dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. While I would hold that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment to Hamby, Shaver, and McSpedden, I would hold that there is a material fact issue as to whether the releases which Jeanes gave Hamby and Shaver were valid. I would further hold that res judicata barred Jeanes’ cause of action for conspiracy to defraud. However, I agree with the majority’s disposition of Je-anes’ contention regarding post-judgment j interest.
i I believe an additional rendition of the facts is in order. I shall attempt to succinctly set them out in the chronological order of the pleadings that led to this appeal.
1. January 1975. Jeanes loans $150,000 to Gar-Dal Inc. and the loan is guaranteed by Hamby, Shaver, McSpedden, Hunt, and Jones. Additionally Jones indemnifies Hamby, Shaver, and McSpedden for any loss or judgment.
2. February 1977. Gar-Dal Inc. defaults and Jeanes re- Cause #75-5721-D covers judgment against Hamby, Shaver, McSpedden, Hunt, and Jones. Hamby, Shaver, and McSpedden recover a judgment of indemnity against Jones.
3. September 1977. Jeanes files suit garnishing the judg- Cause #77-9732-C ment debt of Jones to Hamby, Shaver, and McSpedden.
*7014. Spring 1978. Jeanes files suit to establish lien on Jones’ interest in a joint venture. Cause #78-2019-E
5. December 1978. Hamby, Shaver, and McSpedden intervene, alleging that, when Jeanes garnished their judgment against Jones, the debt of Hamby, Shaver, and Mc-Spedden was merged into the garnishment judgment and was thereby canceled. Cause #78-2019-E
6. July 1979. Hamby and Shaver pay Jeanes $100,000 for a release.
7. August 1979. Jones pays Jeanes $75,000 for a release from the judgment in Cause #75-5721-D.
8. November 1979. The intervention of Hamby, Shaver, and McSpedden is severed and re-docketed #80-523-E.
9. July 1980. Jeanes files counterclaim alleging that the releases given him by Hamby and Shaver are not valid. Cause #80-523-E
10. December 1982. Hamby, Shaver, and McSpedden file amended petition seeking damages for fraud and breach of contract against Jeanes. They also seek a summary judgment that Jeanes’ declaratory judgment action be denied. Cause #80-523-E
11. February 1983. Jeanes files fourth amended petition seeking declaratory judgment that releases given by Hamby and Shaver are invalid and seeking damages for fraud and conspiracy. Cause #80-523-E
12. February 1983. Judgment is entered declaring that the releases signed by Hamby and Shaver are valid and denying all other relief. Cause #80-523-E
In his first point of error, Jeanes contends that the court erred in declaring the releases from Jeanes to be valid because either they were not supported by consideration as a matter of law, or the summary-judgment evidence was insufficient to establish consideration as a matter of law. The majority holds that there was no consideration for these releases as a matter of law. It says that the debts of Hamby and Shaver were liquidated and undisputed, and thus, consideration did not exist for payment by them of a lesser amount. Industrial Life Insurance Co. v. Finley, 382 S.W.2d 100, 104 (Tex.1964); Blaylock v. Akin, 619 S.W.2d 207 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The majority says that, although Hamby and Shaver have argued that the debt was unliqui-dated, it was, in fact, liquidated. Hamby and Shaver do not argue that it was unliq-uidated, but rather than it was disputed. Hamby and Shaver argue that consideration for the releases existed due to their claims (1) that the judgment debt was merged as a result of the garnishment actions by Jeanes; (2) that no sum or credit had been given to the garnishment judgment; (3) that there was pending litigation initiated by both parties at the time of the settlement; and (4) that part of the litigation pending was a claim that Jeanes had conspired to defraud appellees by attempting to settle a judgment that they had against a third party without their knowledge. Thus, there was a good faith dispute between the parties as to what amount, if any, Hamby and Shaver owed Jeanes.
*702Contrary to the majority’s assertion, the releases do mention consideration in addition to the non-monetary consideration mentioned above. The release states in pertinent part:
NOW, THEREFORE, IN CONSIDERATION of the payment of One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00), by Ham-by and Shaver to Jeanes, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged by Jeanes, Je-anes does here and now forever release any claims of any nature whatsoever, known or unknown held by Jeanes or any of his assigns, against Hamby and Shaver.
Contrary to the majority’s assertion, the parol evidence rule does not bar admission of a contemporaneous agreement, collateral to an integrated agreement, which is not inconsistent with nor varies or contradicts the express or implied terms or obligations thereof. Hubacek v. Ennis State Bank, 159 Tex. 166, 317 S.W.2d 30, 32 (1958). Here, the evidence of the non-monetary consideration is not inconsistent with and does not contradict the terms of the releases. This evidence only explained the circumstances surrounding execution of the releases, and the “claims” to which the releases refer. Texas Utilities Fuel Co. v. First National Bank in Dallas, 615 S.W.2d 309, 312 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1981, no writ). I would hold there is a fact question as to whether the amount owed to Jeanes by Hamby and Shaver was disputed.
Moreover, a bona fide dispute may be predicated upon a question of law; here, the question of law was whether the judgment debt of Hamby and Shaver to Jeanes was merged into Jeanes’ garnishment suit against Jones resulting in Hamby and Shaver losing their indemnity judgment against Jones. Although Hamby and Shaver may have been wrong in their beliefs, it is not important that later they may be shown to be in error. General American Life Insurance Co. v. Valley Feed Mills, 458 S.W.2d 860 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1970, writ ref’d n.r.e.). The issue is whether they were honest in them. Loggins v. Stewart, 218 S.W.2d 1011, 1015 (Tex.Civ. App. — El Paso 1949, writ ref’d). That issue raises a fact question precluding summary judgment.
In his second and third points of error, Jeanes contends that the court erred in granting summary judgment to appellees because the releases were invalid. Jeanes argues that evidence exists that they were obtained from him under economic duress; that they were adhesion contracts; and that they were obtained by illegal means and in furtherance of an unlawful conspiracy. Jeanes further argues that the conspiracy to defraud claim was not barred by appellees’ affirmative defenses. These arguments are without merit.
Releases obtained by duress are voidable. Mitchell v. C.C. Sanitation Co., 430 S.W.2d 933, 936 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1968, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Economic duress may be claimed only when the party against whom it was claimed was responsible for the claimant’s financial distress. First Texas Savings Association of Dallas v. Dicker Center, Inc., 631 S.W.2d 179, 185-86 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1982, no writ). In my opinion, there is no evidence that appellees were responsible for the stress of Jeanes’ financial condition which made it unprofitable for him to pursue further legal procedures, as Jeanes argues. It is interesting to note that, after the release was signed, Jeanes did find the • money to litigate the validity of that document. Thus, any claim as to economic duress is without basis in fact in this record.
As to adhesion, Jeanes did not raise any fact issue as to Hamby and Shaver being in an unfairly superior bargaining position nor did Jeanes raise a fact issue as to the releases being unconscionable. Fluor Western, Inc. v. G & H Offshore Towing Co., 447 F.2d 35, 39 (5th Cir.1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 922, 92 S.Ct. 959, 30 L.Ed.2d 793 (1972). Accordingly, any claim as to an adhesion contract is without basis in fact in this record.
Finally, I would hold that Jeanes’ claim as to conspiracy to defraud is barred by res judicata. I would hold that res judicata *703barred any claims arising from actions occurring before February 22, 1977, (the time that Jeanes obtained judgment from appel-lees). Thus, I need not reach any of Je-anes’ arguments regarding appellees’ other affirmative defenses (statute of limitations and estoppel by judgment). In analyzing this affirmative defense, it would be judicious to ask the question: Is the prosecution of the present cause of action offensive to the policy considerations underlying the doctrine of res judicata? In Gilbert v. Fireside Enterprises, Inc., 611 S.W.2d 869, 877 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1980, no writ), we stated those considerations: promotion of judicial economy; prevention of vexatious litigation; prevention of double recovery; and promotion of the stability of decisions. The majority admits that “Jeanes’ cause of action for fraudulent conspiracy arose from the same events which gave rise to his original suit against appellees for payment on the note.” Judgment in the first suit precludes a second action by the parties “not only on matters actually litigated, but also on causes of action or defenses which arise out of the same subject matter and which might have been litigated in the first suit.” Texas Water Rights Commission v. Crow Iron Works, 582 S.W.2d 768, 771-72 (Tex.1979) (emphasis added). Thus, the fraudulent conspiracy claim should have been considered and litigated in the prior suit. Jeanes had his day in court. He now seeks another judgment for essentially the same damages. To allow this suit would threaten stability of decisions. Thus, I would hold that any claim as to fraudulent conspiracy is barred by res judicata.
I agree that post-judgment interest on the original judgment should not be granted. My discussion of these points disposes of the case. In their cross-point, appellees have requested that we only reverse the judgment as to their cause of action for breach of the releases if we reverse the summary judgment granted in their favor. Because I would reverse the summary judgment as to the validity of the releases, I do not consider the breach question discussed by appellees. It also raises fact issues to be determined by the trier of fact.
I would reverse and remand the judgment of the trial court on the issue as to the validity of the releases and render judgment in favor of Hamby, Shaver, and McSpedden on their affirmative defense of res judicata.