(dissenting). Today this Court places an interpretation on our own Rules of Evidence that will make it easier for an arsonist to collect on his fire insurance after he burns down his house or place of business. I cannot believe that those who adopted MRE 410 contemplated or intended such an outrageous result. Furthermore, the language they employed does not require it. I dissent.
i
Less than a month after one fire partially damaged the building in which Dennis Lichon’s party store was located, a second fire completely destroyed it. Thereafter, Lichon sought unsuccessfully to collect for the loss from his insurance carrier. The policy does not provide coverage if "the hazard is increased by any means within the control or knowledge of the insured” or if the loss is "caused by . . . [any] criminal act done by or at the instigation of any insured . . . .”
*433Criminal charges were brought against Lichon.1 With respect to each of the fires, he was charged with conspiracy to commit the crime of arson.2
On the day that his criminal trial was to begin, *434Liehon reached an agreement with the prosecutor and pleaded nolo contendere to a lesser charge of attempted arson. He was convicted and sentenced to one year in the county jail.3
Notwithstanding his conviction and sentence, Liehon, as plaintiff in a civil suit, has continued the effort to collect on his fire insurance policy. However, the trial court granted a motion for summary disposition in favor of the defendant insurer, and explained:
What a ludicrous result it would be if the law allowed a person to benefit financially from his own crime simply because he was allowed to enter a technical plea. Historically, the law has never allowed someone to benefit financially or otherwise from a criminal act, and I do not think we should start now. Plaintiff cannot be allowed to deny in this case what he has been convicted of in a criminal case based on the same events as in the case at bar.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, 173 Mich App 178; 433 NW2d 394 (1988); however, the panel divided concerning the construction to be given MRE 410, which provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this rule, evidence of a plea of guilty, later withdrawn, or a plea of nolo contendere, or of an offer to plead guilty or nolo contendere to the crime charged or any other crime, or of statements made in connection with any of the foregoing pleas or offers, is not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding against the person who made the plea or offer. [Emphasis
*435A majority of the panel favored a construction "which would preclude the admission of evidence of a nolo contendere plea in proceedings which are brought against the person who made the plea, but not in proceedings which are brought by that person”; id., pp 180-181, and opined that "[i]t would be contrary to public policy and a mockery of justice to allow a convicted felon to profit from his crime.” Id., p 182. (Emphasis added.)
On the other hand, the dissent stated, "I read MRE 410 to provide that a nolo contendere plea is inadmissible against the person making the plea and that that exclusion applies to any proceeding, civil or criminal.” Id., pp 183-184, n 1.
n
Prior to its recognition by statute4in 1969, and by court rule5 in 1973, the nolo contendere plea was not available to a criminal defendant in Michigan. As our Court of Appeals has observed, "there is neither history nor a tradition of nolo contendere under Michigan jurisprudence . . . .” People v Gonzales, 70 Mich App 319, 322; 245 NW2d 734 (1976). See also People v Franchi, 3 Mich App 511; 142 NW2d 881 (1966).6
The Legislature’s 1969 amendment of MCL 767.37; MSA 28.977 added only the following sentence:
At the arraignment of any person upon an indictment or upon the charge in a warrant, com*436plaint or information the court may accept a plea of nolo contendere and if such a plea is accepted, the court shall proceed as if he had pleaded guilty. [Emphasis added.]
Since it is clear that this statutory base for nolo contendere lends no support for the position taken by the majority in this case, we turn our attention to MRE 410 and its construction.
Surely, a heavy burden of persuasion should be borne by any who contends that Lichon can maintain a suit on his fire insurance policy after being convicted and sent to jail for attempted arson. Obviously, where a civil suit is instituted by a person who has pleaded nolo contendere, it is not a proceeding against the pleader.
As adopted in 1978, the wording of MRE 410 was identical to its federal counterpart, FRE 410, which also provided that "a plea of nolo contendere ... is not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding against the person who made the plea . . . .”
The majority relies upon the fact that the federal rule was amended in 1980.7 However, MRE 410 has remained unchanged since its promulgation in 1978. In the majority opinion, it is asserted that the federal rule "was altered in 1980 in order to foreclose the sort of interpretation as that offered by the defendant.” {Ante, p 423.) Of course, even if that were true, this Court would in no sense be bound, and particularly is that so since we have declined, for nearly a decade, to follow the federal lead._
*437Furthermore, there is no decision by any federal appellate court, before or since the 1980 amendment, which supports the majority’s assertion. Indeed, the only federal appellate court to confront this issue has come down solidly against the majority’s position. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently decided that the federal rule, FRE 410, even as amended in 1980, does not protect a defendant who has pleaded nolo contendere when he becomes the plaintiff in a civil suit.
In Walker v Schaeffer, 854 F2d 138 (CA 6, 1988), two persons were arrested for disorderly conduct and reckless driving, and pleaded nolo contendere. Later, under 42 USC 1983 they brought a civil action against the police officers, alleging false arrest. The court ruled that the plaintiffs were estopped from making such a claim in the subsequent civil action. The court explained:
We do not consider our conclusion to be barred by Fed R Evid 410, which provides that evidence of "a plea of nolo contendere” is not, "in any civil or criminal proceeding, admissible against the defendant who made the plea.” This case does not present the kind of situation contemplated by Rule 410: the use of a nolo contendere plea against the pleader in a subsequent civil or criminal action in which he is the defendant. ... In this case, on the other hand, the persons who entered prior no-contest pleas are now plaintiffs in a civil action. Accordingly, use of the no-contest plea for estoppel purposes is not "against the defendant” within the meaning of Fed R Evid 410. This use would be more accurately characterized as "for” the benefit of the "new” civil defendants ....
We find a material difference between using the nolo contendere plea to subject a former criminal defendant to subsequent civil or criminal liability and using the plea as a defense against those *438submitting a plea interpreted to be an admission which would preclude liability. Rule 410 was intended to protect a criminal defendant’s use of the nolo contendere plea to defend himself from future civil liability. We decline to interpret the rule so as to allow the former defendants to use the plea offensively, in order to obtain damages, after having admitted facts which would indicate no civil liability .... [Id., p 143. Emphasis in original.]
No case on point from any jurisdiction, with the exception of a recent Michigan Court of Appeals decision,8 is cited by the majority to support its position. That there is such a dearth of authority should not be surprising. Presumably, there are very few who have dared to attempt the remarkable feat which Mr. Lichon now seeks to achieve.
in
In other situations, this Court is required, when construing statutes, to look to the intent and purpose of the Legislature. That is not the case here. The question before us is the intent of this Court and the policies we deem to be appropriate.
Where, as here, the subsequent civil action is based upon the same incident or transaction, evidence of a nolo contendere plea in an earlier criminal proceeding is clearly relevant. As the authors of one leading text have explained, "the fact that a defendant has pleaded guilty or nolo contendere is convincing evidence of guilt.” 2 Weinstein & Berger, Evidence, ¶ 410[03], p 410-34.
*439The same authors also state:
The relevancy aspect of the plea is based upon the hypothesis that "If a man pleads (or offers to plead) guilty, he probably believes he has done the acts required to make him guilty; and if he has this belief, he probably did the acts.” The probative force of this line of proof is high despite the fact that the plea may have been due to other reasons . . . such as . . . desire to compromise to avoid the embarrassment of prosecution, or the like. Since a plea of nolo contendere may not be accepted "without first . . . addressing the defendant personally [and] determining that the plea is voluntary . . .” and people who think themselves innocent usually plead not guilty, a plea of nolo also could be found by a juror to have substantial probative force. [Id., p 410-25.]
Exclusionary rules, such as MRE 410, which make relevant evidence inadmissable, should be narrowly drawn and strictly construed so as to apply only when the exclusion of relevant evidence will serve an overriding public interest that transcends "the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth.” Elkins v United States, 364 US 206, 234; 80 S Ct 1437; 4 L Ed 2d 1669 (1960).
A public interest can be identified which provides some justification for the existence of the nolo contendere plea. However, the ranking of that interest on a scale of comparison with the truth-seeking function is probably reflected by the fact, already noted, that the nolo contendere plea was not even recognized in Michigan until 1969.
Apparently, the policy objective which underlies recognition of nolo contendere and this exclusionary rule is the conservation of judicial and prosecutorial resources through the promotion of plea bargaining. As Professor McCormick has noted, *440"Effective criminal law administration in many localities would hardly be possible if a large proportion of the charges were not disposed of by compromise.”9 However, to the extent that plea bargaining is condoned, it is viewed by many, in and out of the legal profession, as a necessary evil that should be carefully limited and scrutinized. Surely, the promotion of plea bargaining is not a public interest so overriding and paramount as to compel a strained construction of this exclusionary rule — a construction which actually aids the criminal defendant if he seeks to profit from his crime.10
The line which should be drawn in this case is not new to the law. Historically, evidence of a criminal conviction, plea-based or otherwise, was inadmissible in a subsequent civil suit. However, a distinction was made between civil proceedings brought against the criminal defendant and those brought by him to take advantage of his criminal act.11 In the latter situation, courts have almost universally admitted evidence of the conviction in *441the civil suit.12 The Virginia Supreme Court reasoned:
To permit a recovery under a policy of fire insurance by one who has been convicted of burning the property insured, would be to disregard the contract, be illogical, would discredit the administration of justice, defy public policy and shock the most unenlightened conscience. To sustain such a judgment would be to encourage and give support to the current thoughtless and carping criticisms of the legal procedure, and to justify the gibe that the administration of the law is the only remaining legalized lottery. [Eagle, Star & British Dominions Ins Co v Heller, 149 Va 82, 111; 140 SE 314, 323 (1927).]
In light of that distinction drawn at common law, it is reasonable to believe that this Court intended to draw a similar line when, in 1978, it adopted MRE 410 and used the words which plainly limit the evidentiary protection given a nolo contendere pleader to "any civil or criminal proceeding against the person who made the plea . . . .”13_
*442When a criminal defendant is allowed to plead nolo contendere, he not only avoids the time and expense of trial, but he avoids making embarrassing admissions in public. In this case, the plea bargain went further: the prosecutor reduced the charge to attempted arson, he agreed to make no comment on the sentence, and he agreed to take no action to revoke Lichen’s license to practice pharmacy.
But, of course, the major concession extended to a person who pleads nolo contendere is protection from use of the plea in a civil proceeding brought against him by others who seek to impose liability for damages arising out of the criminal activity of which he is convicted. The policy justification underlying MRE 410 must be stretched very far to make such protection available to a nolo contendere pleader.
I find no basis in policy or the plain language of MRE 410 to justify the majority’s expansive interpretation which stretches the rule much further and turns it into an offensive weapon in the hands of one who has been convicted of a serious crime.14
Riley, C.J., concurred with Griffin, J. Boyle, J., concurred only in the result reáched by Griffin, J._MCL 750.73; MSA 28.268.
At Lichon’s preliminary examination, two alleged co-conspirators testified. One of them, Dennis Poindexter, testified that Lichon asked him to find someone to burn the store. According to Poindexter, Lichon paid him $1,500 for the first, unsuccessful attempt, and then another $1,500 for the second attempt which resulted in total destruction of the store. Poindexter recounted that, after the first attempt, Lichon told him to " 'go back and burn it down. Burn the whole damn thing down.’ ” Significantly, Poindexter’s testimony also related to Lichon’s purpose to collect on his fire insurance policy:
Q. Did he give you any reason for going back and doing it again?
A. Money.
Q. Okay. Did he just say money or did he say anything else?
A. Just tired of the store. Too much [sic] problems, too much hassle. Losin’ money.
Q. Did he ever discuss with you anything about insurance?
A. Later.
Q. Okay. During that same conversation?
A. Same conversation was that he had lost on just the fire damage on it the second time. He just lost money.
Q. Okay.
A. The third conversation, the whole damn thing goes, he can collect all of his money.
Q. Okay. When he said he could collect all of his money, did he ever discuss insurance money with you?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Do you remember how he discussed that with you? The words that were used?
A. Well, Hundred Thousand Dollars, so, acceptin’ Seventy-Five Grand was a loss to him.
The other alleged co-conspirator, Nolan Pinkston, testified that Poindexter paid him to actually burn the store. Pinkston also said he overheard a conversation between Lichon and Poindexter on the night of the second fire which destroyed the party store:
Q. Okay. What else did you hear Denny Lichon say out at Dennis Poindexter’s house that night?
A. That he wanted to get it burnt on down so he could get the insurance money for the whole thing. He didn’t want the store no more.
In accordance with the court rule then in effect, MCR 6.101(F)(3)(b), Circuit Judge Borchard reviewed the preliminary examination record and determined that a sufficient factual basis existed for a finding that Liehon was guilty of the charged offense.
1969 PA 334.
GCR 1963, 785.7.
A comment provided by Judge Beasley in People v Gonzales, supra, p 322, is not without support. He wrote, "Perhaps, in some situations the cause of justice has been served by the adoption and use of the nolo contendere rule. But many believe that the problems and confusion caused by the nolo contendere plea far exceed and outweigh any benefits.”
As amended, FRE 410 provides:
[E]vidence of the following is not, in any civil or criminal proceeding, admissible against the defendant who made the plea ....
(2) a plea of nolo contendere ....
Ramon v Farm Bureau Ins Co, 184 Mich App 54; 457 NW2d 90 (1990). The Ramon panel’s statement that use of the nolo contendere plea in a proceeding instituted by the convicted arsonist to collect from his insurance company would render use of the plea "meaningless” is clearly wrong. A nolo contendere pleader would still be protected from use of the plea in any criminal or civil proceeding brought against him, e.g., to impose civil liability for damages. Such benefits are hardly "meaningless.”
McCormick, Evidence (3d ed), § 274, p 814.
It seems reasonable to predict that the rule which the majority adopts today will discourage use of nolo contendere plea bargains by prosecutors, and will make it less likely that such pleas will be accepted by trial courts. A trial court is required by MCR 6.302(D)(2Xa) to state on the record "why a plea of nolo contendere is appropriate” before it can be accepted.
Generally, a judgment of conviction is considered to be hearsay when introduced in collateral proceedings, and at early common law, convictions were usually held inadmissible. However, in analyzing exceptions to the hearsay rule, McCormick observes:
There is ... a growing tendency to admit a prior conviction for a serious criminal offense in a subsequent civil action. . . . The tendency is most noticeable when the judgment is offered in a subsequent civil case in which the convicted defendant seeks affirmatively to benefft from his criminal offense, for example, a convicted arsonist sues to recover upon his ffre insurance policy. [McCormick, n 9, supra, § 318, pp 894-895. Emphasis added.]
See Connecticut Fire Ins Co v Ferrara, 277 F2d 388 (CA 8, 1960), and the cases cited therein.
The majority points also to MRE 803(22), which recites that the hearsay rule does not exclude evidence of "a final judgment, entered after a trial or upon a plea of guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo contendere), adjudging a person guilty of a crime . . . .” In construing the hearsay rule, it is reasonable to surmise that the exclusion of nolo contendere-based convictions as hearsay is to be treated in a manner consistent with the construction given to MRE 410. In other words, the purpose underlying MRE 803(22) is enforcement of the exclusionary policy reflected in MRE 410. See 4 Weinstein & Berger, Evidence, ¶ 803(22)[01], p 803-354 (exclusion under FRE 803[22] is consistent with exclusion under FRE 410); and McCormick, n 9 supra, § 318, p 893 (admissibility of nolo contendere pleas under the hearsay exception would negate their inadmissibility in subsequent proceedings). Accordingly, to the extent that evidence of a nolo contendere plea is considered admissible under MRE 410 when a pleader becomes the plaintiff in a subsequent civil suit, there is no sound policy or logic which would require rote exclusion under MRE 803(22).
While recognizing "the force” of the argument "that public policy should prohibit a party from relying on a nolo contendere plea in a case where that party is a plaintiff” (ante, pp 422-423), the majority suggests that our construction could lead to "nonsensical results” in future hypothetical cases that are not before us. (Ante, p 424.) Since the policy is sound and our construction makes sense in this case, it ought to be applied in this case. Concerns about its possible application in future hypothetical cases can, and should, be addressed by this Court by simply amending the rule.