State v. Flores

NETTESHEIM, P.J.

(dissenting). I disagree with the majority's conclusion that appellate counsel need not obtain court approval to terminate representation of a *283client prior to filing a postconviction motion, notice of appeal or no merit report. I conclude that Flores received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel when counsel terminated her representation of Flores without the approval of the court. Thus, I would reverse the judgment outright and reinstate Flores' right to pursue his postconviction relief.

The majority correctly begins its analysis by observing that the Notice of Intent to Pursue Postconviction Relief is a statutorily recognized filing which sets in motion the machinery and time limits relative to the postconviction/appellate process. See Rule 809.30, Stats. Majority op. at 281. The majority, however, goes on to discount the importance of this notice as it bears upon the issue before us for two reasons: (1) "the notice is not filed with the court of appeals"; and (2) the trial court is "done with the case." Majority op. at 281 (emphasis omitted).

I conclude that Flores' filing of the notice of intent with the clerk of the circuit court commenced the post-conviction process in this case. When the public defender appointed appellate counsel to represent Flores in response to the notice of intent, such counsel became counsel of record and, therefore, was required to obtain the approval of the court before terminating her representation of Flores. I offer the following history and reasoning in support.

The Judicial Council notes to the original Rules of Appellate Procedure recited that ”[t]he term 'postconviction relief,' as used in this Rule [809.30], includes new trial, reduction of sentence, and any other type of relief which the trial court is authorized to give, other them under s. 974.06.” Judicial Council Committee Note, 1978, Rule 809.30, Stats. Notably, "postconviction relief" under this rale did not include an appeal.

*284However, shortly after the adoption of the new Rules of Appellate Procedure and even before their implementation, the Criminal Appeals Subcommittee of the Judicial Council began to examine whether Rule 809.30, Stats., should be "tightened" to reduce the time period between conviction and institution of the appellate process in order to assure that trial counsel meaningfully explored the right and option of appeal with the defendant, and to promote a smoother transition from trial counsel to appellate counsel. See Minutes of the Criminal Appeals Subcommittee (Dec. 8, 1983). The subcommittee's minutes indicate that this inquiry was prompted by the State Public Defender's Office which sought to expedite and clarify the procedure for initiating the postconviction process:

It seemed to Mr. Vetzner [former chief of State Public Defender's Office, Appellate Division] that the initiation of the appellate process could proceed much more expeditiously and smoothly if the defendant were required to notify the court of his interest in pursuing an appeal and having counsel appointed. [Emphasis added.]

In response, the subcommittee proposed Rule 809.30, Stats., in substantially its present form to the General Projects Committee of the Judicial Council. The proposal introduced the concept of a filing by the defendant with the trial court which advised of a wish for representation in seeking postconviction relief. The subcommittee indicated that the proposed Rule would reduce the time for initiating the appellate process:

Basically, the draft reduces from 45 to 10 or 20 days after sentencing the time for initiating the appellate process.

*285Letter from subcommittee reporter James Fullin to the Judicial Council's General Projects Committee (Jan. 13, 1984).

The General Projects Committee then forwarded the proposal to the Judicial Council. The April 13 and June 22, 1984 Judicial Council minutes reveal that the council saw the filing of the notice of intent as initiating the appellate process:

The committee has reached an agreement that the time period should be shortened and that the initiation of the appeal should be through a document filed in court rather than through out-of-court contact with the court reporters or the Public Defender's office.

Minutes of the Meeting of the Judicial Council (Apr. 13, 1984) (emphasis added).

[University of Wisconsin Law School] Prof. [Frank] Remington says that if we expect trial counsel to counsel the defendant about initiating an appeal, we should probably shorten the deadline to something like 10 days, as is the federal rule.
Mr. Phelps asked how this discussion bore on the question of the 10 days for initiating the appellate process.
Justice Abrahamson said she assumed the committee had not considered the conditional plea option because it was concerned primarily with the procedure and timing for initiating the appellate process.
Judge Williams asked whether failure to comply with the 10-day time limit for initiating the appellate process would foreclose the defendant from bringing in an appeal.
*286The short time deadline in today's proposal will only exacerbate that problem. Even extending the time period to 20 days would be helpful in this regard. That will allow at least a little more time for calm reflection on whether to invoke the appellate procedure.

Minutes of the Meeting of the Judicial Council (June 22, 1984) (emphasis added).

Finally, when the supreme court adopted the Judicial Council's proposed Rule 809.30, Stats., the court recited in its adopting order that the proposed amendment pertained to "Rules of Appellate Procedure and statutes governing criminal procedure concerning the initiation of postconviction proceedings." Supreme Ct. Order, 123 Wis. 2d xi (1985) (emphasis added).1

Before the implementation of the Rules of Appellate Procedure in 1978, the supreme court alluded to the problems presented in many criminal cases by the lengthy hiatus between the judgment of conviction and the commencement of an appeal. Whitmore v. State, 56 Wis. 2d 706, 718, 203 N.W.2d 56, 63 (1973). In its original form, Rule 809.30, Stats., reduced this time by giving the defendant forty-five days in which to ask the public defender for postconviction representation. However, the history recounted above reveals that the purpose of the present Rule 809.30 was to further narrow this space to the present twenty days within which the defendant or counsel must file the notice of intent. And, as already *287noted, this history also reveals that the filing of the notice of intent commences the appellate process.2 Rule 809.30(1)(a). Indeed, a defendant seeking such relief in a felony case must file such notice of intent. Rule 809.30(2); see also sec. 973.18(5), Stats.

In this case, following his conviction, Flores filed a Notice of Intent to Pursue Postconviction Relief pursuant to Rule 809.30(2) (b), Stats., and requested the appointment of counsel pursuant to subsec. (b)5 of the Rule. Pursuant to sec. 977.08, Stats., and Wis. Adm. Code sec. SPD 2.03, the public defender's office appointed counsel for Flores. Thus, Flores commenced a postconviction proceeding and counsel of record was appointed to represent Flores. However, when appointed counsel terminated her representation of Flores, she failed to obtain the approval of the court.

Where a judicial , proceeding is commenced and counsel is of record, such counsel may not withdraw without the permission of the court. See Dressler v. Racine County Court, 163 Wis. 2d 622, 632, 472 N.W.2d 532, 536-37 (Ct. App. 1991); see also Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). In my opinion, this important principle governs this case and requires reversal and reinstatement of Flores' right to pursue the postconviction relief denied by the circuit court.

The majority contends, however, that the courts have no business monitoring appointed counsel's abandonment of an appeal because the notice of intent is not *288filed with the court of appeals. Here the majority seems to be saying that because there is no filing with us, we have no case upon which we can act.

This is not so. The notice of intent is, in fact, filed with the clerk of circuit court.3 The majority seems to envision the trial court and the court of appeals as separate, unrelated entities in the postconviction process. I disagree. I see the filing of the notice of intent as triggering a postconviction process which can involve both levels of courts and requiring each to perform in its assigned area of responsibility when called upon to act.

In many cases in which a convicted defendant has filed a notice of intent, the court of appeals routinely makes rulings on motions which are filed before a post-conviction motion, notice of appeal or no merit report is filed. Examples include motions seeking extensions of the various time limits set out in Rule 809.30, Stats., including the extensions of time within which to file a postconviction motion or notice of appeal; motions for bail pending appeal; motions to compel the production of delinquent transcripts; motions by defendants to discharge counsel of record and to seek newly appointed counsel; and motions for approval of substitution of counsel of record. The trial court also has authority to act in the case during this period of time.4 See, e.g., sec. 808.075(2), and Rules 809.30(2)(d), (e) and 809.31, Stats.

*289Although the practice of attorneys in the public defender's office may be different, I especially note that among the motions routinely filed with the court of appeals during this period are requests by counsel of record for leave to withdraw from the representation of a defendant. I assume that such is no longer necessary under the majority opinion.5

I assume the majority does not view the absence of the filing of the notice of intent with this court as a bar to our ruling on the host of motions which daily confront this court. Yet, the majority uses the absence of this filing to preclude us from monitoring counsel's critical decision to terminate representation of the defendant. In Anders, the United States Supreme Court ruled that a court-appointed appellate counsel must obtain the permission of the appellate court to withdraw where counsel has concluded that the defendant's cause is wholly frivolous. Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. Why is the same not so where an appeal may very well be meritorious?6

Under present practice, many counsel of record apply to us for leave to withdraw before ceasing representation of a client following the filing of the notice of intent. Such applications usually contemplate the continuance of the appeal either with successor counsel or with the defendant proceeding pro se. Sometimes, however, such an application contemplates an abandonment *290of the appeal. Regardless, before we rule on such a request, we assure that the defendant is aware of such an application, understands the consequences and, most importantly, is given an opportunity to respond. I fail to understand why such minimal effort on counsel's and the court's part is not required where the consequence to the defendant is the loss of the constitutional right to appeal. Whether viewed from the standpoint of legal requirements, good policy or sound case management, the majority decision is unwise.

To accommodate my concerns, I do not argue for a formal waiver from the defendant of the right to appeal. I simply argue for application of the well-established principle that the attorney of record must obtain the approval of the court before representation of the client in a pending judicial proceeding may cease.

If counsel and the defendant agree that the appeal is not to be pursued, all counsel need do is advise the court that counsel will take no further action in the matter and ask to be relieved of representation. The defendant should be notified of this application and allowed reasonable opportunity to respond or object. If the defendant objects, counsel remains obligated to represent the defendant or to file a no merit report. If the defendant does not object, the court may enter an order allowing counsel to withdraw.7

I do not pretend that such a process will eliminate future claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Such is not the primary objective of the process. *291Rather, the goal is to allow the court to exercise its responsibility to assure that the departure of counsel from the postconviction proceedings is with the knowledge and consent of the defendant and the approval of the court. At the same time, however, the defendant's failure to object to counsel's request likely will constitute strong evidence against any future claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue postconviction relief.

The majority of appointed postconviction counsel (be they from the staff of the public defender's office or counsel appointed from the ranks of the private bar) properly perform their duties. However, we must recognize that such is not always the case. Occasionally, we see cases where postconviction counsel may not pursue the representation of the defendant with the requisite zeal.8 Other times, counsel and the defendant may legitimately misunderstand each other — counsel believing that the defendant does not wish to pursue the postconviction process and the defendant believing just the opposite.

Regardless of which particular scenario is played out, the right to appeal is lost. In such a setting, the majority opinion places the burden on the defendant via the ineffective assistance of counsel route to regain that right. See State v. Moats, 156 Wis. 2d 74, 100-01, 457 N.W.2d 299, 311 (1990). The case law documents that such a claim almost invariably turns on a credibility assessment of the lawyer versus the ex-client. The same *292case law reveals, again nearly invariably, who loses that battle.

The court has the right and the duty to assure that the defendant knows that counsel is abandoning the postconviction process. In addition, the court is entitled and required to approve or disapprove such a decision. If this procedure is followed, I suggest that a collateral benefit will be fewer claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and a more confident resolution of those that are asserted. The majority opinion shuts down this process. I respectfully dissent.

Even under the prior Rule 809.30, Stats., where the concepts of postconviction motion and an appeal were not categorized under the single label of postconviction relief, the supreme court held that an appeal was commenced by the defendant's writing to the public defender's office asking for representation and informing the trial court of that fact. State v. Firkus, 119 Wis. 2d 154, 165-66, 350 N.W.2d 82, 88 (1984).

The Rules of Appellate Procedure governing criminal appeals and civil appeals also require the notice of appeal to be filed with the clerk of circuit court. See Rules 809.30(2) (h) and 809.10(l)(a), Stats., respectively. Surely the majority would not argue that the situs of these filings would preclude us from addressing the appeal.

Thus, I disagree with the majority's statement that "the trial court is done with the case." Majority op. at 281.

I assume the same is true with respect to requests by defendants to discharge counsel of record and to seek new counsel; likewise with substitutions of counsel.

I see no basis for a different rule based upon whether counsel is privately retained or appointed. I read the law to require that, in either setting, court approval of an attorney's request to withdraw is required. The only distinction drawn by Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), is that appointed counsel must file a no merit report in support of the withdrawal request.

It may be that the request for leave to withdraw is more properly directed to the trial court during this period of time. Section 808.075(2), Stats., provides that "[i]n a case appealed under s. 809.30, the circuit court retains the power to act on all issues until the notice of appeal has been filed with the clerk of the trial court."

I do not suggest that postconviction counsel did not zealously represent Flores in this case. Past experience with counsel reveals a highly competent defender. I simply contend that counsel should have obtained the approval of the court before terminating her representation of Flores.