(dissenting in part, concurring in part).
I cannot agree that plaintiff Lynne Cy-byske does not have a cause of action for marital status discrimination under the Minnesota Human Rights Act. To so hold is to significantly narrow the broad construction we gave “marital status” discrimination in Kraft, Inc. v. State, 284 N.W.2d 386 (Minn.1979). We recognized in Kraft that “[b]y including marital status within the parameters of the Human Rights Act, the legislature clearly intended to outlaw arbitrary classifications relating to marriage.” 284 N.W.2d at 388. We found further that, in acknowledging the fundamental nature of the marriage relationship in the Act, the legislature intended that an employer may differentiate on the basis of marital status only where a business necessity is compelling and overriding. Id. If, as we determined in Kraft, mere business convenience is an insufficient basis for differentiation, certainly bias against the “pro-teacher” views of one’s spouse would be so.
The question is not, as the majority opinion suggests, “whether the ‘political status’ of one’s spouse is protected under our Human Rights Act.” The question is whether plaintiff teacher can be denied employment under that act because of the identity and situation of the man to whom she is married. The New York Court of Appeals chose to interpret marital status narrowly under the New York Human Rights Law by holding that marital status discrimination means only the status of being married, single, separated, divorced or widowed and does not look beyond the individual’s conjugal state to embrace the identity or situation of the individual’s spouse. In re Manhattan Pizza Hut, Inc. v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Board, 51 N.Y.2d 506, 511, 415 N.E.2d 950, 952, 434 N.Y.S.2d 961, 963 (1980). Thus, State Division of Human Rights ex rel. Howarth v. Village of Spencerport, 78 A.D.2d 50, 434 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1980), relied on by respondents, is irrelevant to our decision here.
In interpreting our own Human Rights Act, we rejected the view that “marital status” does not embrace the identity or situation of one’s spouse. Kraft, 284 N.W.2d at 388. The four part-time employee plaintiffs in Kraft were denied full-time employment with that company not just because they were married but precisely because of who their husbands were, in that case, full-time employees of Kraft. We held this to be employment discrimination on the basis of marital status under the Human Rights Act. If, as plaintiff in this case alleges, she was denied employment as a teacher by defendant school district precisely because of who her husband was, a “pro-teacher” school board member in a neighboring district, this constitutes, under Kraft, employment discrimination on the basis of marital status. Nowhere in Kraft did we limit our holding to anti-nepotism employment policies. We upheld rather the broad prohibition of the Act against arbitrary classification.
We have consistently held that the remedial nature of the Minnesota Human Rights Act requires liberal construction of its terms. See, e.g., City of Minneapolis v. State by Wilson, 310 N.W.2d 485 (Minn.1981) (holding “race” discrimination included discrimination for association with per*265sons of another race); Continental Can Co. v. State, 297 N.W.2d 241 (Minn.1980) (holding “sex” discrimination included employer inaction in face of sexually derogatory statements and verbal sexual advances directed at one employee by fellow employees); City of Minneapolis v. Richardson, 307 Minn. 80, 239 N.W.2d 197 (1976) (term “discriminate” as used in Human Rights Act means distinction in treatment of individuals based upon irrelevant or impermissible factors). Our continued adherence to a broad construction of “marital status” under the Act is not only required by Kraft but also furthers the Act’s objective of encouraging all employers to base employment decisions on the merits of the individual applicant. This construction does not unnecessarily burden employers. An employer may legitimately establish certain requirements for its employees, “bona fide occupational qualifications,” where those requirements are inherently required by the nature of the business. Minn.Stat. § 363.03, subd. 1 (1982).
The plaintiff here has stated a cause of action for marital status discrimination under the Minnesota Human Rights Act as well as for violation of her constitutional rights. I would reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand for trial on both claims.