(dissenting).
I am in disagreement with the result reached by the majority and the reasoning by which it is achieved, therefore dissent.
I. In holding the letter from Lee County Treasurer to taxpayer constituted a statutorily sufficient “demand”, the majority cites and relies in large part, if not entirely, on Bell v. Stevens, 116 Iowa 451, 90 N.W. 87. That case involved the use of an original notice to fulfill the statutory prerequisite that demand for payment of moneys and credits taxes claimed owing be made thirty days before legal action is commenced to enforce payment. I find no reason to disagree with the holding in Bell v. Stevens, supra, but respectfully submit it accords no support to the position adopted by the majority.
In the cited case, an original action to secure payment of moneys and credits tax was filed and attendant original notice served by the sheriff on defendant-taxpayers. By that original notice plaintiff-treasurer claimed $3,487 was owing by defendants, based on fraudulent concealment and withholding from assessment of certain moneys and credits in a specified amount. Presumably, because the statutory prerequisite demand could not be established that case was abandoned. Subsequently a new action was started. Trial court then sustained a demurrer to the second petition filed, for lack of “demand”. On appeal this court reversed holding the first original notice constituted an adequate prefatory demand. In so doing we said, loc. cit., 116 Iowa 456, loc. cit., 90 N.W. 89: “The service of an original notice instituting an action for a money judgment is a demand of payment in the highest sense of the word.”
Furthermore, rule 50, Rules of Civil Procedure, provides: “The original notice shall be directed to the defendant, and signed by plaintiff or his attorney with the signer’s address. * * * It shall notify defendant to appear before said court within the specified number of days after service * * * and that unless he so appears, his default will be entered and judgment or decree rendered against him for the relief demanded in the petition. A copy of the petition may be attached; but if it is not or if the service is by publication, the notice shall contain a general statement of the cause or causes of action and the relief demanded, and, if for money, the drnotmt thereof.” (Emphasis supplied).
And as we said in Parkhurst v. White, 254 Iowa 477, 480-481, 118 N.W.2d 47, 49: “The requirements of rule 50 which we have emphasized are mandatory. Their apparent intent and purpose is to fully inform the defendant of the nature of the action taken against him and the relief demanded, including the amount if money damages are claimed. These rules have the force and effect of statutes. Summerlott v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 253 Iowa 121, 126, 111 N.W.2d 251, 253, 93 A.L.R.2d 371; Halverson v. Hageman, 249 Iowa 1381, 1388, 92 N.W.2d 569, 574.
“There can be little question as to what is required in the notice. The words used are abundantly clear. Among other things, the defendants are to be advised as to the amount of money claimed by plaintiff by way of damages.” (Emphasis supplied).
*921I submit the foregoing discloses no rational basis upon which plaintiff-treasurer’s letter in the case at bar can be equated with the original notice in Bell v. Stevens, supra.
In fact, as I view the Bell case, it more nearly supports this dissent than the reaching majority opinion.
II. The question here before us is not whether the “polite, courteous and informative” letter from plaintiff-treasurer to defendant’s decedent is a demand in the “highest sense of that word”. Rather, it is whether that communication was sufficient to meet the most minimal demand requirements of the law.
Dealing with the statutes here involved this court said in Laubersheimer v. Huiskamp, Iowa, 152 N.W.2d 625, 627: “The treasurer’s authority to add omitted property to the tax assessment rolls and to bring a suit for nonpayment is found in sections 443.12 and 443.13. ‘This proceeding is purely statutory and unless there was at least a substantial compliance with the terms of the statute, the action cannot be maintained for the plain reason that without statutory authority no suit at law will lie to recover taxes on omitted property.’ Judy v. National State Bank, 133 Iowa 252, 258, 110 N.W. 605.” (Emphasis supplied).
To the extent here relevant Code section 443.12 provides the county treasurer shall demand payment of taxes on omitted property not previously listed and taxed. That demand is to be made within five years of the time the assessment should have been made. And, if payment is not forthcoming within thirty days thereafter the treasurer is to bring an action to recoyer any additional tax owing and demanded.
The principle as stated in Laubersheimer v. Huiskamp, quoted supra, requires that we give it recognition and precedential value.
But the majority refuses to accord such recognition and summarily casts aside the foregoing statement of principle by merely finding, “ * * * those cases are not authority for the issue before us.” I submit Laubersheimer, supra, recites a rule of controlling influence.
In order to resolve the issue at hand certain well settled rules of statutory construction must be considered.
The only legitimate purpose of statutory construction and interpretation is to ascertain legislative intent which must be deduced from the language of the statute. Rule 344(f) (13), R.C.P.; Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Nicholas, 258 Iowa 115, 120-121, 137 N.W.2d 900; and Jones v. Thompson, 240 Iowa 1024, 1036, 38 N.W.2d 672.
Ordinarily the legislature uses words in statutes in the same sense usually given them by the courts. Farmers Drainage District v. Monona-Harrison Drainage District, 246 Iowa 285, 289, 67 N.W.2d 445 and Anderson v. Jester, 206 Iowa 452, 221 N.W. 354.
Additionally Code section 4.1(2) provides : “Words and phrases shall be construed according to the context and the approved usage of the language; but technical words and phrases, and such others as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law, shall be construed according to such meaning.”
Since section 443.12 does not define “demand” or set forth the form and content thereof, we must resort to the ordinary meaning given that term by the judiciary.
As stated in 26A C.J.S. Demand page 169: “ * * * the word ‘demand’ is defined as meaning * * * the assertion of a right to recover a sum of money; * * * a request to pay, * * * a request addressed to a person that he will do some act which he is legally bound to do, after the request has been made; * * * a thing or amount claimed to be due * * (Emphasis supplied). See also Harwood v. Dysart Consolidated School District, 237 Iowa 133, 138, 21 N.W.2d 334; Peterson v. Rodgers, 51 Ariz. 502, 78 P.2d 480, 482; Smith v. Municipal Court of Glendale Ju*922dicial Dist., 167 Cal.App.2d 534, 334 P.2d 931, 934; and State ex rel. Patterson v. Warren, 254 Miss. 293, 180 So.2d 293, 298, 182 So.2d 234.
The majority says, “The word ‘demand’ has been used so frequently that almost any application sought for may be found.” This may be true. But we are here required to seek only that meaning intended by the legislature. And, as stated in rule 344(f) (13), R.C.P.: “In construing statutes the courts search for the legislative intent as shown by what the legislature said, rather than what it should or might have said.”
Mindful of the foregoing, the statutory enactment here involved reveals the legislature intended an action for recovery of moneys and credits taxes cannot properly be instituted until expiration of a thirty day period after demand for payment. This means the demand prescribed by law is a necessary condition precedent to any legal action. See Bell v. Stevens, 116 Iowa 451, 456, 90 N.W. 87, and Van Emmerik v. Vuille, 249 Iowa 911, 913-914, 88 N.W.2d 47.
Although, as aforesaid, the form of such demand is not prescribed by statute, its self-evident purpose is to inform a taxpayer of the specific claim made, specifying the amount owing, with a demand for payment thereof, plus interest, and advise as to possibility of legal action if the amount due be not paid within thirty days. Bell v. Stevens, supra, at 116 Iowa 454, 90 N.W. 87. See also in this regard Sherman B. Ruth, Inc. v. O. S. V. The Marie and Winifred, D.C., 150 F.Supp. 630, 632, and Duffey v. Cross, Tex.Civ.App., 175 S.W.2d 637, 641-642.
Trial court, when confronted with the demand issue, relied on Judy v. National State Bank, 133 Iowa 252, 110 N.W. 605; Bennett v. Finkbine Lumber Co., 199 Iowa 1085, 198 N.W. 1; and Buser v. Kriechbaum, 229 Iowa 888, 295 N.W. 455, and found, in effect, the letter was nothing more than a mere notification of assessment, not a demand for payment of any tax and interest claimed to be then owing.
The cited cases, referred to by trial court, while not dealing specifically with the matter of demand form, do set forth the content of the payment request to be made. There, in each instance, the taxpayer was specifically advised as to the amount of taxes due, and payment thereof plus interest demanded, with notice that failure to pay within thirty days would result in an action to secure payment.
Furthermore, in Kehe v. Blackhawk County, 125 Iowa 549, 101 N.W. 281, this court dealt with an action for recovery of taxes on moneys and credits alleged to have been erroneously assessed and paid. There, taxpayers argued a notice from the county treasurer which stated, in effect, they owed certain taxes and as by law provided an assessment would be accordingly listed on the tax records, unless they appeared and showed cause why such should not be done, constituted a “demand". We there said, loc. cit., 125 Iowa 554 — 555, loc. cit., 101 N.W. 283: “ * * * the notice in the case at bar did not demand anything. It simply said that, unless plaintiff and his wife appeared and showed cause why the property should not be assessed, it would be listed and assessed, and taxes extended, as by law provided. This notice was not, as we have already said, an assessment of the property, nor was it a demand.” (Emphasis supplied).
On the basis of the foregoing, the word “demand”, as employed in Code section 443.12, can mean nothing less than an unqualified request for payment of a specific sum owing. See Bell v. Stevens, supra, loc. cit., 116 Iowa 454, 90 N.W. 87.
But the letter from plaintiff to taxpayer, quoted by the majority, states only, (1) plaintiff was ordered by State Tax Commission to place the included assessment of omitted moneys and credits on the tax lists ; (2) the tax amount did not include penalty; and (3) a meeting with a state tax field man could be arranged if desired.
*923It is thus apparent plaintiff did not in any manner or means demand payment of any tax owing, nor did she say failure to pay within thirty days would result in commencement of legal action.
Briefly stated, the basic intent and purpose of the statutorily required demand procedure is here lacking. The letter under consideration was nothing more than a notification to the effect an assessment had been made and if taxpayer so desired a discussion of the matter could be arranged. This falls far short of the demand required by law.
III. In reversing, the majority states at the outset: “This is an action at law * * for the collection of moneys and credits tax on previously untaxed securities.” Then in Division II appears this statement: “The only question before us is the sufficiency of the treasurer’s demand. Everything else appears.”
These statements are contrary to trial court’s finding, infra, and appear to stem from an assumption without benefit of any apparent support, either factual or legal.
I submit everything else did not appear to trial court when it found: “Absent proof of the specific corporate securities returned by defendant to the Assessor in 1959, except as to the aggregate value thereof, the Court finds plaintiff has not sustained the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the assessment entered against defendant on July 15, 1960 was on property withheld, overlooked or from any other cause not listed and assessed within the meaning of Sec. 443.-12.”
Based on the foregoing, plaintiff-treasurer here asserts, as her second assigned error, trial court erred in holding there was no proof the assessment was on omitted property rather than a revaluation of property for which return had been made. See in this regard Laubersheimer v. Huiskamp, Iowa, 152 N.W.2d 625, 626, and Langhout v. First National Bank, 191 Iowa 957, 960-962, 183 N.W. 506.
In view of the fact I agree with trial court it is not for me to discuss the merits of the above allegation in this dissent. But to reverse, as does the majority on the demand issue, seems to require some consideration be given to trial court’s finding as to whether the property taxed was withheld, overlooked, or not previously listed and assessed, as required by Code section 443.12.
I would affirm.
MOORE, J., joins in this dissent.