(dissenting). I respectfully dissent because I do not believe the concept of stare decisis binds this Court to follow decisions that are based on policy considerations that no longer exist.
In Nickerson v Citizens Mutual Ins Co, 393 Mich 324; 224 NW2d 896 (1975), a case involving a contract of insurance before no-fault, the plaintiff would only be an "assured” covered for injuries caused by an uninsured motorist if the plaintiff was "occupying the insured automobile.” In Nickerson, the term "occupying” was explicitly defined *551in the insurance policy as "in or upon or entering into or alighting from.” Our Supreme Court ruled that the policy term "occupying” should be construed in a broad manner so as to include those persons not actually inside or in contact with the vehicle at the time of the accident if there was "immediate prior 'occupying’ of the insured vehicle” and the subsequent injury arose "out of the use or repair of the same vehicle.” Nickerson, supra at 328-331.
Subsequently, in Royal Globe Ins Cos v Frankenmuth Mutual Ins Co, 419 Mich 565; 357 NW2d 652 (1984), the Court acknowledged that its interpretation of the contract language in Nickerson was calculated to avoid a dilemma that has been vitiated with the adoption of the no-fault act. If the Court had not found that Nickerson was "occupying” the vehicle, Nickerson would have had no recovery for his injuries under the insurance policy because the vehicle that caused his injuries was uninsured. Therefore, as a matter of public policy, a broad, obviously strained construction was adopted for the purpose of finding coverage. Nickerson, supra at 331; Royal Globe Ins Cos, supra at 574.
Since the enactment of the no-fault act, however, several other panels of this Court, including the one that decided Lankford v Citizens Ins Co of America, 171 Mich App 413; 431 NW2d 59 (1988), have questioned the soundness of utilizing Nicker-son as authority to construe the statutory term "occupant” or a policy definition of "occupying” under the no-fault act. See Hackley v State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co, 147 Mich App 115; 383 NW2d 108 (1985); Auto-Owners Ins Co v Turner, 135 Mich App 522; 354 NW2d 813 (1984); Royston v State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co, 130 Mich App 602; 344 NW2d 14 (1983); Griffin v Lumber*552mens Mutual Casualty Co, 128 Mich App 624; 341 NW2d 163 (1983); Winters v National Indemnity Co, 120 Mich App 156; 327 NW2d 423 (1982); Davis v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 116 Mich App 402; 323 NW2d 418 (1982); Kalin v DAIIE, 112 Mich App 497; 316 NW2d 467 (1982).1
In rejecting the Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of the term "occupying” in Nickerson, the Lankford panel held:
The rationale underlying the Nickerson decision was eliminated by the repeal of the uninsured motorist statute and the passage of the Michigan no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq.; MSA 24.13101 et seq. Under no-fault legislation, all fundamental damages are provided for through first-party personal protection coverage or the assigned claims facility, MCL 500.3172; MSA 24.13172. Thus, the primary dilemma which one injured by an uninsured motorist previously faced no longer exists. St Bernard v Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange, 134 Mich App 178, 188-189; 350 NW2d 847 (1984). [171 Mich App 420.]
I am likewise persuaded that the public policy considerations voiced in Nickerson and by the trial court in this case are not relevant here and should not control our decision. Therefore, I would hold that the policy term "occupying” should be given a literal construction consistent with the primary and generally understood meaning of the term used in the policy definition.
On the facts of this case, I would conclude that plaintiff was not a "covered person,” because he *553was not "occupying” a covered auto. Plaintiff was not "in, upon, getting in, on, out or off of’ either the van or the trailer when the collision occurred. Although plaintiff apparently had his hands on the trailer, he was standing beside the trailer with both feet on the pavement, with no intention of entering the trailer. Further, approximately two minutes elapsed from the time plaintiff alighted from the van until he was struck by the unidentified vehicle. Because plaintiff was not "occupying” a "covered car,” Hawkeye should have no obligation to pay no-fault benefits to plaintiff. Consequently, I believe the trial court erred in granting summary disposition in favor of plaintiff. As a matter of law, summary disposition should have been granted in favor of defendant Hawkeye. Plaintiffs remedy would be to seek coverage under the assigned claims provision. MCL 500.3172; MSA 24.13172.
Cf. Hawkins v Allstate Ins Co, 132 Mich App 603, 607; 347 NW2d 760 (1984); Ottenwess v Hawkeye Security Ins Co, 84 Mich App 292, 301-302; 269 NW2d 570 (1978), rev’d in part 408 Mich 164; 289 NW2d 708 (1980); Hathcox v Liberty Mutual Ins Co, 90 Mich App 511, 515-517; 282 NW2d 374 (1979); McPherson v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 90 Mich App 215; 282 NW2d 289 (1979).