(dissenting). I dissent. The majority relies on a number of the same federal cases that formed the basis of our previous opinion, in apparent disregard of the United State Supreme Court’s pronouncement that our previous analysis of federal case law was in error.
In our previous opinion in this matter, we agreed with the trial court that, although there is a grave and legitimate state interest in curbing drunk driving, the sobriety-checkpoint program did not significantly further the public interest in curbing drunk driving and subjectively intruded on individual liberties. Sitz v Dep’t of State Police, 170 Mich App 433, 439; 429 NW2d 180 (1988), lv den 432 Mich 872 (1989), rev’d 496 US —; 110 S Ct 2481; 110 L Ed 2d 412 (1990). We noted in our prior opinion that the United States Supreme Court had previously held that police on roving *700patrol could not arbitrarily stop automobiles unless they were "aware of specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion that the vehicles contain aliens who may be illegally in the country.” Sitz, 170 Mich App 438, quoting United States v Brignoni-Ponce, 422 US 873, 884; 95 S Ct 2574; 45 L Ed 2d 607 (1975).
We also considered United States v Martinez-Fuerte, 428 US 543; 96 S Ct 3074; 49 L Ed 2d 1116 (1976), where the Court held that permanent checkpoints on major highways near the Mexican border were constitutional. We noted that
the ability of a particular law enforcement technique to effectuate actual arrests was deemed a relevant factor by the United States Supreme Court in its analyses in Martinez-Fuerte, supra, p 554, and [Delaware v] Prouse [440 US 648, 660; 99 S Ct 1391; 59 L Ed 2d 660 (1979)]. [Sitz, 170 Mich App 442.]
We concluded that the trial court’s finding that the checkpoint program was not an effective tool for arresting drunk drivers was not clearly erroneous. Sitz, 170 Mich App 442.
We then reviewed two factors from MartinezFuerte in our consideration of the degree of subjective intrusion caused by sobriety checkpoints: (1) the potential of the checkpoints to generate fear and surprise to mptorists, and (2) the degree of discretion left to individual officers. Again, we felt the trial court had not clearly erred in concluding that checkpoints had the potential to generate fear and surprise. Sitz, 170 Mich App 444.
On the basis of our interpretation of prior United States Supreme Court decisions, we concluded that the checkpoint program was an unrea*701sonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. In reversing and remanding this matter to this Court, the United States Supreme Court indicated that the trial court and this Court erred in our analysis of the federal cases applicable to this issue. Specifically, the United States Supreme Court found that we erred concerning the degree of "subjective intrusion” and that we erred in finding that the checkpoint program was not "effective” under the Brown test.
Despite the United States Supreme Court’s conclusion that the checkpoint program does not violate federal standards and that this Court had improperly applied federal law concerning trafile stops, the majority blithely claims that "[fjederal case law is replete with condemnation of suspicion-less random stops of motorists for investigatory purposes.” Ante at 697. I believe the majority’s reliance on other federal precedent in this case is illusory at best and that it ignores the precedential effect of the United States Supreme Court opinion and order in this case.
Furthermore, it is perfectly clear that the majority construes the Michigan Constitution as providing a more stringent standard than the comparable federal provision. This is done in spite of the fact that plaintiffs, in this case, do not argue for a more stringent standard or seek relief under such a theory. Indeed, plaintiffs conceded in their brief and in oral argument that this case does not present
a question of adopting a different, more stringent legal test than that formulated by the United States Supreme Court. Rather, this is merely a matter of applying the evidence presented at trial and the findings made by the trial court to the legal standard which the Supreme Court of the United States established.
*702Plaintiffs also acknowledged that this Court should evaluate this matter under the standards set by the United States Supreme Court, arguing only that we should reach a different result than did the Supreme Court. The majority scarcely addresses the issues actually raised by plaintiffs in this case.
Plaintiffs contend that there is no evidence of effectiveness in this case, where only one arrest was made after 126 cars were stopped. The majority agrees with plaintiffs with respect to this issue despite the express ruling to the contrary by the United States Supreme Court. Plaintiffs argue that "the number of arrests achieved through this program and its deterrent effect are inextricably linked.” However, the United States Supreme Court specifically disapproved a "searching examination of effectiveness” and concluded that the 1.5 percent arrest rate during the Michigan checkpoint operation was sufficient:
[A]n expert witness testified at the trial that experience in other States demonstrated that, on the whole, sobriety checkpoints resulted in drunken driving arrests of around 1 percent of all motorists stopped. 170 Mich App 441; 429 NW2d 183. By way of comparison, the record from one of the consolidated cases in Martinez-Fuerte, showed that in the associated checkpoint, illegal aliens were found in only 0.12 percent of the vehicles passing through the checkpoint. See 428 US 554; 49 L Ed 2d 1116; 96 S Ct 3074. The ratio of illegal aliens detected to vehicles stopped (considering that on occasion two or more illegal aliens were found in a single vehicle) was approximately 0.5 percent. See Ibid. We concluded that this "record . . . provides a rather complete picture of the effectiveness of the San Clemente checkpoint”, ibid., and we sustained its constitutionality. We see no justiñcation for a different conclusion here. *703[Sitz, 496 US —; 110 L Ed 2d 423. Emphasis added.]
Plaintiffs also argue that sobriety checkpoints are unreasonably intrusive. Plaintiffs contend that this Court must consider the overall effect on legitimate traffic and suggest a number of potential extensions and abuses that could occur. However, as the United States Supreme Court noted in its opinion in this matter, the possibility of "unreasonable treatment of any person” is not an issue in this case, which involves only the threshold question whether sobriety checkpoints are "per se” or "facially” unconstitutional.
It is important to recognize what our inquiry is not about. No allegations are before us of unreasonable treatment of any person after an actual detention at a particular checkpoint. . . .
As pursued in the lower courts, the instant action challenges only the use of sobriety checkpoints generally. We address only the initial stop of each motorist passing through a checkpoint and the associated preliminary questioning and observation by checkpoint officers. Detention of particular motorists for more extensive field sobriety testing may require satisfaction of an individualized suspicion standard. [Sitz, 496 US —; 110 L Ed 2d 420.]
Finally, plaintiffs argue and the majority agrees that the proposed checkpoint roadblocks are more intrusive than the fixed roadblocks considered in United States v Martinez-Fuerte, supra. Once again, the United States Supreme Court expressly rejected this argument in its opinion in this case and concluded that "[t]he intrusion resulting from the brief stop at the sobriety checkpoint is for constitutional purposes indistinguishable from the *704checkpoint stops we upheld in Martinez-Fuerte.” Sitz, 496 US —; 110 L Ed 2d 422.
As the majority acknowledges, it is well established that the Michigan Constitution does not generally impose a higher standard of reasonableness for searches and seizures than that imposed by the federal constitution. People v Nash, 418 Mich 196, 214-215; 341 NW2d 439 (1983); People v Armendarez, 188 Mich App 61, 66; 468 NW2d 893 (1991); People v Ragland, 149 Mich App 277, 281; 385 NW2d 772 (1986). As our Supreme Court emphasized just last year in People v Collins, 438 Mich 8, 25, 27; 475 NW2d 684 (1991):
Discerning the intent of the framers and the people who adopted Const 1963, art 1, § 11, this Court has held, in a line of decisions . . . that art 1, § 11 is to be construed to provide the same protection as that secured by the Fourth Amendment, absent "compelling reason” to impose a different interpretation.
[T]here is no evidence that those who later framed and adopted the 1963 Constitution had any intention of expanding the protection provided under Michigan’s search and seizure provision beyond that secured by the Fourth Amendment of the federal constitution.
Our Supreme Court also gave considerable guidance in Collins regarding what might justify a finding of compelling reasons:
[W]e turn now to consider whether in this case there is compelling reason to construe Const 1963, art 1, § 11 to prohibit law enforcement activity that otherwise is permissible under the Fourth Amendment. Although a number of appellate decisions have referred to the compelling reason standard, little in the way of guidance has been pro*705vided concerning its contours and meaning. Surely, the beginning of consideration must be the axiomatic statement of this Court in Holland v Garden City Clerk, 299 Mich 465, 470; 300 NW 777 (1941): "It is a fundamental principle of constitutional construction that we determine the intent of the framers of the Constitution and of the people adopting it.” See also Burdick v Secretary of State, 373 Mich 578, 584; 130 NW2d 380 (1964).
We believe that compelling reason for an independent state construction might be found if there were significant textual differences between parallel provisions of the state and federal constitutions, and, particularly, if history provided reason to believe that those who framed and adopted the state provision had a different purpose in mind. As already noted, the . . . majority [in People v Beavers, 393 Mich 554; 227 NW2d 511 (1975)] placed no reliance upon textual differences between the two constitutions. Moreover, the language of art 1, § 11 is substantially similar to that of the Fourth Amendment, except for the anti-exclusionary proviso in the third sentence of § 11. [Collins, 438 Mich 31-32.]
Neither the majority nor the parties have pointed to textual differences or to a contrary purpose on the part of our constitution’s framers. Nevertheless, the majority summarily concludes, "[w]e do not believe the framers of our constitution or the people adopting it intended that art 1, § 11 permit suspicionless seizures of persons under the circumstances presented in this case.” Ante at 696. I do not believe the majority’s concern with particularized suspicion and effectiveness rises to the "compelling reason standard” envisioned by the Michigan Supreme Court.
In conclusion, I disagree with the majority for three reasons. First, the majority grants relief on grounds not sought or argued by the parties. Even though the parties concede that this case does not *706involve adopting a more stringent test than that created by the United States Supreme Court, the majority has decided that a more stringent test should apply under the Michigan Constitution.
Second, the majority essentially ignores the test set by the United States Supreme Court in Brown v Texas, 443 US 47, 50-51; 99 S Ct 2637; 61 L Ed 2d 357 (1979). Although the United States Supreme Court concluded that this Court had misapplied the Brown test, it is clear from its opinion in this case that the Brown test, as clarified by it, controls.
The Brown test involves weighing three factors. The first factor involves the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure. The parties concede and this Court is well aware that drunk driving is one of our most serious public problems. The second Brown factor weighs the degree to which the seizure advances the public interests. The United States Supreme Court specifically stated that the effectiveness of the Michigan checkpoint program was adequate. Nevertheless, the majority opinion in this case concludes that the checkpoint program was not effective enough. The final factor noted in Brown concerns the severity of the interference with individual liberty. Again, the majority opinion disagrees with the United States Supreme Court’s finding that the intrusion resulting from the brief stop at a sobriety checkpoint is minimal.
Finally ¿ the majority emphasizes its belief that there must be specific facts that support a finding of particularized suspicion in order to justify a traffic stop. This same reasoning, in part, formed the basis of our earlier opinion in this case, 170 Mich App 438. The reasoning employed by the majority in this case has already been rejected by *707the United States Supreme Court in its opinion reversing our earlier decision. I believe it is implicit in the United States Supreme Court opinion that the standard of particularized suspicion, while properly considered in cases involving roving patrol stops, is not appropriate in a checkpoint case like this one. Sitz, 496 US —; 110 L Ed 2d 421-422.
In light of the well-established precedent that the Michigan Constitution does not generally impose a higher standard of reasonableness for searches and seizures than is imposed by the federal constitution and finding no compelling reason to do so, I would decline to impose a standard different from that of the United States Supreme Court in this case. Armendarez, 188 Mich App 66. I do not believe the arguments posed by the majority justify a finding of compelling reasons. Accordingly, I would reverse.