(dissenting). Resident inmates are obviously members of the public in a general sense. However, MCL 24.207(g); MSA 3.560(107)(g) exempts directives which do not affect the rights of, or the procedures and practices available to, the public. The rights of, and procedures and practices available to, inmates are severely restricted while they are incarcerated. Thus, although inmates are members of the public in a general sense, I believe that a contrary result must be reached for the purposes of the rulemaking requirement of the apa. I cannot conclude that the Legislature intended this requirement to apply to Policy Directive 60.01, which only involves the internal disciplinary processing of inmates.
I
The majority fails to interpret MCL 24.207(g); MSA 3.560(107)(g) in light of the overall goals of the apa. The prefatory note to the 1981 Model Act1 states:
This Model Act, like the 1961 Revised Model Act, creates only procedural rights and imposes only procedural duties. It seeks to simplify government by assuring a uniform minimum procedure to which all agencies will be held in the conduct of their functions. Further, this act seeks to increase public access to all of the sources of law used by agencies, and to facilitate and encourage the issu*566anee of reliable advice by agencies as to the applicability to particular circumstances of law within their primary jurisdiction. In addition, it attempts to facilitate public participation in the formulation of the law adopted by agencies, ensure accountability of agencies to the public, and enhance legislative and gubernatorial oversight of agencies. [14 ULA, 1986 supp, p 70. Emphasis supplied.]
These goals are furthered by the rulemaking requirement, which compels agencies to give notice of a public hearing and receive public input on proposed rules.
However, there are a number of statutory exemptions to the rulemaking requirement. In analyzing the underlying purpose of the exemptions, Professor Bonfield (a noted commentator whose work is cited extensively in the comments to the Model Act) states:
These exemptions consequently represent an effort to strike a fair balance between the need to increase public participation in the rulemaking process on the one hand, and the conflicting need for efficient, economical, and effective government on the other hand. In the case of each one of these exemptions, it was determined that subjecting the particular statements in question to rulemaking procedures was either unnecessary, unduly burdensome on the agencies, or would lead to inefficient or ineffective government. [Bonfield, The Iowa administrative procedure act: Background, construction, applicability, public access to agency law, the rulemeiking process, 60 Iowa L R 731, 832 (1975).]
Bonfield also analyzed the purpose of the public rights exemption, Iowa apa, § 2(7)(c), which is similar2 to the one addressed today:
*567This provision also strikes a proper balance between the agencies’ need to conduct their own internal affairs without being excessively burdened by rulemaking requirements, and the public’s need to assure an adequate opportunity for public participation in agency lawmaking. [Id., p 835.]
Taken in this context, I believe that the "public participation” envisioned by the Michigan apa was that of the public at large, or in this case, the non-inmate population. The rulemaking requirement was meant
to assure that rule-making determinations are democratic as well as technocratic — that the body politic may effectively thwart the adoption of rules, no matter how technically sound and lawful, that are politically unacceptable to the community. [14 ULA, 1986 supp, p 87.]
This purpose is clearly inappropriate in a prison setting and indicates further that resident inmates were not intended to come within its ambit.
II
Section VI of the majority opinion states that legislative action and inaction suggest an intent to include resident inmates within the apa.
However, legislative action since Lawrence v Dep’t of Corrections, 88 Mich App 167; 276 NW2d 554 (1979), evidences a general intent to exclude the prison disciplinary process from the strict requirements of the apa. 1979 PA 139 and 1979 PA 140 set up a special hearing procedure for *568inmates.3 Prior to the enactment of those acts, the House Legislative Analysis Section stated:
Many people feel that some of the a.p.a. requirements are inappropriate to the prison disciplinary hearings process. For example, they fear that allowing prisoners to know the identity of witnesses testifying against them could endanger the witness in some cases. The added cost of complying with the a.p.a. requirements, estimated at $1.4 million, is another concern. In response to these considerations, the exemption of prison disciplinary hearings from the Administrative Procedures Act has been advocated. [Analysis of HB 4105 and HB 4480, June 19, 1979. Emphasis supplied.]
This evidences the Legislature’s concern for overburdening the department with the technical, time-consuming, and expensive requirements of the apa. The Legislature has, from time to time, chosen to impose the rulemaking requirements on the department. Nonetheless, in this instance, I cannot conclude that this policy directive should be similarly burdened. There is no express requirement imposed on the day-to-day operations of the disciplinary process.
I submit that legislative inactivity since Lawrence, supra, is meaningless. The absence of a more specific provision dealing with educational, health, and correctional institutions (as found in the Model Act), does not necessarily indicate that the Legislature was aware of the 1981 revision, yet made a conscious decision to disregard it. Instead, reaction to Lawrence, which occurred prior to the Model Act’s revision in 1981, indicates that the Legislature was cognizant of the department’s unique operational responsibilities.
*569m
The majority also fails to give sufficient consideration to the practical effects of its decision. To a great extent, the department’s daily operations are controlled by intra-agency memoranda, directives, and other communications. If inmates are members of the public for purposes of the rulemaking requirement, then conceivably every memorandum which affects prisoners must be promulgated. Such an interpretation effectively renders the exemption meaningless.
The better rule, and one that has been enforced in the past, would require promulgation of those rules which affect the non-inmate public. For example, in Schinzel v Dep’t of Corrections, 124 Mich App 217; 333 NW2d 519 (1983), the Court focused on the actual action taken by the directive to determine if it affected the members of the public at large. The Court required a rule to be promulgated, because members of the general public (i.e., family and friends) were deprived of practices (sending stamps to inmates) which they would otherwise enjoy. Id., p 219.
Spruytte v Walters, 753 F2d 498 (CA 6, 1985), dictates a similar result. The policy directive at issue in that case involved a mother’s right to send a book to her inmate son. Although not dispositive of the case, the court correctly noted that since the public’s rights (i.e., the mother’s) were affected, the directive had to be published as a rule. Id., p 504.
In contrast, Martin was disciplined under a policy directive which only affects the rights of the inmate population. I do not believe that this portion of the internal disciplinary process was meant to be subjected to the rulemaking requirement of the apa.
Nor am I persuaded that the "emergency rules” noted by the majority will relieve any burden. In view of the time-consuming nature of the rulemak*570ing process,4 which includes submission to the Legislature for approval, I seriously doubt that those rules will benefit the department.
IV
The plaintiff must have been aware of the fact that possession of marijuana — a crime itself — was also a violation of prison rules. The Legislature has enacted several measures to assure that inmates are afforded basic rights. However, the rule-making requirement of the apa looks outward for input from those outside the particular agency.5 While in prison, an inmate’s right to participate in the public process is severely limited. The right to vote — perhaps the most basic right enjoyed by members of the public — is taken away. Accordingly, I do not believe that the Legislature intended to grant inmates the identical level of participation in the disciplinary process as that granted to the non-inmate population.
Boyle, J., concurred with Cavanagh, J. Archer, J., took no part in the decision of this case._I agree with the majority that Michigan’s apa closely parallels the Model State apa.
The Iowa exemption states that "[a]n intergovernmental, intera*567gency, or intra-agency memorandum, directive, manual or other communication which does not substantially affect the legal rights of, or procedures available to, the public or any segment thereof’ is not a "rule.” Iowa Code Ann, § 17A.2(7)(c).
Plaintiff was disciplined in accordance with this procedure.
See Processing of administrative rules in Michigan, 63 Mich B J 1024-1029 (1984).
See Bonfield, supra, p 834.