(concurring in result).
Although I agree this case should be reversed, I disagree with footnote 2 of this opinion; I simply do not interpret SDCL 22-42-10 as does the majority. “For the purpose of using such substances” modifies the previous words. Thus, the word “purpose” supplies, by reasonable analysis, the element of guilty knowledge. To facilely dismiss that legislative word in the statute for its true meaning, is to do injury to legislative intent.
Furthermore, the majority opinion fails to cite a case eighteen years after Barr, which case is controlling, namely State v. Huber, 356 N.W.2d 468 (S.D.1984). In Huber, we held, inter alia, that a statute may incorporate an intent requirement even though the words “know,” “knowing,” or “knowingly” do not appear in its language.