For some years the city of Flint has desired to convey to the United States govern*658ment a parcel of city-owned property located in the city of Flint, known as Kearsley Grove, for the purpose of erecting thereon a national guard armory. An attempt by the city in 1955 to accomplish this transfer of the property for the purpose stated and without any remuneration was defeated by taxpayer suit which was ultimately decided by this Court—albeit by a narrow 4-3 margin. Younglas v. City of Flint, 345 Mich 576. The majority opinion there held (p 579):
“The proposed transfer of the city property, without consideration, to the United States government, even though beneficial to the general public, amounts to an appropriation which is not for a city public purpose, an application thereof to public uses not under the control or care of the city, and, hence, void.”
From the bill of complaint filed in the matter currently before this Court, we learn that the city was by no means discouraged in its purpose. We presume the city commission noted the term “without consideration” used above, for the bill of complaint informs us:
“On or about the 27th day of December, 1956, the 9-man Flint city commission, with Commissioner Delling absent, voted 8 to 0 to sell the property known as Kearsley Grove at a private sale without bids, for a reported price of $35,000, to the Committee of Sponsors of the Flint Cultural Development, and on or about the same day, the mayor and clerk signed a deed, purporting to convey said property in the style and manner above related.”
The bill of complaint likewise alleges city ownership of the land and its operation as a public park since 1920, and the plaintiff’s interest as a neighboring property owner who relied upon the park’s *659existence. It also alleges that the city paid over $50,000 for the land, that it has a fair market value in excess of $100,000, and that the sale was actually a gift. The suit sought a decree holding the conveyance void as violative of Younglas, supra, and restraining the city from any further acts seeking to convey Kearsley Grove.
Defendants moved to dismiss the hill of complaint, claiming principally that the court did not have jurisdiction since the grantees of the deed (more particularly the ultimate grantee, the United States government) were not joined as parties. Attached to the motion was an affidavit attesting execution of 2 deeds, copies of which were also attached as exhibits.
One of these deeds, dated December 27, 1956, was from the city of Flint and purported to convey Kearsley Grove to the Committee of Sponsors for the Flint College and Cultural Development, Inc., for the sum of $35,000. It described the purpose of the transaction as being that of permitting the committee to convey to the United States government, with a reversion to the city of Flint in the event the United States government ceased for a period of 3 years to use same “for training of reserve components of the armed forces.” The second deed was dated the same day and purported to run from the Committee of Sponsors to the United States of America for the purposes and on the conditions just described. Both deeds showed the recording stamps of the Genesee county register of deeds of December 28, 1956.
¥e have examined with care plaintiff’s answer to the motion to dismiss and can only conclude that in effect it admits the authenticity of these 2 exhibits for purposes of the motion to dismiss although denying the legal effect claimed for them and, on the *660contrary, claiming that the deeds are null and void on constitutional grounds.
The chancellor who heard the motion denied it, holding the court had jurisdiction. Thereupon defendant city of Flint filed an application for leave to appeal which was granted by this Court September 4, 1957.
Prior to submission of the appeal to this Court, the attorney general of Michigan intervened on behalf of the people of the State (CL 1948, § 14.28 [Stat Ann 1952 Rev §3.181]), to advance the following argument:
“That the donation of land by the city of Flint in the Younglas Case and thereafter the sale of the same land to a corporation for a substantial consideration, which corporation in turn conveyed it to the United States, did not violate article 10, § 12, of the Constitution (1908), inasmuch as the United States government is not ‘any person, association, or corporation, public or private.’ ”
The attorney general’s brief disclosed concern pertaining to “the legality of a large number of transactions in which the various departments of the State, particularly the conservation department, under legislative authorization made numerous conveyances of State-owned property and gave long-term leases to the United States of America for no monetary consideration in furtherance of the national defense.” Subsequently appellant city of Flint, by supplemental brief, expressed agreement with the brief of the intervenor attorney general.
It is plain that what appellant and the intervenor now seek is the overruling of this Court’s holding in Younglas, supra, as it applies to the current fact situation. Although this question was not presented to the chancellor below (who obviously had no power to decide it), we feel the current appeal cannot *661properly be disposed of without passing upon the issue thus posed by the intervenor attorney general.
For purposes of ultimate disposition of defendants’ motion to dismiss, we accept plaintiff’s well-pleaded facts. Dodge v. Blood, 299 Mich 364; Society of Good Neighbors v. Mayor of Detroit, 324 Mich 22. Among these are: (1) that the city of Flint acquired the site in question for $50,000 in 1920; (2) that it has a present market value of over $100,000; (3) that the consideration for the deed is $35,000; and (4) that the difference represents a gift without consideration even though made for the purposes and on the conditions recited in the deeds.
The 2 constitutional provisions which Younglas, supra, held to bar the gift of this site to the United States were article 8, § 25, which reads, in part :
“No city or village shall have power * * * to loan its credit, nor to assess, levy or collect any tax or assessment for other than a public purpose,”
and article 10, § 12, which reads:
“The credit of the State shall not be granted to, nor in aid of any person, association or corporation, public or private.”
Four members of the Court, in an opinion by the Chief Justice, held the transfer without consideration to be void because not “for a city public purpose;” and, by implication, held the United States government to be a public corporation within the meaning of article 10, § 12, Const (1908).
Three members of the Court concurred in a view expressed in an opinion by Mr. Justice Black, holding the contrary on both issues. In holding that the proposed conveyance was for a public purpose within the meaning of article 8, § 25, the minority opinion relied upon language from 37 Am Jur, Municipal Corporations, § 120, pp 734, 735, previously-*662quoted by this Court in Hays v. City of Kalamazoo) 316 Mich 443, pp 453, 454 (169 ALR 1218):
“A public use changes with changing conditions of society, new appliances in the sciences, and other changes brought about by an increase in population and by new modes of transportation and communication. The courts as a rule have attempted no judicial definition of a public as distinguished from a private purpose, but have left each case to be determined by its own peculiar circumstances. * * * The modern trend of decision is to expand and liberally construe the term ‘public use’ in considering State and municipal activities sought to be brought within its meaning. The test of public use is not based upon the function or capacity in which or by which the use is furnished. The right of the public to receive and enjoy the benefit of the use determines whether the use is public or private.”
The views on this topic have been recently and carefully considered by this Court in the 2 opinions in Younglas. What has changed is not the reasoning of the members of the Court, but the composition of the Court itself. Younglas was decided too recently and by too close a margin to carry great weight under the doctrine of stare decisis. The majority of this Court, as presently constituted, feels that the modern and authoritative view on the constitutional questions presented is that of the minority opinion in Younglas which we hereby adopt and incorporate by reference.
The United States government and the city of Flint are not strang’ers to each other in the matter of national defense. We take judicial notice of the heightened mutuality of obligation in this field at the present point in history.
Briefly, we hold that the furnishing of a site for the training of the young men of Flint in reserve components of the armed forces of the United States *663is a lawful public purpose for tbe expenditure of funds of tbe city of Flint. Opinion of the Justices, 297 Mass 567 (8 NE2d 753); Hodgdon v. City of Haverhill, 193 Mass 406 (79 NE 830).
See, also, Stanley v. Schwalby, 162 US 255 (16 S Ct 754, 40 L ed 960); Vrooman v. City of St. Louis, 337 Mo 933 (88 SW2d 189); Hayes v. City of Kalamazoo, supra; Brozowski v. City of Detroit, 351 Mich 10.
We also hold that this transaction does not violate article 10, § 12, of the Michigan Constitution (1908). No use of credit is involved. City of Blytheville v. Parks, 221 Ark 734 (255 SW2d 962). Nor is the United States government customarily regarded as a “public corporation” in this constitutional sense. McNichols v. City and County of Denver, 101 Colo 316 (74 P2d 99).
See, also, Malone v. Peay, 159 Tenn 321 (17 SW2d 901); Vrooman v. City of St. Louis, supra; 15 Mc-Quillin, Municipal Corporations (3d ed), § 39.30. The contrary views expressed in the majority opinion in Younglas, supra, are overruled.
We note that the bill of complaint does not allege that the site is required under the master plan of the city of Flint (see CLS 1956, § 117.5, subd (e) [Stat Ann 1957 Cum Supp §5.2084, subd (e)]), although plaintiff’s brief before the court below concedes that there is such a master plan. See Brozowski v. City of Detroit, supra, 14.
Finally, since we cannot find from the well-pleaded allegations of the bill of complaint that plaintiff had any vested rights in the maintenance of this site in city ownership or in its operation as a park, no due process question is presented.
On the facts as stated and conceded in plaintiff’s pleadings and the legal conclusions contained in this opinion, there is a showing of legal title to this property in the United States government. The *664motion, to dismiss should be granted. Stanley v. Schwalby, supra. Cf., United States v. Lee, 106 US 196 (1 S Ct 240, 27 L ed 171).
Our decision in Peoples Savings Banlc v. Stoddard, 351 Mich 342, did not alter the long-standing rule that on motion to dismiss the Court may consider all well-pleaded facts in plaintiff’s bill of complaint plus any facts stipulated to or conceded by the pleadings of the parties for purposes of said motion. Our decision herein is founded upon the well-pleaded facts in plaintiff’s bill of complaint plus the deeds referred to, authenticity (though not validity) of which we view as conceded.
Reversed and remanded for entry of order as indicated in this opinion. No costs, public questions being involved.
Smith, Black, and Voelker, JJ., concurred with Edwards, J.