(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. Claims for unfair discriminatory practices under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) must be brought “within 300 days after the occurrence of the practice.” Minn.Stat. § 363.06, subd. 3 (1986). Our Supreme Court has not interpreted the “occurrence of the practice” language in a case in which an employee received notice of termination prior to the actual date of termination.
*150The United States Supreme Court has construed nearly identical language in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. In Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 101 S.Ct. 498, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980), a college professor was denied tenure, but his employment was not terminated until one year later. After his employment was terminated, he filed a claim against his employer under Title VII. The Court interpreted the language of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) that a claim must be filed within one year “after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred." Id. at 257, 101 S.Ct. at 504. It held the statute of limitations began to run when the professor received notice that he was denied tenure. Id. at 259, 101 S.Ct. at 504. The Court stated that “the proper focus is upon the time of the discriminatory acts, not upon the time at which the consequences of the acts become most painful.” Id. at 258, 101 S.Ct. at 504 (quoting Abramson v. University of Hawaii, 594 F.2d 202, 209 (9th Cir.1979) and adding emphasis).
One year later in Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 102 S.Ct. 28, 70 L.Ed.2d 6 (1981), the Court extended the notice rule to an employment discharge case. In Chardon, nontenured school administrators who received unequivocal notice that their employment would be terminated at specified later dates filed a lawsuit against their employer. The Court held the statute of limitations began running when the administrators received notice “that a final decision had been made to terminate their appointments.” Id. at 8, 102 S.Ct. at 29. The rationale underlying the decision was that the decision to terminate the administrators’ employment for allegedly improper reasons was an illegal act. Id. As the majority opinion notes, federal courts have uniformly applied the Ricks and Chardon notice rule in both Title VII and age discrimination claims.
This court applied the notice rule in Biltz v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 363 N.W.2d 94 (Minn.App.1985). Biltz, who was diagnosed as an alcoholic and pronounced unfit for his job, was placed on personal leave pursuant to the terms of his employment contract. In March 1977 his employer denied his request for sick or medical leave. Id. at 96. After being terminated effective February 7,1978, Biltz filed a claim against his employer for violations of the MHRA on July 13, 1978. Id. The Biltz court held the statute of limitations began running when Biltz received notice that his request for sick or medical leave had been denied. Id. at 96-97. Citing Chardon with approval, the court stated:
This case does not present a “continuing violation,” for what Biltz suffered in 1978 was only the consequence of [his employer’s] 1977 decision. The United States Supreme Court held that in Title VII discrimination eases, the applicable limitations period begins to run when the discriminatory act occurs, not when the consequences of the act become painful.
Id.
The Biltz holding conflicts with the holding of another case from this court, Fitzgerald v. Norwest Corp., 382 N.W.2d 290 (Minn.App.1986), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 24, 1986). The Fitzgerald plaintiff, who received notice of discharge two weeks before the effective termination date, filed an age discrimination claim under the MHRA against her former employer. This court held the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the date of her discharge. Id. at 292. To reach its decision, the Fitzgerald court relied on Richardson v. School Board of Independent School District No. 271, 297 Minn. 91, 210 N.W.2d 911 (1973) and Buchholz v. Capp Homes, Inc., 321 N.W.2d 893 (Minn.1982). That reliance is misplaced. Neither the Richardson court nor the Buchholz court interpreted the phrase “occurrence of the practice” in the context of this case. There was no dispute in either case about whether the statute began to run on the date of notice or the date of discharge.
The issue in Richardson was whether a school district’s policy of forcing pregnant teachers to resign at the fifth month of pregnancy was a continuing violation of the MHRA so as to make the statute of limitations inapplicable. Our supreme court concluded that the policy was not a continuing violation and stated that the statute began *151to run when there was no further expectation of continued employment. Richardson, 297 Minn. at 98, 210 N.W.2d at 916. In Buchholz the issues were whether a 1981 amendment to Minn.Stat. § 363.06, subd. 3 was retroactive and whether the amendment eliminated the statute of limitations for certain actions brought under the MHRA. Buchholz, 321 N.W.2d at 894-95.
Because our supreme court has not interpreted the phrase “occurrence of the practice” in the context of this case, I believe the better reasoned and more consistent approach' to this case would be to interpret the statutory language in light of federal decisions interpreting nearly identical language in Title VII. The Minnesota Supreme Court frequently follows federal cases interpreting Title VII when construing provisions of the MHRA. For example, the court recently cited Ricks with approval and followed federal decisions on the issue of whether a discriminatory job classification was a single act or continuing violation. Sigurdson v. Isanti County, 448 N.W.2d 62, 66-68 (Minn.1989). See also Anderson v. Hunter, Keith, Marshall & Co., 417 N.W.2d 619, 626-30 (Minn.1988) (following Title VII law in defining right to recover back pay and attorney’s fees under MHRA); Sigurdson v. Isanti County, 386 N.W.2d 715, 722 (Minn.1986) (adopting Title VII standard for determining meaning of “reasonable attorney’s fees” under Minn. Stat. § 363.14, subd. 3 (1984)).
Policy considerations also support adoption of the Ricks and Chardon notice rule. First, the notice rule protects employers from the burden of defending claims arising from long-past employment practices. Ricks, 449 U.S. at 256-57, 101 S.Ct. at 503-04. Second, in cases in which several employees receive notice of discharge on the same date but the effective date of termination is different for each, the notice rule will allow all employees the same amount of time to file a claim. Third, employers may be discouraged from giving any notice at all if notice extends their potential exposure to lawsuits.
Here, the illegal act was the decision to terminate Turner for allegedly improper reasons in violation of the MHRA. Turner received unequivocal notice of that decision in writing on February 4,1987. He did not commence this action until January 8,1988. I would hold that this action is barred by the 300 day statute of limitations contained in Minn.Stat. § 363.06, subd. 3.
In light of the conflict among decisions from this court, the consistent federal decisions, and the steady run of cases on the issue, I respectfully request our supreme court decide whether unequivocal notice or date of discharge triggers the statute of limitations contained in Minn.Stat. § 363.06, subd. 3. Alternatively, it would be helpful if the legislature clarified the statutory language to explicitly indicate whether “occurrence of the practice” refers to notice or date of discharge.