(dissenting).
An assistant attorney general, the hearing officer herein, placed the burden of proof upon the grievant to establish that he was wrongfully discharged. In effect, the warden of the South Dakota State Penitentiary was acting as the employer and discharged his employee, a correctional officer, and the burden of proof rests upon the employer to justify the dismissal and to prove up the reasons for the discharge. Hartpence v. Youth Forestry Camp, 325 N.W.2d 292 (S.D.1982). Therefore, for this reason alone, ordinarily, a reversal for a new de novo hearing where the proper burden of proof is utilized would be in order. However, it appears from the record that notwithstanding this statement by the hearing officer, the burden of proof was assumed by the Career Service Commission which offered its case and went forward with the evidence and testimony as to the reasons for the termination of griev-ant. Grievant was required to refute the *891justification for termination and did so, through himself and other witnesses. Thus, although the wrong burden of proof was expressed, the correct burden of proof was employed.
The majority opinion would reverse, in effect, Warden Solem, the State Penitentiary Disciplinary Board, the hearing officer, the South Dakota Board of Charities and Corrections, the Career Service Commission, and the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, Minnehaha County, South Dakota, upon the basis that the grievant was ostensibly discharged under an isolated wrong standard of conduct. As I read the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Career Service Commission, they are clearly supported by evidence that disciplinary action was taken against this correctional officer for a good cause. The circuit court entered a memorandum decision on August 3, 1983, and an order on August 11, 1983, sustaining the termination of the grievant by virtue of having considered all of the evidence and testimony in the record of the proceedings.
Having reviewed the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered upon sworn testimony and exhibits by the Career Service Commission, I could not hold that the decision of the Career Service Commission was clearly erroneous, arbitrary or capricious; nor could I hold that said decision was characterized by an abusive or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion or an error in law.
There is no doubt that the grievant, as a Correctional Officer II, was a career service employee. His position required that he maintain order in the penitentiary, supervise and transport prisoners incarcerated in the penitentiary, and to take orders from and maintain a proper attitude toward his superior officers and fellow correctional officers. After each of the incidents as set forth in the majority opinion, the grievant was confronted by his supervisors who explained both the severity and potential ramifications (to include discharge) of such type of off-duty conduct. This is supported by the record. On each occasion, it appears that the grievant took exception to the official reports of the incidents. No sorrow or regret was manifested. The transcript bears out that there was some type of counseling between the grievant and his immediate supervisor, Officer Ha-gen. This was characterized by Officer Hagen as “directive counseling” and that he and the grievant had “an understanding — I felt there was a definite understanding that incidents like this are unacceptable behavior.” With reference to the “hit and run accident” on July 3, 1980, counseling took place between Officer Ha-gen and grievant as the vehicle which was struck belonged to a fellow officer, Sergeant Berg. Grievant told Officer Hagen that he “was going to take care of it.” A May 19, 1982 report on grievant relates that it was on July 30, 1980, that the griev-ant left the scene of an accident and abandoned his vehicle. In addition to the hit and run accident, it was apparently discovered that grievant had illegally changed the license plates from another vehicle. According to this report, the grievant made no effort to pay his fellow officer for damages to his vehicle and a judgment was obtained against grievant in December of 1980 for over $500, but as of May 19, 1982, no payments were made upon the judgment. Grievant, according to his brief, now says that he paid off this judgment in full “after he was terminated from his employment.” It was after the May 3, 1982 incident that a disciplinary hearing was held on May 18, 1982, and at this time grievant’s entire record was reviewed and four fellow officers, constituting the State Penitentiary Disciplinary Board, decided that grievant could no longer be retained and he was so informed.
SDCL 3-6A-38.1 provides, among other things, that “the career service commission shall determine and decide whether the discharge, suspension, or demotion was made for good cause.” (Emphasis supplied.) Note that it does not say “just cause” as reflected by ARSD 55:01:12:05. Said statute goes on to state: “If the commission finds that the discharge, suspension, or demotion was made for good cause, it shall enter an order upholding the decision of the appointing authority discharging, sus*892pending, or demoting the employee.” (Emphasis supplied.) The South Dakota Career Service Commission formally decided that the discharge was for “good cause.” One of the important Findings of Fact, number 7, expressed:
Grievant O’Neill was well informed and advised by his superiors that his refusal to alter, modify or change his pattern of behavior, performance and conduct, both on and off the job, would put his position in jeopardy and that he was well advised and informed of that fact prior to the incident of May 3, 1982, which was the cumulative act that led to his termination. (Emphasis supplied mine.)
The special concurrence concerns itself with uniform treatment in futuro, apparently triggered by a new setting created via the majority’s position. Finding of Fact number 8 provides:
Grievant O’Neill was disciplined consistently with other correctional officers who were employed by the South Dakota State Penitentiary prior to the time of his employment. The Penitentiary staff was not guilty of any discriminatory act in its treatment and discipline of Grievant O’Neill, in that the action taken by the administrative staff was consistent with action applied and administered to other correctional officers for like or similar violations of conduct and failure to perform the standards and accepted conditions of employment of the South Dakota State Penitentiary.
Thus, there can be no doubt, unless this Court puts on a fact-finding suit, that grievant O’Neill was not beset upon for idle.or biased reasons. He was disciplined and terminated for “good cause” because he did not measure up to the conditions of employment as a correctional officer. Conclusion of Law number 3 reflects that O’Neill undertook “a course of conduct which is contrary to that prescribed by'the rules and regulations of the South Dakota State Penitentiary and as required by law officers under the laws of the State of South Dakota.” This Court, as well as the trial court, “shall give great weight to the findings made and inferences drawn by an agency on questions of fact.” SDCL 1-26-36. “A ruling or decision of an administrative agency is upheld unless the decision is clearly erroneous in light of its entire record .... ” Application of Leo ⅛ Bus Serv., Inc., 342 N.W.2d 228, 230 (S.D.1984). See also, Application of Southern Hills Bank of Edgemont, 339 N.W.2d 310 (S.D.1983); Matter of Ackersoi-, Karlen & Schmitt, 335 N.W.2d 342 (S.D.1983).
In Appeal of Miller, 283 N.W.2d 241 (S.D.1979), we admonished that the Personnel Service Board should not interfere with managerial decisions entrusted to those in positions of responsibility who must insure that employees of a department should perform their duties with skill and competence and that citizens of this state are entitled to expect professional skill and competence. We expressed:
We cannot believe that the legislature intended that the Career Services Act be interpreted and administered in a manner that would have the effect of immunizing employees covered by the provisions of the Act from good faith managerial decisions, based upon good cause, designed to promote the efficient operation of the executive branch of state government.
Miller, 283 N.W.2d at 243. Specifically, this grievant occupied a position to correct inmates and to take orders from his superiors. Yet, in the City of Sioux Falls, he set about violating the local ordinances on numerous occasions to the detriment not only of the citizenry at large but one of his fellow officers. The warden is not only responsible for the inmates but the officers who correct the inmates. Necessarily, the warden must require the type of conduct and standard of behavior, both on and off duty, for the efficient and effective administration of the South Dakota State Penitentiary. This warden, and all governmental subdivisions thereafter, acted pursuant to law in exercising their statutory duties to administer the law fairly. The grievant violated directions given to him by his supervisor under ARSD 55:01:12:05(5). Whether denominated a “just cause” or “good cause” under SDCL 3-6A-38.1, the Commission properly upheld the decision of *893the State Penitentiary Disciplinary Board and its warden in discharging the grievant. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.