(concurring specialty)-
Although I agree with the result reached by the majority, I am concerned with language in the majority opinion that could be interpreted as undermining the preeminence of the intention test that we most recently recognized in In re Tax Appeal of Logan and Assocs., 331 N.W.2d 281 (S.D.1983). Since an agreement entered into by the party making the annexation is relevant in determining the intention of that party, the statement in the majority opinion that “[w]e opt to look at the objective circumstances and not the subjective agreement of the parties,” should not be taken literally to mean that an agreement between parties is to be given no credence in determining the nature of the property. See, Logan, supra.
We must consider all the circumstances of a particular case. First Nat’l Bank of Aberdeen v. Jacobs, 273 N.W.2d 743 (S.D.1978). The parties to this action entered into a stipulation of facts which discloses that the structures vary in diameter from fourteen to thirty-one feet and in height from twenty-two to ninety feet, and that they may weigh as much as five tons. The silos are installed on a concrete slab that is approximately one foot larger than the unit which is installed. The parties also stipulated that the head of the Department’s property tax program would testify that the silos are treated as real property for property tax purposes, and appellant concedes that the contractor’s excise tax is applicable to situations in which the silos are sold directly to the customer.
In addition to the lease agreement’s reference to the silo as personal property, the silo is financed as personal property under *831the Uniform Commercial Code. In a similar case, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that the fact that a silo is financed under the Uniform Commercial Code is not controlling for purposes of taxation. Wisconsin Dep’t of Revenue v. A.O. Smith Harvestore, 72 Wis.2d 60, 240 N.W.2d 357 (1976). The Smith Harvestore opinion states that “it can be said as a matter of law that the average farmer, when purchasing a Harvestore [silo], intends to make a permanent accession.” 240 N.W.2d at 361.
An additional fact that distinguishes this case from Logan, supra, is the relationship of the parties vis-a-vis the realty upon which the silo was placed. In Logan, the property was placed by a tenant upon leased realty. Here, the silo was erected upon land owned by the lessee of the silo. As the Wisconsin Court stated in the Harvestore case, supra:
Finally, it must be conceded that respondent relies heavily upon cases and authorities that refer to trade fixtures, or to relations between landlords and tenants. This court has pointed out the fallacy of carrying over fixtures cases in one classification to another classification, where the status and relations of the parties are different. Such a warning is especially appropriate in this case. Where a tenant installs fixtures, there is a presumption that they are temporary and that he intends to remove them at the end of the lease period. In fact, the appellant here concedes that it does not regard as fixtures those relatively few Harvestores sold to tenant farmers. The rule is different, however, when an owner purchases a structure, and has it erected on realty which he owns. In such a case there must be a marked tendency to regard the annexed property as realty, as long as the other criteria are satisfied.
240 N.W.2d at 363 (footnotes omitted).
This is not to say, of course, that the silos in question would not be classified as real property improvements if they were placed upon leased or mortgaged property. In those situations, according to the stipulation of facts, the landowner-lessor or mortgagee is required to sign severance agreements or waivers of any interest in the silos. See SDCL 43-33-2.
After considering all the circumstances of this case, I cannot say that the South Dakota Department of Revenue was clearly erroneous in its determination.