(concurring). I join the majority opinion. I write separately only in refutation of the assumption of the dissent (dissent op., pp. 638-639) that as a result of the majority opinion, "the court of appeals adhering to sec. 808.03(2) and sec. (Rule) 809.50 will have to grant all the petitions for leave to appeal a bindover order." (Emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
Neither statute cited requires such a conclusion. Such a rule would unnecessarily load the court of appeals calendar with frivolous and meritless appeals. It would of course unnecessarily postpone the eventual trial of the particular case. This would give criminal defendants another unnecessary tool to thwart the system of justice. That is not the purpose of a preliminary hearing.
The court of appeals should continue to do what it now does: look at each petition and decide whether an interlocutory appeal is warranted in the particular case.
I am authorized to state that Justice Callow joins in this concurring opinion.
LOUIS J. CECI, J.(concurring). I fully agree with the court's opinion and write separately to express my view that the position advocated by the dissent will create yet another excuse to overrule a conviction obtained in an error-free trial. The defendant in this case concedes that he was accorded all the rights he was entitled to under the Wisconsin Constitution and the United States Constitution, to wit, a full, fair, error-free trial by his peers. However, he asks this court to overturn his conviction because of error in the preliminary hearing. The majority correctly refuses to do so because the Wisconsin Constitution and the United States Constitution only require that a defendant receive "a speedy public trial by an impartial jury . . .." Wis. Const, art. I, sec. 7; U.S. Const, amend. VI. The defendant concedes he was *638given such a trial. Accordingly, his conviction should be affirmed.