This is an appeal from an order taxing costs in a disqualification proceeding,1 dated May 12, 1966, and entered May 14, 1966, in the Wayne county circuit court by visiting circuit judge Fred N. . Searl. The facts are well stated in Judge Searl’s *27opinion granting respondent’s motion to assess costs, as follows:
“The principal case of Harvey v. Lewis has been in the courts since 1952, see opinion in Harvey v. Lewis, (1959), 357 Mich 305. Circuit judge John V. Brennan was originally assigned the case and filed an opinion on the merits of the original controversy. Subsequently a receiver was appointed. Judge Rashid entered the case in 1957, after other judges who had heard it either died, retired or became disqualified.
“In January or February 1966 plaintiffs filed a petition to disqualify Judge Rashid and it was heard before the writer of this opinion, who was assigned the case by the court administrator. After a two-day trial and at the conclusion of plaintiffs’ testimony, a motion to dismiss was granted, and subsequently an order entered dismissing the petition to disqualify.
“The proofs consisted of the claims (1) that Judge Rashid made erroneous orders in the receivership matter; (2) that in 1952 when he was an assistant prosecutor he had taken part in a coroner’s inquest involving a member of the Lewis family, some members of which are defendants here; and (3) that an employee of the receiver has been incompetent or worse.
“There was offered no evidence to show any connection between Judge Rashid and the Lewis family in the years that followed 1952, and there was no evidence of any kind indicating that Judge Rashid had any prejudice or bias in fact.
“As stated, Judge Rashid had been acting in the ease some 9 years and in that period of time it appeared that plaintiffs had taken at least 19 appeals and had prevailed in none of them. One is pending at the present time in the Court of Appeals.
“In one of the appeals the Court stated, 364 Mich 494;
*28“ ‘Per Curiam. Appeal dismissed for failure to comply with order of May 2, 1961, appellants’ brief and appendix being grossly lacking in tbe requirements of propriety and grossly disregarding the requirements of a fair presentation of tbe issues involved to tbe Court. Court Rule No 70, § 5 (1945). Case remanded to circuit judge for assessment of damages. Greenough v. Greenough (1958), 354 Mich 508; Harden v. Widovich (1960), 359 Mich 566 and 361 Mich 422. Costs to appellees.’ ”
Appellants raise 2 issues on appeal: (1) May a circuit judge after a full bearing on a petition to disqualify another circuit judge exercise discretion to assess costs, including reasonable attorney fees, against tbe petitioner under GCR 1963, 111.6? (2) Is a question of public policy involved in a good faith disqualification proceeding ?
Tbe statutory authority to tax costs is set forth in chapter 24 of PA 1961, No 236 (CLS 1961, § 600-.2401 et seq. [Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27A.2401 et seq.]). Section 2401 provides in part:
“Except as otherwise provided by statute, tbe supreme court shall by rule regulate the taxation of costs.”
Section 2405 provides in part:
“Tbe following items may be taxed and awarded as costs unless otherwise directed:
“(2) Matters specially made taxable elsewhere in tbe statutes or rules. * * *
“(6) Any attorney fees authorized by statute or by court rule.”
Respondent and appellee relies on tbe authority granted to tax costs in special matters as provided in GCR 1963, 111.6:
“Unwarranted Allegations and Denials. If it appears at the trial that any faot alleged or denied by *29a pleading ought not to have been so alleged or denied and such fact if alleged is not proved or if denied is proved or admitted, the court may, if the allegation or denial is unreasonable, require the party making such allegation or denial to pay to the adverse party the reasonable expenses incurred in proving or preparing to prove or disprove such fact as the case may be, including reasonable attorney fees.”
Appellants do not cite and we fail to find any statute concerning costs applicable to unwarranted allegations and denials in pleadings.2 In the absence of such a statute, we conclude the court rule in question is operative.
Plaintiffs assert that the appellee, Judge Rashid, is not an adverse party and therefore cannot claim costs under GCR 1963, 111.6. It is conceded that he is a respondent. However, plaintiffs fail to cite any authority indicating that a respondent in disqualification proceedings is not an adverse party.
The word “adverse” in legal proceedings has been said to be equivalent to or synonymous with “opposing” and “opposite.” 2 CJS, Adverse, p 503. It is quite evident that Judge Rashid stood opposite plaintiffs. His adverse position is evidenced not only by the various pleadings and memoranda entered, but also by the 2 days of hearing on the motion to disqualify. The narrow question therefore becomes: Was respondent Judge Rashid a party to the disqualification proceeding ?
In 54 CJ, Respondent, p 726, it is stated in part as follows:
*30“Any one who answers or responds may properly he called a ‘respondent/ ‘Respondent’ is not a technical word, bnt is often used as meaning the defendant in a snit in personam or the claimant in a snit in rem. Originally, ‘respondent’ was the term used to designate the person against whom a bill in equity was exhibited; the party who makes an answer to a bill or other proceeding in chancery; the person upon whom an ordinary petition in the court of chancery, or a libel in admiralty, is served, and who is, as it were, a defendant thereto.” (Footnotes omitted; Emphasis supplied.)
Through counsel, Judge Rashid answered the motion to disqualify, and plaintiffs’ subsequent reply to this answer stated:
“A. Plaintiffs:
“1. Deny that said answer is by A. Albert Sugar or by any other ‘attorney’ and say that since it is signed and verified by respondent it is Judge Rashid’s answer.”
This Court has been unable to find any case directly on point in this jurisdiction. For the reasons herein stated concerning the general rule of law applicable to “respondents” we find the term “adverse party” as set forth in GfCR 1963, 111.6 to encompass the respondent circuit judge named in the motion to disqualify brought under GCR 1963, 405.
Judge Searl made certain findings in his opinion granting repondent’s motion for awarding costs. We repeat them here as follows:
“Turning now to rule 111.6. Did it appear at the trial that any fact alleged by the plaintiffs’ motion to disqualify ‘ought not to have been so alleged’ ?
“The court found that none of the grounds set forth for the alleged disqualification were sustained.
“1. There was not a scintilla of evidence to support the charge that Judge Rashid was biased or *31prejudiced, in fact, in favor of or against either the plaintiffs or the defendants.
“2. The allegation that Judge Rashid had made erroneous orders was wholly without merit. ‘Prejudice or bias can never be based solely upon a decision in the due course of judicial proceedings.’ Justice Wiest in Crowley, Milner & Co. v. Macomb Circuit Judge (1927), 239 Mich 605, 613. To the same effect is Kolowich v. Ferguson (1933), 264 Mich 668; Mahlen Land Corp. v. Kurts (1959), 355 Mich 340, 350.
“Moreover, there was no proof of erroneous decisions. One decision is presently being appealed to the Court of Appeals. Plaintiffs attempted to appeal 19 others and met with no success in any of them. For examples of some of these appeals, see Harvey v. Lewis (1961), 363 Mich 232; Harvey v. Lewis (1961), 364 Mich 493.
“3. The allegation of disqualification because of misconduct of an employee was equally without merit. Counsel for plaintiffs attempted to show some connection between Judge Rashid and the employee, but wholly failed. The nearest thing to proof was the fact that as assistant prosecuting attorney he had apparently questioned the employee during the course of the 1952 inquest, and some photographer had taken a picture while he was talking to the employee. Much more connection between plaintiffs’ counsel and the employee was shown. In Judge Brennan’s opinion, which plaintiffs offered in evidence, the employee was described as a member of plaintiffs’ counsel’s legal household. Whether this conclusion was warranted was not an issue in the disqualification case and was not decided. The fact remains that there was no evidence that connected Judge Rashid with the employee in any regard.
“This brief review makes it abundantly clear to the mind of the judge who heard the matter, at least, the allegations made by plaintiffs were wholly with out merit and should not have been made.
*32“Judge Rashid was placed in a position, where he could have 3 choices: One, he could permit the matter to proceed without contest on his part and thus give the impression that he did not deny the truth of the allegations made. Secondly, he could appear in person, a course that has never been recommended for lawyers and certainly not for judges. Finally, he could employ counsel to adequately represent him. He followed the latter course, and this I believe was fully justified.
“Naturally the attorney who had to review 13 years of litigation had to spend much more time than would usually be required to defend a disqualification motion. There is no evidence to dispute the claim that he spent 60 hours, which included 2 days in court. Nor is there any dispute that $25.00 per hour is a fair charge to be made in the city of Detroit.
“The question is, who is going to stand the loss, Judge Rashid, the attorney who rendered the services, or the plaintiffs who brought the unwarranted proceedings ?
“I find that Judge Rashid is entitled to receive from plaintiffs the reasonable expenses incurred in the preparation and trial necessary to defend the unwarranted charges made against him ‘including reasonable attorney fees.’ I also find that $1,500 is a reasonable attorney fee.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The findings of Judge Searl under the facts were proper and fully justified. We agree that the plaintiffs’ allegations of prejudice and bias were made without any factual basis and were unreasonable and therefore should not have been made. A circuit judge whose integrity, probity and candor is questioned in a motion to disqualify has a duty to defend the conduct of the court in which he is presiding. This is especially true where after acting in a case for some 9 years, unwarranted allegations of prejudice and bias are made. The reasonableness of the *33attorney fees has not been questioned on this appeal, nor do we question them.
Plaintiffs word their second issue thus: Is a question of public policy involved in a good faith disqualification proceeding ?
In equitable proceedings involving questions of public interest or public policy the Supreme Court denies costs where the matters for its consideration are apparently brought in good faith. Case v. City of Saginaw (1939), 291 Mich 130; White v. Welsh (1939), 291 Mich 636; Lewick v. Glazier (1898), 116 Mich 493; School District No. Thirteen v. Dean (1868), 17 Mich 223; People v. Auditors of Wayne County (1858), 5 Mich 223.
The question as posed of whether there is immunity from taxation of costs because of public policy need not be considered where plaintiffs are shown not to have proceeded in good faith.
The overall record bears out the trial court’s finding of an absence of a good faith proceeding. Therefore, plaintiffs are not to be cloaked with an immunity which otherwise might have been present were a good faith proceeding undertaken; The rule concerning no costs to be awarded because of public policy has no application here.
The taxation of costs is neither a reward granted the prevailing party nor a punishment imposed on the losing party. It is but a part of the burden of litigation and this is presumed to have been known by plaintiffs when bringing their petition.
Affirmed. Costs to appellee.
Lesinski, C. J., concurred with Holbrook, J.GCR 1963, 405,
Gundersen v. Village of Bingham Farms (1965), 1 Mich App 647, cited by appellants is distinguishable from the instant ease. Gundersen was a suit to enjoin enforcement of a zoning ordinance. No statute or court rule was cited to support the attorney fee taxed. In the instant ease, there is an operative court rule. Further, in Gundersen there was no showing of an inequitable result to justify the award. Such a showing was apparent and is discussed infra, in the findings of the court below.