(dissenting). I am in agreement with the majority that the trial court erred in granting an accelerated judgment on the factual basis herein, contending that the action must be initiated in the Court of Claims. The plaintiff commenced his action in a proper forum, the circuit court. Further, I am in accord that if plaintiff adequately had made the university aware of his handicap, the university’s alleged refusal to allow him to tape class lectures, if established as a cause of poor academic performance, would have violated the HCRA. All the same, while one must be respectful of the efforts made by the plaintiff in his endeavors to continue in law school, the trial, court did rule correctly in granting a summary judgment based upon GCR 1963, 117.2(3), the lack of existence of a genuine issue of material fact, as well as under GCR 1963, 117.2(1).
The following facts are not disputed in the lower court. Plaintiff applied for admission to Wayne State University’s Law School in March, 1974. The plaintiff answered on an admissions application that he was not aware of any physical disability *422during the last five years preceding the application. On May 24, 1974, Dean Hain of the law school informed plaintiff that he was not qualified for admission under the normal criteria but that he would be considered for the Summer Minority Program which had been created in order to assist economically disadvantaged students who were unable to meet traditional standards to obtain a Juris Doctor degree. All students were and are required to meet the academic requirement that they complete 120 hours of course work with a grade point average of 2.00 or better.
After first being placed on a waiting list, plaintiff was admitted into the Summer Minority Program in June, 1974. Students accepted into the Summer Minority Program were required to receive a final grade average of C minus or better in the two courses offered during the summer as a prerequisite to admission into the law school in September, 1974. Plaintiff fulfilled the requirements of the program and entered law school in the fall term of 1974.
In the normal academic year (September through May), a student must maintain a 2.00 grade point average in order to be considered in good standing with the law school. If a student achieves a grade point average which is above 1.65 but below 2.00, he will be placed on probation and allowed a full academic year to reinstate himself in good standing with the law school. Following the 1974-75 school year, the plaintiff attained a grade point average of 1.88. Consequently, he was placed on academic probation. In accordance with the above-quoted requirements, Mr. Littsey was required to attain a 2.00 grade point average in all courses taken during the 1975-76 school year. He was notified that failure to meet this standard *423would result in academic termination from the law school at the end of that academic year. On the 15 credits plaintiff completed in the fall term, his grade point average fell below 2.00. By letter dated February 10, 1976, the law school again informed plaintiff of the requirements of his academic probation and offered assistance to plaintiff in his effort to meet the requirements. Plaintiff, however, again received a grade point average of below 2.00 for work completed during the winter term, 1976, and his cumulative grade point average remained below 2.00. Because plaintiff failed to meet the terms of his probation, he was terminated academically in June, 1976.
In June, 1977, one full year after his termination, plaintiff petitioned the Readmissions Committee to readmit him to law school for the fall term, 1977. In his petition, he explained that a hearing problem and marital problems had contributed to his poor academic performance in law school. He assured the committee that these problems had been resolved. He advised the committee that he had had an operation performed on his left ear in December, 1976, which had successfully restored some hearing to his left ear. He further stated that a final operation was scheduled which should restore his hearing to within a socially acceptable level. Mr. Littsey further indicated to the committee that the emotional upheaval which resulted from his divorce had subsided. In all matters, he indicated that he was ready to undertake law school without the previous impediments.
Based on the information presented and Mr. Littsey’s representations, the Readmissions Committee granted plaintiff’s petition and readmitted him to law school beginning with the fall term, 1977. Plaintiff’s readmission was expressly condi*424tioned upon his achieving a 2.33 grade point average (C plus) or better on courses taken during the fall term, 1977. He was also required to seek counselling in order to increase his chances for success. Plaintiff was informed that failure to meet these requirements would result in academic termination from the law school. Twenty-five individuals petitioned for readmission during 1977. Plaintiff was one of seven individuals readmitted tó the law school during that year.
Plaintiff enrolled in law school in September, 1977, taking 17 credit hours. He withdrew from the three-credit course, Professional Responsibility, prior to the end of the term and received no grade or credit for this course. Plaintiff’s grade point average was 1.85 (C minus) on the course work completed during the fall term, 1977. As his grade point average was below that required as a condition of his readmission, plaintiff was terminated academically from the law school.
In a letter dated February 6, 1978, plaintiff petitioned Arthur Lombard for permission to continue for another semester. He claimed that the August, 1977, operation on his left ear had caused him to fall behind in his work. However, since a hearing test administered in December, 1977, showed that his ear was operating well within the socially acceptable level, he felt that he could accomplish more in school. Plaintiff made no mention of any alleged problems caused by his not being able to tape-record certain lecture sessions during the fall term, 1977. He merely stated, once again, that he would do better in the future.
In a conference with Mr. Littsey, Arthur Lombard explained that it was not within his power or discretion to reverse or modify the decision of the committee. He also stated that the committee was *425no longer constituted, as it exists only for a short time in the summer months. Plaintiff did not present any further petitions to the Readmissions Committees, although two committees have been so constituted since plaintiffs ultimate termination from law school.
On July 25, 1979, plaintiff filed suit against Wayne State University, alleging violation of the Michigan Handicappers’ Civil Rights Act and seeking an injunction ordering his reinstatement into law school and appropriate damages and costs.
In the area of judicial intervention into academic affairs, it is established that courts will venture into the academic arena only insofar as to determine whether the college’s actions were arbitrary or capricious or motivated by bad faith. The United States Supreme Court has expressed its agreement with these principles in Board of Curators of University of Missouri v Horowitz, 435 US 78; 98 S Ct 948; 55 L Ed 2d 124 (1978). The law in this particular area indicates the following: courts subscribe to the theory of judicial abstention in matters concerning university academic decisions unless it clearly is shown that a particular and ascertainable right was breached. In ascertaining whether said right may have been breached, the following criteria are applied: (1) there is a presumption of validity for an academic decision and (2) plaintiff must show: (a) wrongful discrimination or (b) arbitrary and capricious action (i.e., bad faith). See Connelly v University of Vermont & State Agricultural College, 244 F Supp 156 (D Vt, 1965), Keys v Sawyer, 353 F Supp 936 (SD Tex, 1973).
Plaintiff, Littsey, requested direct judicial intervention into academic judgments of the law school. The trial court found that a rational basis existed *426for plaintiffs termination from law school. Plaintiffs poor academic record while in attendance at the law school provided this rational basis. He did not and could not demonstrate bad faith, arbitrariness, or capriciousness.
It is an indisputable principle of law that courts will not interfere with the management of a university’s internal affairs unless there has been "a manifest abuse of discretion or where [the school officials’] action has been arbitrary or unlawful”. State ex rel Sherman v Hyman, 180 Tenn 99, 113; 171 SW2d 822 (1942), or unless the school authorities have acted "arbitrarily or capriciously”, Frank v Marquette University, 209 Wis 372, 377; 245 NW 125 (1932), or unless they have abused their discretion, People ex rel Bluett v Board of Trustees of University of Illinois, 10 Ill App 2d 207; 134 NE2d. 635 (1956), Coffelt v Nicholson, 224 Ark 176; 272 SW2d 309 (1954), or acted "in bad faith”, Barnard v Inhabitants of Shelburne, 216 Mass 19; 102 NE 1095 (1913).
The courts have followed the doctrine of nonintervention where there is no showing of arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory action on the part of the school officials.
The United States Supreme Court has consistently abstained and granted due deference to academic judgments:
"Courts do not and cannot intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily operation of school systems * * *.” Epperson v Arkansas, 393 US 97, 104; 89 S Ct 266; 21 L Ed 2d 228 (1968).
The Court has been especially viligant to protect and reinforce the academic freedom to meet and confer on academic criteria and standards. See *427e.g., Horowitz, supra, Regents of University of California v Bakke, 438 US 265; 98 S Ct 2733; 57 L Ed 2d 750 (1978).
The trial court, in recognizing the doctrine of judicial noninterference and, further, in finding no genuine issue of fact, entered summary judgment in favor of defendant. The trial court’s determination should be affirmed for reasons stated herein.