state.
MCL 500.440; MSA 24.1440, in imposing the premium tax, provides in pertinent part:
Section 440. Every foreign insurer of the classes enumerated in this section, admitted to do and doing insurance business in this state as a condition precedent to the privilege of doing business, shall pay to the commissioner for prompt deposit with the state treasurer ... a premium tax upon its insurance carrier services written in this state under the authority of the commissioner for the year ending December 31, computed as follows: (a) Life insurers, a tax of 2% on the gross premiums excluding considerations for original annuities. [Emphasis added.]
MCL 500.441; MSA 24.1441, in defining taxable premiums, provides:
Section 441. The taxes on premiums from insurers shall be upon all premiums, whether upon business written or renewed, which are received by any insurer or by any person acting as agent therefor, both upon policies issued by agents in this state or policies issued at the ofñce of the insurers upon application of subagents or others, or for any individuals or association of individuals, not incorporated or authorized by the laws of this state, to effect insurance against fire, inland, marine, life, casualty, title, or other risks .... [Emphasis added.]
The Michigan premium tax here in question levies the privilege tax directly and solely on that *669part of the foreign insurer’s gross premiums which were generated from its insurance business in Michigan. The section imposing the tax explicitly refers to "insurance business in this state” and "business written in this state.” Section 441 further qualifies the meaning of "premiums” within the statute to those received by the insurer "upon policies issued by agents in this state or policies issued at the office of the insurers upon application of subagents or others . . . .”
Recognizing that the terms "gross premiums” and "all premiums” must be construed within the context of each statutory section and the code as a whole, I am persuaded that the most reasonable construction is that the premium tax may be imposed on, and only on, premiums received in connection with the business of writing or renewing insurance policies. While the subject of the tax is the privilege of doing business within this state, its measurement is based upon the amount of gross premiums received from the carrying on of an insurance business — the amount of gross premiums received from persons who have bought policies in the regular course of business. The contributions of mony’s employees and field underwriters toward their employee benefit programs, therefore, should not be included in the tax base upon which the premium tax is levied.
II
As noted by the Court of Appeals, the courts of several other jurisdictions have addressed similar questions. The reported decisions construing similar tax provisions have uniformly concluded that insurance fringe benefits, such as the employee-*670benefit plan of mony, do not constitute the conduct of insurance business for premium tax purposes.3
The Court of Appeals appropriately focused on Mutual Life Ins Co of New York v New York State Tax Comm, 32 NY2d 348; 345 NYS2d 475; 298 NE2d 632 (1973). In that case, the New York court, applying that state’s similar premium tax, held that such employee contributions were not taxable.4 The court emphasized the employer-employee relationship involved:
The relationship involved, then, is not commercial, nor one of seller and purchaser, with profit or contribution to surplus accruing to the former; rather, it is an incident of its employer-employee relationship, no different from that of any other employer not subject to the premium tax. Concededly, noninsurance company employers who provide insurance benefits for their employees similar to those provided by the petitioner are not subject to the taxing provision of section 187. Such employer-sponsored programs do not constitute the doing of an insurance business within the meaning of the statute, and we agree with the petitioner that what constitutes a nontaxable employer-employee relationship for noninsurers — rather than the doing of an insurance business — is not transformed into a taxable insurance business merely because the employer is licensed to conduct such a business. [32 NY2d 352.]
The California Court of Appeals arrived at the *671same conclusion earlier in California-Western States Life Ins Co v State Bd of Equalization, 151 Cal App 2d 559; 312 P2d 19 (1957). California imposed an annual privilege tax on the basis of the amount of gross premiums received from "business done in California.” The court held that "the retention ... of a part of wages due participating employees were not premiums received . . . upon [the insurer’s] business done” within the state for purposes of determining the base upon which the premium tax is to be levied. Id., 561. See also Metropolitan Life Ins Co v State Bd of Equalization, 32 Cal 3d 649; 186 Cal Rptr 578; 652 P2d 426 (1982).
The Massachusetts Supreme Court, construing a similar tax provision, reached the same conclusion in State Tax Comm v John Hancock Mutual Life Ins Co, 341 Mass 555; 170 NE2d 711 (1960). Following the reasoning of the California Court of Appeals in California-Western, supra, the Massachusetts court noted the similarity of insurance contracts provided by employers pursuant to employee-benefit plans and commercial insurance contracts. Referring to the employee-benefit plan at issue, however, the court said
[it was] not a product of the company’s solicitation of the purchase of insurance policies by the general public. Instead, it is one aspect of the company’s employer-employee relations, a method by which it assumes an expense to facilitate its business and compensates its employees for services in its usual insurance operations. [Id., 563.]
The court, concluding that the employee-benefit plan was not within the tax measure, stated that "serious doubt exist[ed] whether the Legislature had any intention to classify the [benefit plan] for taxation with policies issued in [the ordinary] *672course [of insurance business],” and articulated the well-established principle that tax statutes are to be strictly construed and that "all doubts are to be resolved in favor of the taxpayer.” Id., 565.
Both the Louisiana Court of Appeals and the Tennessee Supreme Court have reached the same conclusion, applying similar premium tax provisions. See Danna v Comm’r of Ins, 228 So 2d 708 (La App, 1969); Williams v Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins Co, 221 Tenn 508; 427 SW2d 845 (1968).
The reported decisions that have considered the status of contributory insurance programs maintained by insurance companies, similar in nature to the employee-benefit plan in the instant case, have held that such programs do not constitute, for premium tax purposes, a part of the insurance business carried on by the employer. I find the analyses of those decisions to be persuasive. Moreover, as noted by the Court of Appeals in the instant case, any ambiguity in the tax provisions here in question must be construed against the taxing authority. Ecorse Screw Machine Products Co v Corporation & Securities Comm, 378 Mich 415, 418; 145 NW2d 46 (1966); Ready-Power Co v Dearborn, 336 Mich 519, 525; 58 NW2d 904 (1953); Consumers Power Co v Corporation & Securities Comm, 326 Mich 643, 648; 40 NW2d 756 (1950); Standard Oil Co v Michigan, 283 Mich 85, 88; 276 NW 908 (1937).
Ill
I agree with the majority that the premium tax is not a "gross-profits tax”; the tax is imposed as a condition precedent to the privilege of conducting an insurance business within this state, and it is measured by the amount of "gross premiums” received through the exercise of that privilege. *673The purpose of the privilege tax is to exact payments from insurers doing business in Michigan, and the gross-premiums measure is designed to approximate the volume of business done in this state. In light of this purpose, I find it doubtful that the Legislature intended employee contributions toward their own participatory benefit plan, supplied on a nonprofit, nonactuarial basis, to be included in calculating the base upon which the premium tax is to be levied.
A contrary conclusion cannot be supported by finding no ambiguity in the premium tax provisions. Likewise, such a conclusion is not "buttressed” by the Legislature’s enactment of MCL 500.3726; MSA 24.13726, which relates to the statutory purpose of facilitating the availability of health insurance for Michigan residents sixty-five years of age or older,5 or by attempting to distinguish the Michigan premium tax provisions from those of other states.6
Therefore, I respectfully dissent. I would hold *674that the contributions of mony’s employees and field underwriters are not to be included in the calculation of "gross premiums” subject to the premium tax. My disposition of this issue would make it unnecessary to decide whether erisa would preempt the taxation if construed to apply to the costs of the employee-benefit program here in question.
Cavanagh, J., concurred with Riley, J. Archer, J., took no part in the decision of this case.Originally, whether the employer’s contributions were taxable was also at issue. The trial court held that they were not and that issue is no longer contested.
29 USC 1001 et seq.
See Danna v Comm’r of Ins, 228 So 2d 708 (La App, 1969), untimely app not considered 255 La 283; 230 So 2d 588 (1970), Williams v Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins Co, 221 Tenn 508; 427 SW2d 845 (1968), State Tax Comm v John Hancock Mutual Life Ins Co, 341 Mass 555; 170 NE2d 711 (1960), California-Western States Life Ins Co v State Bd of Equalization, 151 Cal App 2d 559; 312 P2d 19 (1957), and other cases cited by the Court of Appeals, at 399, n 2, in its opinion in the instant case.
At issue in the New York court’s Mutual Life decision was the application of New York’s similar premium tax to the same employee benefit plan of mony at issue in the instant case.
The purpose of Chapter 37 of the Insurance Code is "to provide a means of more adequately meeting the needs of persons who are 65 years of age or older ... for [health] insurance coverage,” and "to make possible the fullest extension of such coverage by encouraging insurance companies to combine their resources and experience and to exercise their collective efforts in the development and offering of policies of health insurance to all such applicants,” and "to regulate the joint activities [therein] authorized in accordance with” 15 USC 1011-1015. MCL 500.3701; MSA 24.13701.
Accordingly, §3726 states that, for purposes of taxation, "any association formed under this act shall be treated as a domestic corporation . . . .” MCL 500.3726; MSA 24.13726. "Association” is defined in § 3702 as "a voluntary unincorporated association formed for the purpose of enabling cooperative action to provide health insurance in accordance with this chapter in this or any other state having legislation enabling the issuance of insurance of the type authorized by this act.” MCL 500.3702; MSA 24.13702.
The existence of § 3726 of Chapter 37 of the Insurance Code, which is specifically applicable to "associations” as defined in that act, is not relevant to the issue in the instant case: whether employee contributions toward their own participatory benefit plan constitute "premiums” within the meaning of § 440.
The majority’s attempt to distinguish the New York court’s Mu*674tual Life decision by noting that the New York statute had been administratively interpreted as excluding the cost of insurers’ employee-benefit programs is misplaced. Appellant has conceded, in the instant case, that mony’s "employer’s contribution” is not subject to the tax. Only the "employees’ contribution” is at issue, and the longstanding administrative interpretation referred to by the majority, which was reversed by the opinion of the New York Attorney General, related only to the employer cost. Appellee aptly makes this point in its brief.
Michigan’s premium tax, applicable to foreign insurers doing business within this state is, in substance, indistinguishable from similar tax measures imposed by the several states. The substantial uniformity of state premium taxes, imposed as a privilege tax, is documented in the United States Supreme Court decision in Western & Southern Life Ins Co v State Bd of Equalization of California, 451 US 648; 101 S Ct 2070; 68 L Ed 2d 514 (1981), in which California’s "retaliatory” tax provision was upheld against a constitutional challenge. Michigan has a similar "retaliatory” tax provision. See MCL 500.476; MSA 24.1476.