(dissenting).
I think the trial court should be affirmed. It is obvious from the record that because of the use of waters within its municipal limits for such activities as water skiing, surfboard riding, and the operation of speedboats the village council was faced with a real problem in maintaining the safety and good order of the community. The general-welfare clause, as expressed in M. S. A. 412.221, subd. 32, is intended to empower the village council with authority to meet new conditions as they arise. Since the ordinance in question has application to the use of a limited area of water within the corporate jurisdiction of the village — located in an urban, heavily populated area — it is not unreasonable for the council to legislate with reference to the kind of watercraft used in such area; the places where such craft may be operated, with a view to the rights of others using it for other recreational purposes; and the hours during which water skiing and surfboard riding may be permitted. Where, as here, the village council from knowledge and experience of a particular problem growing out of the character of the community in which it is located has determined that a licensing provision is necessary to accomplish an effective enforcement of an ordinance designed to protect the safety and good order of the community, this court should hesitate to nullify the judgment of the municipal authority. I do not think that the licensing provision is so unreasonable as to justify this court in substituting its own opinion for that of the municipal authority. See, Village of Fairmont v. Meyer, 83 Minn. 456, 460, 86 N. W. 457, 458; State ex rel. Remick v. Clousing, 205 Minn. 296, 299, 285 N. W. 711, 713, 123 *340A. L. R. 465; State v. Morrow, 175 Minn. 386, 221 N. W. 423; Sverkerson v. City of Minneapolis, 204 Minn. 388, 283 N. W. 555, 120 A. L. R. 944; Bybee v. City of Minneapolis, 208 Minn. 55, 292 N. W. 617; State v. The Crabtree Co. 218 Minn. 36, 15 N. W. (2d) 98; City of Duluth v. Cerveny, 218 Minn. 511, 16 N. W. (2d) 779; Annotations, 104 A. L. R. 1342 and 72 A. L. R. 229; People ex rel. Sweitzer v. City of Chicago, 363 Ill. 409, 2 N. E. (2d) 330, 104 A. L. R. 1335; Evans v. City of St. Paul, 211 Minn. 558, 2 N. W. (2d) 35; Opinion Attorney General, No. 273-D-2, April 5, 1956; 13 Dunnell, Dig. (3 ed.) §§ 6683a, 6752, 6755, 6794(4); Nelson v. DeLong, 213 Minn. 425, 7 N. W. (2d) 342; State ex rel. Moriarity v. McMahon, 69 Minn. 265, 72 N. W. 79, 38 L. R. A. 675; M. S. A. 645.16; Bridgeman v. City of Derby, 104 Conn. 1, 132 A. 25, 45 A. L. R. 728; Report Attorney General, 1916, No. 637; In re Wilson, 32 Minn. 145, 148, 19 N. W. 723, 724; State ex rel. Cook v. Bates, 101 Minn. 301, 112 N. W. 67; Gunderson v. Anderson, 190 Minn. 245, 251 N. W. 515; State v. Taubert, 126 Minn. 371, 148 N. W. 281; City of St. Paul v. Clark, 194 Minn. 183, 259 N. W. 824; Lyons v. City of Minneapolis, 241 Minn. 439, 63 N. W. (2d) 585; City of St. Paul v. Dalsin, 245 Minn. 325, 71 N. W. (2d) 855; White v. City of Chatfield, 116 Minn. 371, 377, 133 N. W. 962, 965.
I respectfully dissent.
Thomas J. Gallagher, Justice (dissenting).I concur in the dissent of Mr. Justice Murphy.