In 1965, when defendant-appellant was 22 years of age, she pled guilty to the offense of assault with intent to rob, being armed.1 She was placed on probation, but she allegedly violated its terms and was sentenced to serve 2 to 20 years in prison. In 1968, she filed a motion to withdraw her plea of guilty alleging failure of the trial court to inquire into the underlying facts and circumstances of the charge before accepting her plea which was heard by the successor to the trial judge. The motion was denied on the grounds that GCR 1963, 785.3, was substantially complied with in that statements made by her to the investigating detective showed that she was informed of a plan to commit a robbery; that she was a “lookout”; that she drove off with the money; and that she drove her accomplice, who was shot, to the hospital. In other words, the court considered this confession to provide a subtsantial basis for the acceptance of her plea.
The trial court exhaustively questioned the defendant as to her unequivocal desire to plead guilty. It did not pursue the apparent intention and willingness of the defendant to discuss the circumstances *684behind her plea.2 The court, did comply minimally with OCR 1963, 785.3(2), as to the plea being freely made, but did not meet the additional requirement that a defendant be carefully examined as to the nature of the accusation which must contain the elements of the crime charged. It is desirable that a defendant not plead guilty to a crime which she well may not have committed despite her willingness to believe to the contrary. People v. Perine (1967), 7 Mich App 292; People v. Barrows (1959), 358 Mich 267.
The recent case of People v. Bartlett (1969), 17 Mich App 205, is support for this holding that a guilty plea is properly taken when the court carefully inquires into the facts. However, even where there are elements of the crime charged which are not apparent in those facts revealed by the defendant during this carefnl questioning, they may be properly provided by reference to the preliminary examination. So if the court, reviewing all available facts, is satisfied that if there were a trial, the defendant might well be convicted, then the acceptance of the plea was correct. Such a factual basis is essential.
At the preliminary examination here, a confession by the defendant was read into the record. The confession was given to a detective without counsel present after she had stated to the assistant prosecuting attorney, a few hours previously, that she did not wish to talk, and asked, “If I want a lawyer what do I do V’
She now says she did not question the confession at the taking of the plea because evidence of the prior statement to the assistant prosecuting attorney was not in the court file and she could not know that the confession would be used to provide a factual *685basis for the unquestioned acceptance of her plea. The fact that the reviewing court which heard her motion to withdraw the plea apparently relied heavily on the confession in denying the motion prompts us to remand this case for a “Walker hearing” (People v. Walker [On Rehearing, 1965], 374 Mich 331) to determine the legality of the obtaining of the confession upon which the tender and acceptance of the plea was based. People v. Daniels (1966), 2 Mich App 395.
The only other evidence offered at the preliminary examination was provided by a patrolman who testified that, based on a description and address of a girl who drove the wounded man to the hospital, he went to defendant’s house. She there stated that she did drive the man to the hospital after he came to her house and asked her to do so.
If the Walker hearing reveals that the confession was involuntary and thus improperly taken at the preliminary examination, the trial court should further inquire into the facts of the case before again accepting this plea as was done in Daniels, supra. If the confession was proper, taken together with the testimony of the patrolman, then a sufficient factual basis appears to exist, despite the absence of the desirable examination of the defendant.
Remanded for a hearing on the voluntariness of the confession based on People v. Walker, supra. If the confession is found to have been involuntarily made, then a new trial shall be had, otherwise the cause is affirmed.
Lesinski, C. J., concurred.CL 1948, § 750.89 (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 28.284).
CL 1948, § 768.35 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.1058).