I concur in the opinion of Justice Brickley except with respect to the standard of review.
Levin, J.(separate opinion). The majority holds that the proper standard of appellate review in child custody cases is set forth in § 8 of the Child Custody Act of 1970,1 and that, in accordance with *891§ 8, "[findings of fact are to be reviewed under the 'great weight’ standard, discretionary rulings are to be reviewed for 'abuse of discretion,’ and questions of law for 'clear legal error.’ ”2
The majority concludes that the standards of review described in the lead opinion preclude de novo review of custody cases by appellate courts,3 and that a finding of fact is contrary to the great weight of the evidence if the evidence " 'clearly preponderate^] in the opposite direction.’ ”4 The lead opinion continues that discretionary rulings, including the decision to whom custody should be awarded, is to be • reviewed under the Spalding abuse of discretion standard requiring the appellant to show that the custody decision must be so "palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic that it evidences not the exercise of will but perversity of will, not the exercise of judgment but *892defiance thereof, not the exercise of reason but rather of passion or bias.”5
I agree with the majority that an appellate court should not review child custody cases de novo.
I write separately because this Court, not the Legislature, is charged by the constitution with determining the scope of judicial review, and because the legislatively prescribed standard for appellate review set forth in § 8 of the Child Custody Act, construed as requiring an appellate court to defer to the trial court’s exercise of discretion, provides inadequate appellate review, and should not be adopted by this Court.
i
The constitution provides that "[t]he judicial power of the state is vested exclusively in one court of justice which shall be divided into one supreme court, one court of appeals, one trial court of general jurisdiction known as the circuit court,”6 and that "[t]he supreme court shall by general rules establish, modify, amend and simplify the practice and procedure in all courts of this state.”
*893The constitution further provides that the supreme court shall have "appellate jurisdiction as provided by rules of the supreme court,”7 and that, while "[t]he jurisdiction of the court of appeals shall be provided by law,” "the practice and procedure therein shall be prescribed by rules of the supreme court.”8
It is thus clear that while the Legislature may provide concerning the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, the practice and procedure in the Court of Appeals, as with practice and procedure in all courts in this state, shall be prescribed by this Court.
It is for this Court ultimately to decide the scope of appellate review. Just as the Legislature could not establish for a tort or contract action a standard of appellate review as deferential as that prescribed for administrative action, such as "competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole record,” or, in the case of worker’s compensation proceedings, "any eyidence,”9 so too it cannot impose on parents, children, and family law, unless this Court acquiesces, a "great weight of evidence” standard or a "palpable abuse of discretion” standard as set forth in § 8 of the Child Custody Act.
ii
This Court, in the exercise of the power to prescribe practice and procedure, adopted a court rule concerning the scope of appellate review of trial court findings of fact. The court rule provides that in actions tried on the facts without a jury the Court shall find the facts, which shall not be *894set aside on appellate review unless clearly erroneous.10
In Tuttle v Dep’t of State Hwys, 397 Mich 44, 46; 243 NW2d 244 (1976), this Court adopted the construction placed by the United States Supreme Court on comparable "clearly erroneous” language in Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The United States Supreme Court had stated that " '[a] finding is "clearly erroneous” when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’ ” United States v United States Gypsum Co, 333 US 364, 395; 68 S Ct 525; 92 L Ed 746 (1948).
In Beason v Beason, 435 Mich 791, 801; 460 NW2d 207 (1990), concerning an alimony award, this Court recognized that the court rules construed in Tuttle "do not distinguish between law and equity cases,” and stated that "we recognize today that the definition of clearly erroneous which we adopted in Tuttle does not contemplate a review de novo” where the issue concerns an award of alimony.11'_
*895Beason was followed by Sparks v Sparks, 440 Mich 141, 151-152; 485 NW2d 893 (1992), a divorce action in which the issue concerned the division of property, and the Court said:
To alleviate any possible confusion stemming from our prior cases, we hold here that the appellate standard of review of dispositional rulings is not limited to clear error or to abuse of discretion. *896The appellate court must first review the trial court’s findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard. If the findings of fact are upheld, the appellate court must decide whether the dispositive ruling was fair and equitable in light of those facts. But because we recognize that the dispositional ruling is an exercise of discretion and that appellate courts are often reluctant to reverse such rulings, we hold that the ruling should be affirmed unless the appellate court is left with the firm conviction that the division was inequitable. [Emphasis added.]
Ill
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals, after reviewing our efforts in Beason and Sparks, said that it found itself nevertheless confused.12
The lead opinion acknowledges. that in Sparks this Court adopted a less deferential standard of review for dispositional rulings concerning the division of property when this Court said that a *897property dispositional ruling should be affirmed unless the appellate court is left with the firm conviction that the division was inequitable. The lead opinion states that because of the difference between custody and property disputes, "we need not question Sparks or extend Sparks to custody cases.”13
The court rule obliges the trial court, in an action tried on the facts without a jury, to state the facts and, separately, its conclusions of law "and direct entry of the appropriate judgment.”14 The "appropriate judgment” is characterized in Sparks and by the lead opinion as a "dispositional ruling” that is to be reviewed on appeal, under Sparks, to determine whether a property division is "inequitable” in light of the facts.
In the instant case, the majority in effect directs that a dispositional ruling concerning child custody should be reviewed by the Court of Appeals to determine only whether there was an abuse of discretion, unless the evidence respecting one or more of the legislatively prescribed best-interests-of-the-child factors15 "clearly preponderate^]” against a trial court finding._
*898IV
I question the wisdom of appearing to provide less review of a trial judge’s "discretionary” dispositional decision concerning child custody than is provided respecting a trial judge’s discretionary dispositional decision awarding alimony or dividing property.
The lead opinion states that "trial courts are more experienced and better situated to weigh evidence and assess credibility,”16 and "hear testimony and observe witnesses.”17 But that can also *899be said of almost any civil case in which the judge sits as trier of fact.
I am inclined to the view that there is sufficient flexibility in the clearly erroneous standard, and in the mandate that the trial court shall, after finding the facts, enter an "appropriate” judgment, that it is unwise to continue to proliferate reviewing standards for actions tried to the court.
This Court observed in Schneider v Pomerville, 348 Mich 49, 54; 81 NW2d 405 (1957), that "the judicial sieve” on appellate review should be of "finer mesh” when the appellate court is reviewing a judge’s findings of fact rather than a jury’s findings of fact because, although the judge may be learned in the law, a finding of fact by a jury is "more apt to be sound than that of one man.” (Emphasis added.) This language was quoted with apparent approval in Tuttle.
There is as much need for appellate review of a trial judge decision awarding the custody of a child or children as there is of a decision awarding alimony or dividing property, or a bench decision awarding or declining to award damages for breach of contract or tortious injury.
I would not defer, even on an experimental basis, to the legislatively prescribed child custody appellate review standard, "great weight of evidence” and "palpable abuse of discretion,” construed as insulating from appellate review such decisions unless the evidence preponderates against a finding on one of the best-interests-of-the-child factors or there was an abuse of discretion as defined in Spalding.
v
I agree with the observations of the lead opinion in part iii except that I would be inclined to allow *900the Court of Appeals considerable leeway in deciding whether to remand for more specific fact finding, and I would not suggest that remand for reevaluation of a custody award is necessarily the correct disposition unless the error perceived by the Court of Appeals is seen as harmless.
Mallett, J., concurred with Levin, J.Section 8 of the Child Custody Act of 1970 provides:
To expedite the resolution of a child custody dispute by prompt and final adjudication, all orders and judgments of the circuit court shall be affirmed on appeal unless the trial judge made findings of fact against the great weight of evidence or committed a palpable abuse of discretion or a clear legal error on a major issue. [MCL 722.28; MSA 25.312(8).]
Ante, p 877.
Ante, p 882.
Ante, p 879.
The lead opinion states that in Beason v Beason, 435 Mich 791, 803; 460 NW2d 207 (1990), this Court "explained that a factual finding is clearly erroneous if the trial court’s account of the evidence is implausible.” Ante, p 879, n 2.
The lead opinion states that its disposition of the instant case "does not require us to determine whether the 'great weight standard’ applicable to fact finding in custody cases is more or less deferential than the clearly erroneous standard applicable to divorce matters generally under Beason. The functional difference, if any, will be borne out best in practice.” Id.
The lead opinion nevertheless states that "a trial court’s findings on each ['best interests of the child’] factor [MCL 722.23; MSA 25.312(3)] should be affirmed unless the evidence 'clearly preponderate^] in the opposite direction,’ ” referencing (ante, p 879). Murchie v Standard Oil Co, 355 Mich 550, 558; 94 NW2d 799 (1959), in which this Court stated that where it is claimed that a new trial should be granted because the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence this Court examines the record "to determine whether the verdict is so contrary to the great weight of the evidence as to disclose an unwarranted finding, or whether the verdict is so plainly a miscarriage of justice as to call for a new trial,” and that a new trial is granted only when "we conclude from a review of the evidence that the verdict is manifestly against the clear weight of the evidence.”
Ante, pp 879-880.
The lead opinion states that under § 8 "discretionary rulings are reviewed under a 'palpable abuse of discretion’ standard,” and that "abuse of discretion was defined in Spalding v Spalding, 355 Mich 382, 384-385; 94 NW2d 810 (1959).” Ante, p 879.
The lead opinion states that the decision to whom custody should be awarded is a discretionary-dispositional ruling that should be affirmed unless it represents an abuse of discretion. The lead opinion continues that "[w]hile the abuse of discretion standard is strict, it does not afford trial courts unfettered discretion in awarding custody” because the exercise of that discretion is limited by the best-interests-of-the-child factors (see n 15), and "a court’s ultimate finding regarding a particular factor is a factual finding that can be set aside if it is against the great weight of the evidence.” Ante, pp 880-881.
I observed in People v Talley, 410 Mich 378, 398; 301 NW2d 809 (1981) (Levin, J., concurring), that the Spalding standard appears to be of "apparently insurmountable height.”
Const 1963, art 6, § 1.
Const 1963, art 6, § 4.
Const 1963, art 6, § 10.
Const 1963, art 6, § 28.
The court rule provides that, on appellate review, "[findings of fact by the trial court may not be set aside unless clearly erroneous,” and that "regard shall be given to the special opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses . . . .” MCR 2.613(C).
Beason, supra, p 802.
In Beason, supra, pp 803-805, this Court added:
In Anderson v Bessemer City, 470 US 564, 573-574; 105 S Ct 1504; 84 L Ed 2d 518 (1985), the United States Supreme Court emphasized the deference which is due a trial court’s factual determination in a review for clear error under FR Civ P 52(a):
"This standard plainly does not entitle a reviewing court to reverse the finding of the trier of fact simply because it is convinced that it would have decided the case differently. The reviewing court oversteps the bounds of its -duty under Rule 52(a) if it undertakes to duplicate the role of the lower court. ... If the district court’s account of the evidence is *895plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”
Thus, if the trial court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the Court of Appeals may not reverse. However,
"This is not to suggest that the trial judge may insulate his findings from review by denominating them credibility determinations, for factors other than demeanor and inflection go into the decision whether or not to believe a witness. Documents or objective evidence may contradict the witness’ story; or the story itself may be so internally inconsistent or implausible on its face that a reasonable factfinder would not credit it. Where such factors are present, the court of appeals may well find clear error even in a finding purportedly based on a credibility determination.” [Anderson, supra at 575.]
Where a finding is derived from an erroneous application of law to facts, the appellate court is not limited to review for clear error. Nor is an appellate court so limited where the trial judge’s factual findings may have been influenced by an incorrect view of the law. Pavlides v Galveston Yacht Basin, Inc, 727 F2d 330, 339, n 16 (CA 5, 1984); Weissmann v Freeman, 868 F2d 1313, 1317 (CA 2, 1989), cert den 493 US [883] (1989). Chaparral Resources, Inc v Monsanto Co, 849 F2d 1286, 1289 (CA 10, 1988).
In summary, we hold that the factual findings of a trial court in a divorce case are to be reviewed for clear error. A finding is clearly erroneous if the appellate court, on all the evidence, is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. While this standard gives the appellate judge more latitude than when reviewing a trial by jury, it does not authorize a reviewing court to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court; if the trial court’s view of the evidence is plausible, the reviewing court may not reverse.
200 Mich App 505, 521; 504 NW2d 684 (1993). The lead opinion states:
By declining to incorporate Beason and Sparks into the Child Custody Act, this Court believes that today’s decision is “the best we can do” to alleviate the confusion expressed by the Court of Appeals. [Ante, p 889, n 9.]
The Court referred to the appellate review standard set forth in § 8 of the Child Custody Act, and concluded, after review of recent decisions of that Court, that it "may review de novo the dispositional ruling of a trial court, but. only after we have concluded, as we do here, that the trial court has either made findings of fact against the great weight of the evidence or committed a palpable abuse of discretion or a clear legal error on a major issue. In this case, the trial court committed the first and third of these prohibitions and we are, therefore, free to review de novo the custody issue.” 200 Mich App 522.
While the Court said that in such a case it "may change the dispositional ruling ourselves without a remand,” it did not do so and rather "[rjeversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with” its opinion, and did not retain jurisdiction. Id. at 521-522.
Ante, p 881, n 4.
The court rule provides that in "actions tried on the facts without a jury,” the court "shall find the facts specially, state separately its conclusions of law, and direct entry of the appropriate judgment.” MCR 2.517(A)(1).
Section 3 of the Child Custody Act as amended by 1993 PA 259 provides:
As used in this act, "best interests of the child” means the sum total of the following factors to be considered, evaluated, and determined by the court:
(a) The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the parties involved and the child.
(b) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to give the child love, affection, and guidance and to continue the education and raising of the child in his or her religion or creed, if any.
(c) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to *898provide the child with food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care recognized and permitted under the laws of this state in place of medical care, and other material needs.
(d) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity.
(e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial home or homes.
(f) The moral fitness of the parties involved.
(g) The mental and physical health of the parties involved.
(h) The home, school, and community record of the child.
(i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court considers the child to be of sufficient age to express preference.
(j) The willingness and ability of each of the parties to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent or the child and the parents.
(k) Domestic violence, regardless of whether the violence was directed against or witnessed by the child.
(l) Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a particular child custody dispute. [MCL 722.23; MSA 25.312(3).]
Ante, p 890.
The lead opinion also points out that the trial court may interview children, and invoke other judicial resources, to assure a thorough and careful evaluation of the child’s best interests.
The practice is indeed to allow the circuit judge to interview children, and for appellate judges not to do so.
I see no reason why an appellate court could not "invoke” or cause to be invoked "other judicial resources to assure a thorough and careful evaluation of a child’s best interests.” Id.
Id.