(dissenting). Except for the reversal of the habitual offender charge in accordance with People v Young, 410 Mich 363; 301 NW2d 803 (1981), I dissent from the majority opinion as I am persuaded that defendant was rightly convicted. The majority reverses on the failure of the trial court to adequately instruct the jury on the *612defense’s theory of accident. This is simply appellate second sight in the raw. Trial counsel, whose adequacy was not questioned in this appeal, was satisfied with the instructions and expressed that satisfaction on the record.
Furthermore, the trial judge instructed in addition that:
"If you find that the defendant, for any reason whatsoever did not consciously and knowingly act with the intent to murder James Reeves, the crime cannot have been committed and you must find the defendant not guilty of the crime of assault with intent to commit murder.”
GCR 1963, 516.2 provides that:
"No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider the verdict, stating specifically the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection. Opportunity shall be given to make the objection out of the hearing of the jury.”
Neither this issue nor the issue of prosecutorial misconduct have been properly preserved for appellate review.
I would affirm except for the plea to the habitual offender charge reversal which is mandated by People v Young, supra.