(concurring in the result). I concur in the result that sec. 26, art. IV of the Wisconsin constitution does not prohibit a county from granting an increase in compensation to a county judge during his term of office payable out of the county treasury pursuant to secs. 253.07 (2) and 66.195, Stats. But, I arrive at this conclusion not on the broad ground that county judges are not public officers within the meaning of sec. 26 but on the narrower ground the increase in their compensation was neither determined by the legislature nor paid out of the state treasury. I believe county judges are public officers and to the extent their basic salary is fixed by the legislature and paid out of the state treasury, either directly or indirectly, such salary is subject to the constitutional restriction of sec. 26.
I agree with the majority opinion in its re-examination of the question whether the compensation of circuit judges and justices of this court come within the ambit of sec. 26, art. IV, and with its conclusion. In reaffirming State ex rel. Sullivan v. Boos (1964), 23 Wis. (2d) 98, 126 N. W. (2d) 579, this court correctly decided the issue presented. Although this court is committed to the proposition it has the power under the doctrine of stare decisis to modify and even overrule a court-made doctrine, Bielski v. Schulze (1962), 16 Wis. (2d) 1, 114 N. W. (2d) 105, that power should not be exercised unless there exists a more compelling reason than that the end justifies the means.
Desirable as equal salaries for equal work and midterm increases are for the judiciary, this court should not by ju*152dicial interpretation to attain such result overthrow the time-accepted precedents construing the constitution. Twice an appeal has been made to the people of this state to amend the constitution to eliminate the cause of the inequality of compensation within the same classification of judicial officers and unfortunately on both occasions the proposals were rejected. It would ill behoove this court by judicial construction now to reach a result which the people of this state have expressed a desire should continue. The solution lies in another appeal to the voters to change the constitution, not in a changed construction of it by this court.
Prior to court reorganization the compensation of county judges was not subject to sec. 26 because in some cases their compensation consisted of fees and not of a fixed salary and came under the rule of the Hackett Case,1 or if a fixed salary it was not paid out of the state treasury as required by the Kalb 2 and the Rooney Cases.3 However, as part of and since court reorganization the basic salaries of judges outside of Milwaukee county have been determined and been paid by the state with a part thereof charged back to the county. In Milwaukee county the same result is reached indirectly by having Milwaukee county pay the salaries with a partial reimbursement by the state. The reason for this difference was to make it possible for the county judges in Milwaukee county to continue to qualify under the Milwaukee county pension system.
To my mind there is no question a county judge is a public officer. In State ex rel. Zimmerman v. Dammann (1930), 201 Wis. 84, 228 N. W. 593, the term “public officer” as used in sec. 26, art. IV, was defined as having attributes of continuous and permanent duties, a definite term, an oath *153of office, the exercise of some portion of the sovereign power of the state in which the public has a concern. The office of county judge fulfils these requirements. Under court reorganization, county judges (outside Milwaukee county) have for all practical purposes the same jurisdiction as circuit judges with the exception of treason in the criminal field and cases involving over $100,000 in the civil field. This court has held county judges may sit under some circumstances as circuit judges. State ex rel. McCormack v. Foley (1962), 18 Wis. (2d) 274, 118 N. W. (2d) 211. The salary of county judges is determined by the legislature and the employer’s cost of their pension on their basic salary is paid by the state, sec. 66.89, Stats. I cannot agree with the majority that county judges are by the nature of their office not to be considered public officers under sec. 26 because they are not state officers.
It is true in several opinions 4 of this court the term “public officer” in reference to sec. 26 was used interchangeably with “state officer” but it was not held virtually or otherwise in those cases that a public officer meant only a state officer. The term “public officers” is used in sec. 26 without qualification or restriction. Sec. 26, art. IV, providing “the legislature . . . nor shall the compensation of any public officer be increased or diminished during his term of office” was a restriction on the legislature in its custodianship of state funds and includes within its benefits and disadvantages all public officers who receive their compensation from the state’s purse. By reason of the court reorganization county judges come under sec. 26, art. IV, the same as the legislators did when the constitution was amended to grant the legislature the power to fix the compensation of its members. State ex rel. Zimmerman v. Dammann, supra.
*154The public policy of sec. 26, as stated in the Dammann Case, i.e., to protect the public against the evil of letting a public official use his official power and influence to augment his own salary; to protect individual officers against legislative oppression; and to prevent persons from using the prestige and power which they possess by virtue of their public office from using same to their personal advantage, applies equally well to county judges as to circuit judges and justices of this court.
The reasoning of State ex rel. Sullivan v. Boos does not apply to the instant facts because the salary of circuit judges can only be fixed by the legislature under sec. 10, art. VII of the constitution. When additional compensation is authorized by statute to be paid to a circuit judge by a county, such payment to be valid must be pursuant to a valid delegation to the county of legislative authority, the exercise of which is subject to sec. 26, art. IV. The compensation is in legal effect fixed and determined by the legislature even though not paid out of the state treasury and this is sufficient to make sec. 26, art. IV, applicable. However, there is no requirement in the constitution that the legislature must determine the compensation of county judges.
Although the same public policy which inspired sec. 26, art. IV, has been applied by the législature by statute to county judges in many instances over the years, at the present time no statute exists prohibiting county boards from granting an increase in compensation in midterm to county judges. Sec. 59.15 (1), Stats., has been suspended temporarily by sec. 66.195. Thus to the extent the legislature has authorized but not directed the county to pay additional compensation to county judges under sec. 253.07 over that determined by the legislature and because such compensation is neither definitely fixed by the legislature nor paid out of the state treasury, sec. 26 does not apply.
For the foregoing reasons I concur in the result.
State ex rel. Martin v. Kalb (1880), 50 Wis. 178, 6 N. W. 557.
Rooney v. Supervisors of Milwaukee County (1876), 40 Wis. 23.
Rooney v. Supervisors of Milwaukee County, supra; Petition of Breidenbach (1934), 214 Wis. 54, 252 N. W. 366; State ex rel. Sullivan v. Boos, supra.