(dissenting). I would grant leave to appeal, and dissent from the peremptory reversal of the Court of Appeals.
I adhere to the view that peremptory reversal should be reserved for cases in which the law is settled and no factual assessment is required.* Peremptory disposition is not appropriate.
*83The Court of Appeals analyzed the question presented as follows:
The term "employee” is defined in section (1)(y) of the act as "a person who may become eligible for membership under this act, as provided in § 13, if the person’s compensation is paid in whole or in part by the State.” In section (1)(e), a member is defined as a "state employee included in the membership of the retirement system, as provided for in section 13.” And, under section 20(4), "[i]f a member has 10 or more years of credited service . . . and is separated from the service of the state for a reason other than retirement or death, he or she shall remain a member during the period of absence from the state service for the exclusive purpose of receiving a retirement allowance.”
Petitioner claims that by satisfying section 20(4), he has obtained membership status in the retirement system and this status, combined with the operation of sections 1(e) and 1(y), make him an employee entitled to pay to the retirement fund what contribution is necessary to receive retirement benefits for his pre-July 1, 1974 service. In contrast, the retirement board’s interpretation of the act would limit the ability to purchase credits to employees whose compensation is paid in whole or in part by the state, current employees.
After our review of the record, we must admit that the meaning of "employee” is unclear. The term encompasses those who "may become members of the system under § 13.” It also limits the class of potential members to those whose compensation "is paid” by the state. To add to the confusion, nowhere in the statute does there appear any *84time limit in which the purchase of retirement credits must be made.
While the ability of current employees to buy service credit itself is clearly bestowed by § 13, we find that the right of former workers to buy service credit is not expressly prohibited. In light of this fact and the fact that representations by the retirement system misled the petitioner, we are persuaded in this case that petitioner is entitled to purchase the service credits that he seeks. Our conclusion is strengthened by a recent opinion of this Court, Lazarus v Detroit, 186 Mich App 1; 463 NW2d 198 (1990), in which a panel concluded that pension laws, being remedial in nature, should be liberally construed in favor of the persons intended to be benefited by them.
That analysis is not so palpably erroneous as to justify peremptory reversal.
People v Wright, 439 Mich 910, 910-911 (1992) (Levin, J., dissenting); Roek v Chippewa Valley Bd of Ed, 430 Mich 314, 322; 422 NW2d 680 (1988) (Levin, J., separate opinion); Grames v Amerisure Ins Co, 434 Mich 867, 868-875 (1990) (Levin, J., dissenting); People v Little, 434 Mich 752, 769-770; 456 NW2d 237 (1990) (Levin, J., dissenting); People v Wrenn, 434 Mich 885, 885-886 (1990) (Levin, J., dissenting); Harkins v Northwest Activity Center, Inc, 434 Mich 896, 899 (1990) (Levin, J., dissenting); Dep’t of Social Services v American Commercial Liability Ins Co, 435 Mich 508, 515; 460 NW2d 194 (1990) (Levin, J., separate opinion); Yahr v Garcia, 436 Mich 872 (1990) (Levin, J., dissenting); Universal Underwriters Ins Co v Vallejo, 436 Mich 872, 873-874 (1990) (Levin, J., dissenting); People v Stephens, 437 Mich 903, 903-910 (1991) (Levin, J., dissenting); People v Berkey, 437 Mich 40, 54; 467 NW2d 6 (1991) (Levin, J., dissenting); Turner v Washtenaw Co Rd Comm, 437 Mich 35, 38-39; 467 NW2d 4 (1991) (Levin, J., separate opinion); Lepior v Venice Twp, 437 Mich 955, 956-966 (1991) (Levin, J., dissenting).
See Schweiker v Hansen, 450 US 785, 791; 101 S Ct 1468; 67 L Ed 2d 685 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("A summary reversal is a rare disposition, usually reserved by this Court for situations in which the law is settled and stable, the facts are not in dispute, and the decision *83below is clearly in error”); Leis v Flynt, 439 US 438, 457-458; 99 S Ct 698; 58 L Ed 2d 717 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Summary reversal 'should be reserved for palpably clear cases of . . . error.’ Eaton v Tulsa, 415 US 697, 707 [94 S Ct 1228; 39 L Ed 2d 693 (1974)] [Rehnquist, J., dissenting]”).