(concurring in part, concurring specially in part & dissenting in part).
I concur in all respects with issues I, II and IV.
I concur specially in issue III.A because, as stated in Michalek, it is simply not clear beyond a reasonable doubt that absent the errors here the jury would have returned the same verdict of guilty. State v. Micha*507lek, 407 N.W.2d at 818-819. See also United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 510-511, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 1981, 76 L.Ed.2d 96, 107 (1983); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-711 (1967). Therefore, in this case, there is prejudicial error.
I dissent as to issue III.B, because it was improper to permit A.J. to give his opinion that “women did not like Wimberly.” Stripped of its innuendo, this opinion testimony implies that “if Wimberly had sex, he had to rape to get it because no woman would consent.”
Criminal convictions should be based on evidence, State v. Ashker, 412 N.W.2d 97, 105 (S.D.1987), not opinion testimony and innuendo. At the very least, the prejudicial effect of this testimony should be carefully weighed against its probative value before it is admitted in evidence. State v. Klein, 444 N.W.2d 16, 18-19 (S.D.1989); SDCL 19-12-3, 19-12-4.