dissenting.
I dissent from that part of the opinion which holds that the cross-examination of the defendant by the State concerning his prior conviction for giving false information to a police officer requires that the judgment be reversed.
First of all, the defendant, on direct examination, did not correctly identify the crime. It seems to me that the State should be able to correctly identify the misdemeanor of which the defendant had been convicted.
More importantly, it seems to me there was no prejudice to the defendant. The defendant has the burden to prove that the claimed error actually prejudiced him instead of creating the possibility of prejudice. State v. Gore, 212 Neb. 287, 322 N.W.2d 438 (1982). Although the credibility of the defendant was an important issue, there was an abundance of testimony that the jury had to disbelieve before it could find the defendant guilty. Under the circumstances of this case, the conduct of the prosecutor and the trial court’s failure to declare a mistrial did not “materially influence the jury in a verdict adverse to a substantial right of the defendant.” State v. Friend, 230 Neb. 765, 769, 433 N.W.2d 512, 515 (1988). Furthermore, the trial *213court sustained the defendant’s objection to the prosecutor’s improper impeachment and instructed the jury to disregard the prosecutor’s question of whether the defendant lied to a police officer. I would affirm the judgment.