Salmon v. Bradshaw

RENTTO and HOMEYER, Judges (dissenting).

Plaintiffs brought this action for a declaration of their rights under an easement granting right of ingress and egress and to *509enjoin the defendants from interfering with their use of such easement. The majority has now determined from the written instrument itself that the easement covers the whole area of a so-called "narrow appendage" which actually is a tract of land with a 40 foot frontage on Kiwanis Avenue and a depth of 140 foot plus into Lot 10 with trees, shrubs, flowers and lawn situated on a major portion thereof. It holds that the dominant tenement has the right to use the first and the last inch of that whole area for purposes of ingress and egress to Lot 2. We do not believe this conclusion is supported by the instrument, by the law, or by any reasonable construction of the record before us.

The majority starts from the premise that "both parties agree the easement granted to plaintiffs is clear, definite and unambiguous in its terms and provisions and it is unnecessary to resort to extrinsic facts or circumstances to determine its meaning". This is an incorrect analysis of defendants' position and is not supported by the record or by the briefs. Neither was it the view of the trial court.

An examination of the record and a reading of the briefs reveals that defendants acknowledged that the instrument granted to plaintiffs a right-of-way over the "appendage" for ingress and egress to Lot 2 and to that extent it was clear, definite and unambiguous. However, defendants have never conceded that precise location of such easement and the width and length thereof was definite and certain and ascertainable from the instrument itself without resort to extrinsic evidence. The majority's holding is in accord with plaintiffs' contentions, but it certainly does not correspond with defendants' position in this litigation. For example, in defendants' brief they say "But plaintiffs and defendants took different positions with reference to this written easement" and then they summarize their respective positions. In such summarization defendants state "the parties (plaintiffs) had themselves over nine years before the starting of this suit put their own interpretation on this written instrument * * ¥" by constructing and using "the 16-foot wide *510concrete driveway at the point where they chose on the servient estate * * * as their 'access to Kiwanis Avenue from said Lot 2, Block 3'

Defendants' position is further manifested in Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law they proposed:

Finding of Fact IV: ''The right to the passageway or right of way from Lot 2 across Lot 10 onto Kiwanis Avenue is definite in the easement, but the particular location of that passageway or right of way is not fixed or described in the easement itself."
Conclusion of Law V: "With the execution of the easement instrument of April 2, 1956, the only thing which remained indefinite and uncertain was the specific location of the right of way across the servient estate."

In our opinion, the written instrument does nothing more than fix the general location of the easement area. Such being the case the authorities we have been able to find without exception hold that "a grant or reservation of a right of way 'over' a particular area, strip or parcel of ground is not to be construed as providing for a way as broad as the ground referred to." 25 Am.Jur.2d, Easements and Licenses, § 78, p. 485. 28 C.J.S. Easements § 79: "Where an easement in land is granted in general terms, without giving definite location and description to it, so that the part of the land over which the right is to be exercised cannot be definitely ascertained, the grantee does not thereby acquire a right to use the servient estate without limitation as to the place or mode in which the easement is to be enjoyed." To the same effect is a statement from Thompson on Real Property, Vol. 2, 1961 Replacement § 387. Cases in support are found in Annot., 28 A.L.R.2d, § 7, p. 265. See also, Hyland v. Fonda, 44 N.J.Super. 180, 129 A.2d 899.

Since material facts essential to a proper disposition of this case are in dispute and appear not to have been fully developed, in our opinion summary judgment should not have been granted.