(dissenting). I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that defendant’s unconditional plea of guilty waives the loss of jurisdiction over him occasioned by the prosecution’s failure, without excuse, to bring defendant to trial within 180 days of his arraignment as required under MCL 780.131; MSA 28.969(1).
The responsibility for bringing the case to trial does not rest with the defendant, rather, the burden is on the prosecution to justify any delay beyond the 180-day limit. People v Wolak, 153 Mich App 60, 66; 395 NW2d 240 (1986). Further, the Wolak Court noted:
[jurisdiction is not lost if a defendant does not actually go to trial in 180 days. The statute requires only that "good faith action” on the part of the prosecutor and the court system to commence proceedings be initiated within the time limit. Jurisdiction is lost only if a delay is "inexcusable.” [Id.]
Where the defendant has not contributed to the delay, otherwise unexplained inaction in excess of 180 days is excusable only if caused by "exceptional or unavoidable circumstances.” Id., p 66. Delays caused by chronic docket congestion do not constitute excusable delays. People v Forrest, 72 Mich App 266, 273; 249 NW2d 384 (1976). Furthermore, as noted by the majority, this Court has held in several previous opinions, including Wolak, supra, p 69, that a defendant’s subsequent guilty plea does not waive this issue. See ante, p 652.
In this case, 251 days passed between defendant’s arraignment and entry of his plea. During *660that time it appears from the record that the prosecution filed only one motion, on January 13, 1987, to extend the time for trial, specifying:
That the Prosecuting Attorney has in good faith met with the Defendant’s counsel in an attempt to settle the case.
The motion was heard on January 20, 1987, and the court noticed defendant’s case for trial on February 25, 1987, still within the 180-day limit. Thereafter on March 6,1987, without any explanation in the record, the court renoticed defendant’s trial for May 20, 1987. No explanation is advanced here on appeal by the prosecution for the delay. Consequently, I feel that there is no alternative but to find that the delay beyond the 180-day limit was inexcusable, and, thus, jurisdiction over defendant in this matter was lost by the trial court.
This issue was recently addressed by another panel of this Court in People v Smith, 183 Mich App 537; — NW2d — (1990). In Smith, Judge Griffin in dissent advanced the same position as he does in this case writing for the majority. For the majority in Smith, Judge Sawyer wrote:
As for the view of the dissent that the issue of the violation of the 180-day rule is waived since it affects personal, rather than subject-matter, jurisdiction, we must disagree. Even assuming that our colleague in dissent is correct that this issue involves a question of personal jurisdiction, a conclusion upon which we offer no opinion, we do not believe it affects the analysis. The Supreme Court explained in People v New, 427 Mich 482, 495-496; 398 NW2d 358 (1986), what issues are waived by a guilty plea:
"In summary, in addition to the Reid [People v Reid, 420 Mich 326; 362 NW2d 655 (1984)] condi*661tional plea situation, a criminal defendant may appeal from an unconditional guilty plea or a plea of nolo contendere only where the claim on appeal implicates the very authority of the state to bring the defendant to trial, that is, where the right of the government to prosecute the defendant is challenged. Such rights are never waived by a plea of guilty or nolo contendere. Where the claim sought to be appealed involves only the capacity of the state to prove defendant’s factual guilt, it is waived by a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.” Thus, the question is not, as our dissenting colleague would hold, whether defendant could waive the issue. See post, pp 543-544, 548. Rather, the question is whether the issue goes to the state’s authority to prosecute or to the state’s ability to prove guilt. The 180-day rule involves the former issue, not the latter. Accordingly, it is not waived by a guilty plea. Simply put, the issue is not whether defendant could have waived the issue, but whether he did waive it. In the case at bar, defendant did not. [Smith, pp 541-542, emphasis in original.]
A standard which requires only a good faith effort on the part of the prosecution to justify a delay beyond the 180-day limit is by no means an onerous one. Yet in this case, the prosecution advanced no reason whatsoever for the delay. The majority in Smith reversed and vacated the defendant’s conviction. I would do the same here.