On Rehearing
FOURNET, Chief Justice.We granted a rehearing in this case on the application of plaintiffs-appellants, limited however to the question of quantum that they are entitled to recover for a certain number of trees cut and removed from their property by the defendants-appellees in violation of the contract between the parties and converted into pulpwood which was sold and delivered to the International *414Paper Company at the rate of $12.50 per cord.1
When the case was originally before us we concluded, as did the trial judge, that defendants were in moral as well as legal bad faith. Following the well-established jurisprudence of this court in such cases we allowed the plaintiffs the value of the timber converted into pulpwood without deduction or allowance for costs and expenses.2
Plaintiffs’ application for rehearing prays that our judgment be amended (1) by increasing the award to an amount equal to the manufactured value of the young trees into lap pulp without deducting the cost of manufacture or (2) in the alternative by increasing the award of damages to an amount equal to the value of the young trees taken at their first stage of maturity as lumber without deducting the cost of manufacture, or (3) in the further alternative by increasing the award of damages to the value of the young trees figured at the first stage of maturity as sawlogs, delivered at the mill without deducting the cost of cutting and delivery.
In support of the first contention, that is, that the award of damages for the conversion of the timber in moral bad faith should not be the price for which the defendants sold it to International Paper Company but rather its value after being converted into pulpboard or lap pulp, plaintiffs rely on cases where the trespasser in moral bad faith converted the timber so appropriated into lumber, cross-ties, staves, or the like, with the exception of the case of Havard v. Luttrell, 68 So.2d 798, a Court of Appeals case, in which the point is not made clear whether the timber was sold to a third party, as in the case at bar, or was actually converted into lumber by the trespasser himself. Consequently these cases are not controlling here.
Counsel for plaintiffs in brief and orally on rehearing strenuously argued that damages should not be limited to the amount received by the trespasser for property taken in moral and legal bad faith, contending *416that such a limitation allows the business ability of the trespasser to become the criterion for damage assessment. He calls to our attention that this rule was laid down more than half a century ago, when the logger and the sawmill owner were one and the same but he points out that modern day specialization separates the logger from the sawmill owner; consequently the law should evolve with the times and in such cases the award should be the same, i. e. the value of the timber manufactured into lumber. Otherwise the owner of standing timber is subject to the will of an unscrupulous trespasser.
What counsel has overlooked is that, unless specifically provided for, under our system of law exemplary damages are not allowed. The rationale for the rule allowing an. award equal to the manufactured or • converted value of the property tortiously talcen,. without reimbursement to the trespasser or wrongdoer for expenses incurred in the manufacture or conversion, stems from the right of the owner to recover his'property which has been illegally taken from him in whatever altered form it may have taken.
It may be well to point out that there is no intimation that the property was not sold for its fair market value in the case at bar and if, as suggested by counsel, there should be any unscrupulous manipulations to the disadvantage of the owner, the court, upon proper showing made, would readily make proper allowances.
The two alternative contentions of plaintiff are based on counsel’s theory that inasmuch as the Constitution of the State of Louisiana declares that “Timber, other than virgin timber, shall be recognized as a growing crop,” 3 the measure of damages for the wrongful and wilful cutting of young and yet unmatured trees should be computed and determined as damages tO' other crops.
It is to be noted that the provision of the Constitution relied on by appellants deals with Revenue and Taxation and paragraph 5 is entitled: “Severance tax on timber.” Read in context the designation of timber as a growing crop is readily recognizable as a connotation for tax purposes only, i. e. “on trees and timber severed from the soil or water.” There is no declared nor implied intention that this section shall change *418the long-established rule of law evolved by the jurisprudence for determining the amount of damages to be awarded for the wrongful conversion of growing timber.
While we recognize that in this day and time, because of the influx into this state of manufactories and other enterprises using forest products, extensive areas which were formerly planted to cotton, corn and other crops, are now being converted to the growing of pine timber we are unable to adopt counsel’s theory without doing violence to the canons and rules by which courts are bound in fixing damages. “We can only rest our judgment ‘ * on the basis of certainty, and not on mere conjecture and speculation.’” Ferguson v. Britt, 191 La. 371, 185 So. 287, 288, and cases therein cited. We feel that it is in the province of the legislature and not of the courts to designate young trees as a growing crop if it so desires, and such legislation, if adopted for the purpose of granting redress for damages for the wrongful conversion or damage to such crops, would necessarily set up some standard by which to determine future value.
Until some yardstick has been adopted whereby the courts can measure such damages with consistency and fairness we must continue to use the established methods.
For the reasons assigned our original decree is re-instated and made the final judgment of' this court. 1 '
. Plaintiffs-appellants sold to defendantsappellees all the merchantable timber on a certain tract of land with the restriction that the purchaser “shall not cut any pine smaller than 10 inches in diameter, 12 inches from the ground or any hardwood timber less than 12 inches in diameter, 12 inches from the ground.” Violation of this restriction, after notice, gave rise to this suit by the landowners against defendants for damages for the unlawful cutting and removal of undersized timber.
. Bolles Wooden Ware Co. v. United States, 100 U.S. 432, 1 S.Ct. 398, 27 L. Ed. 230; Guarantee Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. E. C. Drew Inv. Co. et al., 107 La. 251, 31 So. 736; St. Paul v. Louisiana Cypress Lumber Co., 116 La. 585, 40 So. 906; State v. F. B. Williams Cypress Co., 131 La. 62, 58 So. 1033; State v. Jefferson Island Salt Mining Co., 183 La. 304, 163 So. 145; Kennedy v. Perry Timber Co., 219 La. 264, 52 So. 2d 847; Coignet et al. v. Louisiana Cypress Lumber Co., Ltd., 177 La. 1023, 150 So. 6; Allen v. Frank Janes Co., Ltd., 142 La. 1056, 78 So. 115.
. Louisiana Constitution, Art. 10, Sec. 1, paragraph 5: “Timber,' other tlian virgin timber, shall be recognized, as a growing crop. A severance tax on trees and timber severed from the soil or water is .hereby levied at the rate of 214% On, .all forms'of timber except pulpwo.od, and 5%' for pulpvs;ood, of the then current average stumpage market value of such timber, to be determined annually on the second Monday of January by the Louisiana Forestry Commission and the Louisiana Tax Commission, such tax to bo collected in accordance with the laws for the collection of severance taxes on natural resources, existing at the time of collection.”