(dissenting).
I would affirm the trial court on the basis that there was consent for the trooper to wait in Flegel’s trailer. Had Flegel refused to leave the privacy of his bedroom, the trooper would have needed a warrant for his arrest, but he voluntarily presented himself to the trooper. In fact, despite some dispute in the testimony, the trial court specifically found on the record that the trooper was asked to go into the entry way of Flegel’s home and that Flegel then emerged and presented himself to the trooper voluntarily. This voluntary consent was sufficient for a warrantless home arrest. See Patzner, 779 F.2d at 1369; United States v. Briley, 726 F.2d 1301, 1303 (8th Cir.1984).
These findings are supported by the record. When the trooper arrived at Fle-gel’s residence, he learned there were two trailers, one belonging to Flegel and one to his father. The trooper spoke to Flegel’s father outdoors in the driveway and asked to speak with Flegel. The trooper testified Flegel’s father said “follow me” or “come on in” and that he then followed the father into Flegel’s trailer. The trooper further testified that, once inside, the father told him to have a chair, asked him if he wanted a cup of coffee and said he would get his son. The familial relationship between Fle-gel and his father, the fact their trailers were in such close proximity to one another and, particularly, the fact the father felt free to enter Flegel’s trailer without any attempt to rouse Flegel from outdoors supports the conclusion that the father held common authority or control over the premises for most purposes. Clearly these facts supported a reasonable belief by the trooper that the father possessed sufficient authority to consent to his limited entry into the kitchen area of the trailer. See State v. Zachodni, 466 N.W.2d 624, 628 (S.D.1991).
While the trooper sat waiting at the kitchen table he heard Flegel’s father rousing Flegel in another room. Shortly thereafter, Flegel emerged to talk to the trooper. Once inside the kitchen area of the trailer, the trooper had a right to be where he placed Flegel under arrest * when Fle-gel emerged voluntarily from his bedroom. A different case would be presented if the trooper, similar to the officers in Welsh and Patzner, had proceeded from the kitchen area, where he had consent to be present, to the bedroom to make the arrest. Such an incursion would have exceeded the scope of the consensual entry and constituted an invasion on a separate and distinct expectation of privacy held by Flegel. This issue does not arise, however, because of Flegel’s voluntary emergence from his bedroom. Therefore, we should affirm.
Probable cause for the arrest is not challenged in this appeal.