(specially concurring).
I agree with the result and the major part of the opinion authored by the Chief Justice but write separately to express my views on the issue of fault in the context of an equitable property division.
The trial court found not only marital misconduct, that is, adultery, but also financial mismanagement of the marital assets, squandering of those assets and serious endangerment to the continued ownership of the remaining assets — all by the appellant. The trial court characterized the appellant’s financial misconduct by stating that he “unnecessarily and grievously diminished the holdings of the parties and has placed them in jeopardy of further loss through dissipation and foreclosure.” It is this kind of financial misconduct, rather than moral or marital misconduct, that is relevant. Fault is an appropriate consideration only insofar as it can be shown to have substantially affected the economic status of the parties. Marital misconduct which is not significantly related to the economic condition of the marriage is not germane to a division of property and should not be considered. Smith v. Smith, 331 S.E.2d 682 (N.C.1985); see also O’Kelly, Entitlement to Spousal Support After Divorce, 61 N.D.L.Rev. 225, 257 (1985). So, a compulsive gambler, unarrested alcoholic, or economic reprobate may be award*663ed a lesser division of property if it is shown that there was substantial dissipation or waste of assets by virtue of that party’s conduct. See Anstutz v. Anstutz, 331 N.W.2d 844 (Wis.Ct.App.1983).
As far as I am concerned, the adulterer will reap retribution in a different arena. I believe this Court shares the enlightened view of the marriage relationship — that marriage is a partnership enterprise, a joint venture, to which each party contributes his and her efforts and skills, as agreed upon, either or both within or without the home. See Briese v. Briese, 325 N.W.2d 245 (N.D.1982). Upon dissolution therefore, the accumulated property should be distributed on the basis of the contributions to the partnership that entitle each party to a fair share of the property. See Smith v. Smith, supra; Blickstein v. Blickstein, 99 A.D.2d 287, 472 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1984); Hinton v. Hinton, 70 N.C.App. 665, 321 S.E.2d 161 (1984). This view of marriage makes noneconomic fault irrelevant to fair division based on joint efforts.
The Ruff-Fischer guidelines are consistent with this analysis. Insofar as one of those guidelines is the conduct of the parties, it should be interpreted to mean, for purposes of property distribution, the conduct of the parties that led to destruction, squandering or waste of assets.
In this case, the trial court’s finding of economic fault was not clearly erroneous, although its finding of marital misconduct was irrelevant, in my view. I do not believe that the latter finding justifies reversal under the circumstances of this case.
I add that while I am troubled by the appellant’s claim of bias, I conclude that the appellant made what amounts to a broadside attack on the alleged lack of impartiality of the trial judge, without enumerating or articulating in reasonably orderly fashion the evidence to support this claim. We are not a “de novo court” and we should not be expected to search the record for error. Cf., Umpleby By and Through Umpleby v. State, 347 N.W.2d 156 (N.D.1984). It is up to the litigants to point us in the right direction and provide us with facts and law sufficient to serve as our compass.
MESCHKE, J., concurs.