(concurring).
In concurring, I wish to express that the Indictment is poorly drafted and should have been more explicit. The Indictment begins with past tense, i.e., “did” and then alleges a definition of tampering with the witness; and this latter allegation is worded in the future. Again, we see sloppy procedure which spawns unnecessary appeals to this Court. I can comfortably concur, notwithstanding the sloppy procedure, because this appellant knew what she was charged with, namely tampering with the witness under SDCL 22-11-19(1) and she knew with reasonable certainty of the accusation so as to prepare a defense. Likewise, she was protected from double jeopardy if found not guilty. Her substantial rights have not been prejudiced.
Appellant schemed to squelch a prosecution by successfully attempting to influence this young girl to change her story from whom she obtained her marijuana. This young lady, Terri, was a prospective witness and this appellant and Troll knew it. Beyond peradventure, Troll and Appellant were aware that Terri had knowledge about Hildebrand’s drug distribution activities; they knew she would be a witness in a future court proceeding. The dignity of the law cannot tolerate potential defen*445dants to intimidate or influence prospective witnesses in a criminal proceeding with no repercussions whatsoever. Solicitation of false testimony from a prospective witness is abhorrent to the orderly administration of justice. Threatening a prospective witness — intimidating a prospective witness— to have them testify falsely, full well knowing that a criminal proceeding, via a criminal investigation, is underway is addressed by SDCL 22-11-19(1). Oftentimes, this Court has expressed that the manifest intent of a statute must be derived from a statute as a whole. State Theater Co. v. Smith, 276 N.W.2d 259 (S.D.1979). We are not at liberty to pick and peck away at the intent of a statute, thereby fractionalizing it to independent slices, by resting our interpretation on one segment thereof.