(dissenting).
The majority makes two leaps. For the first time we adopt the so-called firemans’ rule. And the rule is applied against a police officer in a dram shop case. I have reservations about the first leap and respectfully disagree with the second.
I. It seems to me that there is considerable force in the criticism (cited by the majority) of the rule. I have no disagreement with the obvious fact that fire fighters or police officers, in responding to a call for assistance, are no ordinary invitees. They volunteer for hazardous undertakings as a matter of career choice.
On the other hand, I think this obvious fact is already well accommodated as a part of fundamental tort law. I see no need for establishing a special rule of no liability in claims by fire fighters or police officers.
II. If a firemans’ rule is to be adopted it should not apply here. The dram shop statutes provide a statutory right of recovery. We have said that “[d]ram shop statutes impose strict liability .... ” Williams v. Klemesrud, 197 N.W.2d 614, 617, 64 A.L.R.3d 843, 846 Iowa (1972). The statute accords this right of recovery to “[ejvery ... person who shall be injured in person or property _” Iowa Code § 123.92 (1983).
I think it is inappropriate to create an exception to the statute by adopting a common law rule. I think the trial court correctly overruled the dram shop operator’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. .
I would affirm.
McCORMICK and LARSON, JJ., join this dissent.