Peaden v. Employment Security Commission

Carr, J.

(concurring). The order of the-circuit court of Ingham county affirming on certiorari the *633decision of the defendant appeal board should be affirmed. That a labor dispute, beginning May 2, 1955, and continuing for a number of weeks thereafter, existed between Calumet & Hecla, Inc., and its employees, including the plaintiffs in this proceeding, is not open to question. The matter at issue is when the unemployment resulting from such dispute ended.

On the 12th of August, 1955, the employees through their union having rejected an offer made by the employer, the company issued a so-called liquidation notice stating, in substance, that it was closing its mines and plants, and liquidating the properties involved in the existing strike. However, negotiations were continued and on August 21, 1955, a new agreement was executed. Thereupon preparations were carried out for the resumption of operations. It appears that by September 10th following such operations reached a stage of normalcy.

On behalf of plaintiffs it was contended before the appeal board that the strike ended August 12th, at the time of the issuance of the notice of intended liquidation. Obviously, however, negotiations were continued thereafter, and resulted in an agreement being reached pursuant to which operations, and employment, were continued. The appeal board, after consideration of the testimony taken on the hearings before the referee, concluded that during the period beginning May 2, 1955, and ending September 10, 1955, plaintiffs were unemployed because of a labor dispute and were, in consequence, disqualified from receiving benefits during such period under-provisions of section 29 of the employment security act,* CLS 1956, § 421.29 (Stat Ann 1957 Cum Supp §17.531).

*634On appeal in the nature of certiorari the decision of the appeal hoard was upheld, the circuit judge saying, in part:

“This court has reviewed the lengthy record in this cause and cannot find that the decision of the appeal board is contrary to the great weight of the evidence or contrary to law. There is no question that for the period between May 2 and August 13, 1955, the claimants were disqualified for benefits because of a labor dispute. On and after August 13, 1955, the labor dispute continued and the dispute ended on August 21, 1955. That nature of the company’s operations are such that they could not put everyone back to work immediately when the dispute ended, but rather it took several weeks to get the mines and various operations back in production. The record discloses that all employees were called back to work after the strike ended as quickly as possible, but some time had to elapse before all normal operations could be started again. The notice of August 12, 1955, that the company was liquidating their business did not change the status that a strike was in progress. The labor dispute did not end until August 21, 1955, and all employees were called back to work as quickly as possible .after that date.”

We are in accord with the conclusions of the circuit judge. The proofs taken in the proceeding clearly supported the factual findings of the appeal board. The application of the statutory provisions relating to disqualification to receive benefits, above cited, required the conclusion reached.

An analogous question was involved in Buzza v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 330 Mich 223. It was there held that plaintiff employees were not entitled to receive unemployment benefits during the period following the ending of the strike and the completion of preparations by the employer to resume normal operations. It may be noted,- also, *635that under section 38 of the employment security act, CLS 1956, § 421.38 (Stat Ann 1957 Cum Supp § 17.540), the Court may not reverse the decision of the appeal board of the employment security commission on a finding of fact unless the decision “is contrary to the great weight of the evidence.” As before indicated, the findings of the board were clearly supported by the evidence taken in the proceeding.

The order of the circuit court of Ingham county is affirmed. Defendant employer is entitled to costs on the appeal to this Court.

Dethmers, C. J., and Kelly, J., concurred with Carr, J.

CL 1948, § 421.1 et seq., as amended (Stat Ann 1950 Rev § 17.501 et seq., as amended).